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The dominant definition and framework for the analysis
of corruption – which then informs or misleads the ways
to address corruption -- is much too narrow a definition
and itself a construct of the systemic abuse of economic
power as it presents itself today in the world. Ours is a
global justice perspective and our objective is to place
corruption in the contemporary context of corporate
globalization. We wish to reach important constituencies
outraged about corruption and help channel that
understanding into a broader movement that tackles
corruption at the root and structural level, and not simply
in a few corporate-friendly limited expressions.
We view corruption as a process facilitated by institutions
and economic interests, and not simply single acts
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mind, we articulate a broader and more contemporary
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victims in particular, account for many of the daily
economic injustices suffered.
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I. Introduction
The	pictures	and	table	below	show	heads	of	government	and	the	
amount	of	funds	they	are	estimated	to	have	embezzled	over	the	
last	three	decades.1	
Head of Government Estimated Funds  Allegedly Embezzled
Mohamed Suharto 
President of Indonesia, 1967-98
US$ 15 to 35 billion
Ferdinand Marcos 
President of Philippines, 1972-86
US$ 5 to 10 billion
Mobutu Sese Seko,  
President of Zaire, 1965-97
US$ 5 billion 
Sani Abacha  
President of Nigeria, 1993-98
US$ 2 to 5 billion 
Slobodan Milosevic 
President of Serbia/Yugoslavia, 1989-
2000
US$ 1 billion
Jean-Claude Duvalier 
President of Haiti, 1971-86
US$ 300 to 800 million
Alberto Fujimori 
President of Peru, 1990-2000
US$ 600 million
What’s	 wrong	 with	 this	 picture?	 	We	 have	 no	 quarrel	 with	 the	
selection	of	the	scoundrels—money	stolen	having	a	smaller	value	
than	 the	 lives	 of	 the	 thousands	murdered	 under	 their	 regimes.	
The	report’s	compiler,	Transparency	International,	is	the	premiere	
international	 nongovernmental	 network	 working	 against	
 Compiled by Transparency International, Global Corruption Report,
   http://www.transparency.org/publications/gcr/download_gcr/ 
   download_gcr_2004
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corruption,	 although	 its	mandate	 is	not	 limited	 to	 the	South,	or	
to	 accusing	 individuals.	 	The	problem	 is	 not	 the	 authorship	but	
the	 mainstream	 anti-corruption	 perspective	 it	 represents.	 	 The	
selection	raises	some	of	the	fundamental	questions	that	are	the	
subject	of	this	work:	
•	 Why	do	all	those	selected	come	from	outside	the	North?	
Are	no	such	crimes	committed	in	the	North?	
•	 Why	only	 individuals?	 	Are	we	 to	 infer	 that	corporations	
and	institutions	are	above	malfeasance?
•	 Why	is	the	nation	state	taken	as	the	unit	of	analysis?		Are	
the	 North-dominated	 international	 financial	 and	 trade	
regimes	free	of	corruption?
•	 Why	is	corruption	so	associated	with	the	public	sector?		Is	
the	private	sector	so	pristine	that	it	merits	no	scrutiny?	
One	need	not	become	head	of	state	 in	a	developing	country	to	
engage	in	grand	corruption.		Or	does	this	have	something	to	do	
with	the	way	corruption	 is	defined?	 	The	dominant	definition	of	
corruption—which	then	informs	the	ways	to	address	corruption—
is	the	abuse	of	public	power	for	private	gain.		This,	in	our	view,	is	
much	too	narrow	a	definition	and	entirely	inadequate	to	address	
the	abuse	of	power	as	it	presents	itself	today	in	the	world.		This,	of	
course,	is	not	to	deny	the	seriousness	of	public	sector	corruption,	
but	 the	 selectivity	 is	 troublesome.	 	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	
definition	provided	by	most	dictionaries	also	presents	analytical	
problems,	namely	being	too	broad:	impairment	of	integrity,	virtue	
or	moral	principle:	depravity.2		The	same	is	true	with	the	definition	
offered	by	Wikipedia—Corruption	is	a	general	concept	describing	
any	organised,	interdependent	system	in	which	part	of	the	system	
is	 either	 not	 performing	 duties	 it	was	 originally	 intended	 to,	 or	
performing	 them	 in	 an	 improper	 way,	 to	 the	 detriment	 of	 the	
system’s	original	purpose.		According	to	Wikepedia,	specific	types	
of	corruption	include	political	corruption	(corruption	of	a	political	
system	 where	 public	 officials	 seek	 illegitimate	 personal	 gain	
through	 actions	 such	 as	 bribery,	 extortion,	 cronyism,	 nepotism,	
2 Webster’s Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary.
patronage,	 graft	 and	 embezzlement),	 police	 corruption,	 data	
corruption,	 language	corruption	of	Metroid	Prime	3:	Corruption,	
the	third	video	game	in	the	Metroid	Prime	series	for	the	Nintendo	
Wii.		
The	problem	of	how	to	define	and	address	corruption	is	not	new.	
Stiaan	 van	 der	 Merwe,	 the	 founding	 Chief	 Executive	 Officer	 of	
Transparency	 South	 Africa,	 explains	 how	“the	 word	 ‘corruption’,	
as	 explained	 in	 a	 dictionary,	 can	 be	 used	 to	 refer	 to	 anything	
unethical	 or	 for	 whatever	 is	 wrong	 in	 the	 world.	 	 However,	 for	
strategic	 purposes,	 legislation	 and	 procedures	 in	 organisations,	
some	parameters	of	or	 limitation	in	meaning	need	to	be	agreed	
to.	 	 If	 everything	bad	constitutes	 corruption,	 the	word	becomes	
meaningless	for	all	practical	purposes	and	we	could	face	a	situation	
in	which	nothing	is	eventually	done	about	it.”3
We	 could	 of	 course	 throw	 out	 the	 word	 corruption	 and	 call	 a	
spade	a	spade:	exploitation,	larceny,	crime,	etc.		But	ours	is	a	global	
justice	perspective	and	our	objective	is	to	place	corruption	in	the	
contemporary	 context	 of	 corporate	 globalisation.	 	 We	 wish	 to	
reach	 important	 constituencies	 outraged	 about	 corruption	 and	
help	channel	 that	energy	 into	a	broader	movement	that	 tackles	
corruption	at	the	root	and	structural	level,	and	not	simply	in	a	few	
limited	expressions.	 	 	We	view	corruption	as	a	process	facilitated	
by	institutions	and	social	groupings,	and	not	simply	single	acts	by	
single	individuals.		With	this	in	mind,	we	articulate	a	broader	and	
more	 contemporary	 understanding	 of	 corruption	 that	 can	 help	
people,	victims	in	particular,	account	for	many	of	the	daily	economic	
injustices	suffered.		People’s	understandings	and	experiences	must	
form	part	of	the	analytical	framework	of	corruption,	independent	
of	how	the	dictionary,	the	law	and	publicity-loving	pundits	view	
corruption.		
Our	intention	has	been	not	to	take	the	wind	out	of	the	present	anti-
corruption	movement	and	consciousness	but	to	invite	it	to	review	
its	course	and	destination.	 	This	entails	an	effort	 to	broaden	the	
consensus	on	the	understanding	of	corruption	and	how	to	fight	
 Stiaan van der Merwe, Combat Corruption Collectively, Mobilizing South  
   African Civil Society on Corruption, governance and Ethics, (Transparency  
   South Africa, Pretoria: 200), p. 8.  Much of the theoretical discussion presented 
   here draws on this important study.
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against	it	in	a	more	holistic	manner.		There	is	no	single	blueprint,	
but	 in	all	 cases	 its	 strategies	can	be	 linked	 to	broader	 struggles	
to	create	new	spaces	for	democratic	discussion	and	new	forms	of	
decision-making.	
Our	 perspective	 welcomes	 the	 inclusion	 of	 moral	 and	 ethical	
considerations	 derived	 from	 the	 contemporary	workings	 of	 the	
global	political	 economy.	 	 Specifically,	 to	 explore	 the	 corruption	
inherent	 in	 the	 relationship	between	 the	marginalisation	of	 the	
majority	of	the	world’s	inhabitants	and	the	historically	unparalleled	
global	 concentration	 of	 power	 and	 wealth.	 	 We	 propose	 an	
understanding	 of	 corruption	 as	 the	 use	 and	 abuse	 of	 public	 or	
private	power	for	private	or	institutional	enrichment.
Evidently	definitions	are	crucial	as	they	inform	strategy,	struggles	
and	therefore	material	outcomes.	 	As	van	der	Merwe	and	others	
have	argued,	a	broader,	deeper	and	more	coherent	understanding	
of	corruption	is	required	precisely	to	contrast	the	possibilities	of	
transformation	as	opposed	to	the	reinforcement	of	the	broad	status	
quo	by	those	who	defend	narrow	definitions	and	often	resist	any	
attempt	 to	 broaden	 the	 scope	 of	 anti-corruption	 consideration	
and	action.		
If	 we	 are	 serious	 about	 eradicating	 corruption,	 let	 us	 do	 so	
coherently.	 	And	 let	us	 look	to	see	who	our	real	allies	are	 in	this	
struggle.		Are	we	to	depend	on	external	forces	that	have	their	own	
agenda	or	biases?		Or	should	we	approach	the	task	from	a	domestic	
mobilisation	perspective	linked	it	to	the	construction	of	economic	
justice	 and	 self-determination?	 	This	 essay	 is	 a	brief	preliminary	
effort,	sponsored	by	the	International	Initiative	on	Corruption	and	
Governance	 (IICG)4,	 to	scrutinize	 the	 issue	of	corruption	and	 the	
action	 of	 anti-corruption	 governance	 reforms,	 and	 to	 point	 the	
way	to	people-centered	strategies	to	make	real	development	and	
sovereignty	possible.
Understandings	of	corruption	are	influenced	by	different	visions	
of	anticipated	outcomes.		Ideology	is	at	the	core	of	perspectives,	
particularly	 as	 to	 how	 markets	 and	 societies	 should	 interact	
and	how	nations	should	and	can	develop.	 	Here	we	will	explore	
therefore	 how	 the	 ideology	 of	 the	 dominante	 anti-corruption	
4 For further information on the IICG see www.peoplesgovernance.org
campaigns	purposely	focus	on	narrow	not	broad	definitions,	the	
nation-state	and	not	 the	capitalist	 international	power	structure	
as	the	prime	framework	of	analysis,	on	the	public	sector	and	not	
the	corporate	sector,	on	 illegal	 individual	acts	of	corruption	and	
not	on	forms	of	legalized,	corporate-induced	corruption	that	is	at	
the	heart	of	 the	net	outflow	of	 resources	 from	the	South	to	 the	
North—that	is,	the	greatest	economic	crime	of	our	time.5
 An earlier version of this study appears in International Initiative on Corruption  
  and Governance, The People Speak on Corruption and Governance, Vol. 7,
  (IBON Books, Manila, 2007).  
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II.   Taking the Lid off Corruption:
 An Incomplete Process
The	mainstream	definition	of	corruption	is	summarised	in	a	simple	
formula:
Corruption (C) = Monopoly (M) + Discretion (D) – Accountability (A)
The	formula	helps	account	for	the	stellar	selection	of	individuals	
presented	 at	 the	 beginning.	 	 That	 picture	 reflects	 and	 seeks	 to	
reinforce	the	view	that	corruption	 is	almost	exclusively	 found	 in	
the	public	sector.		That	is,	government	departments,	civil	servants	
and	 politicians	 who	 abuse	 their	 alleged	 “monopoly”	 of	 public	
power	 are	 powerful	 enough	 to	 insure	 “discretion”	 or	 secrecy	
and	are	not	democratically	or	 legally	“accountable.”	 	Virtually	all	
international	conventions,	resolutions	and	national	legislation,	as	
well	as	Transparency	 International	and	the	World	Bank,	 take	this	
view.
The	 conservative	 approach	 only	 deals	 with	 certain	 forms	 of	
corruption,	principally	individual	acts	of	bribery	and	extortion	in	
the	public	sector	(or	where	it	intersects	with	the	private	sector,	as	
in	 the	case	of	contracts	and	procurement).	 	Under	 this	 legalistic	
framework,	fighting	corruption	is	chiefly	the	task	of	state	agencies,	
increasingly	with	support	 from	civil	 society,	 the	World	Bank	and	
the	 lively	 fiction	 called	 the	 international	 community	 (chiefly	
“donors”).		Auditor-generals,	public	prosecutors,	district	attorneys,	
the	justice	system	and	legislative	bodies	are	tasked	to	pursue	anti-
corruption	within	the	state,	promulgating	legislation,	supervisory	
bodies	or	commissions,	and	other	procedures	aimed	at	addressing	
corruption	 and	 enhancing	 transparency	 in	 government.	 	 Most	
of	 the	 attention	 is	 focused	 on	 the	 actions,	 prosecution	 and	
punishment	 of	 politicians	 and	 government	 officials	 involved	 in	
bribe-taking,	kickback	 schemes,	 favouritism,	embezzlement,	 	 etc.	
Media	 and	 civil	 society	 groups	 are	mobilised	 to	 play	watchdog	
and	whistle-blower	roles	while	“donors”	pressure	governments	to	
implement	administrative	and	technical	procedures	to	deal	with	
the	problem.		
Our	critique	of	the	predominant	conception	in	no	way	precludes	or	
denies	the	importance	and	dimension	of	corruption	in	the	public	
sector.	 	 It	 is	 real	and	growing.	 	Given	the	expanding	dimensions	
of	 international	 crime	networks,	much	work	 is	also	necessary	 to	
enhance	 governmental	 abilities	 to	 collectively	 combat	 patently	
illegal	activities.		Recognition	is	due	to	watchdogs	and	corruption-
fighters	who	risk	their	own	security	and	to	the	various	successful	
efforts	by	Transparency	International	to	put	the	corruption	issue	
on	 the	 international	 agenda.	 	 Under	 the	 Presidency	 of	 James	
Wolfensohn,	 the	 World	 Bank	 took	 on	 the	 dreaded	 “C-word,”	
winning	 praise	 for	 having	 lifted	 the	 lid	 on	 the	 discussion	 of	
corruption	 in	 a	 development	 context.	 	 Critics,	 however,	 insisted	
that	 the	Bank	also	 look	at	 itself.	 	 In	1996,	 the	World	Bank	finally	
introduced	 a	 new	 provision	 into	 its	 procurement	 guidelines	 to	
address	 fraud	 and	 corruption,	 with	 penalties	 for	 firms	 found	 to	
have	acted	fraudulently.
But	 the	 lid	 was	 not	 removed	 completely	 and	 the	 discussion	
remained	safely	circumscribed.		Writing	for	Corner	House	in	2000,	
Susan	Hawley	noted	how	“Most	 commentators	on	corruption—
and	 on	 the	“good	 governance”	 initiatives	 instigated	 to	 combat	
it—dwell	on	developing	countries,	not	 industrialised	ones.	Most	
scrutinise	politically-lax	cultures	in	the	South,	not	the	North.		Most	
call	 attention	 to	 the	 petty	 corruption	 of	 low-paid	 civil	 servants,	
not	 to	 the	 grand	 corruption	 of	 wealthy	 multinationals.	 	 Most	
focus	on	symptoms	such	as	missing	resources,	not	causes	such	as	
deregulation	of	state	enterprises.	Most	talk	about	bribe-takers,	not	
bribe-givers.”6		Van	der	Merwe,	then	with	Transparency	South	Africa,	
stated	presciently	in	2001,	“The	suspicion	is	that	a	limited	view	of	
corruption	 is	 promoted	 and	maintained	 by	 design.	 	 As	 a	 result,	
the	problem	is	being	cut	in	such	a	way	that	it	fits	those	in	power.	
The	need	to	broaden	the	understanding	of	corruption	is	explicitly	
ignored	and/or	even	actively	suppressed	by	very	powerful	players	
and	concerns	in	countries	or	internationally,	since	dealing	with	it	
may	 just	be	 too	cold	 for	 comfort.	 	As	 such,	 these	 role-players	 in	
the	anti-corruption	drive	become	part	of	the	overall	problem	and	
need	to	be	cited	as	such.”7		
 Susan Hawley, “Exporting Corruption: Privatization, Multinationals and 
   Bribery,” Corner House Briefing No. 19, http://www.thecornerhouse.org. 
   uk/item.shtml?x=5197
7 Van der Merwe, Combating Corruption,2
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Power	and	power	relations	are	no	doubt	also	at	play	in	the	shaping	
of	anti-corruption	campaigns,	placing	strict	limitations	on	areas	of	
inquiry,	even	though	the	 inquiry	 itself	pointed	 in	directions	that	
made	some	uncomfortable.		A	shift	in	focus	remains	necessary	if	for	
no	other	reason	than	to	show	the	ongoing	linkage	between	anti-
corruption	and	the	broader	struggles	for	liberation,	independence	
and	democracy	in	the	South.		There	is	a	need,	for	example,	to	pay	
due	credit	to	historical	struggles	for	 independence	or	 liberation,	
as	 from	apartheid,	where	corruption	was	embedded	 in	 the	very	
nature	of	the	regime.		A	narrow	anti-corruption	campaign	against	
the	 ruling	 regimes	 in	 South	Africa,	 Indonesia,	 the	 Philippines	or	
Argentina	in	the	1970s	or	1980s	would	have	made	little	political	
sense.		Indeed	they	may	have	been	considered	distractions	from	
the	broader	agenda	to	uproot	the	regimes.	 	Most	of	the	corrupt	
individuals	 cited	 at	 the	beginning	were	 chased	out	 of	 office	by	
popularly-driven	movements	 propelled	 by	 indignation	 over	 the	
corruption	and	abuses	practiced	by	the	dictators.		As	van	der	Merwe	
argues,	“These	systems	are	forms	of	corruption	per	se	and	not	only	
the	different	corrupt	acts	of	persons	or	groups	that	take	place	in	
a	system.	 	We	should	not	forget	that	 it	was	not	only	the	corrupt	
behaviour	 of	 people	 in	 colonialism	 and	 apartheid	 that	 finalised	
the	picture	 of	 corruption.	 	These	were	 indeed	massive	 forms	 of	
corruption	 in	 themselves....	 	 Structural	 corruption,	 in	 the	 sense	
of	organisational	structures	and	economic	and	political	systems,	
must	be	put	squarely	on	the	table	for	local	and	international	anti-
corruption	discourse	and	strategy	developments.”8		
A	peoples’	understanding	of	corruption	is	not	divorced	from	history,	
not	solely	focused	on	government,	and	not	limited	to	the	demand	
for	 punishment	 of	 official	 wrong-doers.	 	 The	 understanding	 is	
fundamentally	 political	 as	 evidenced	 in	 abuses	 of	 power,	 both	
political	 and	 economic,	 by	 both	 national	 and	 international	
entities.		
Another	 linkage	 conveniently	 ignored	by	 the	 conservative	 anti-
corruption	 movement	 is	 the	 ongoing	 connection	 between	
governing	 elites	 and	 transnational	 corporations	 (TNCs)	 and	
International	 Financial	 Institutions	 (IFIs)	 in	 order	 to	 extract	
  Van der Merwe, Combating Corruption, p. 19-20.
resources	 from	 peoples,	 including	 national	 natural	 resources.	
Pillage	and	looting	is	a	form	of	corruption	as	old	as	the	empires	
that	practiced	them.		Incalculable	riches	in	the	form	of	resources	
and	human	 lives—from	gold	 to	 rubber	 to	oil—were	 taken	 from	
peoples	 and	 continents	 that	 have	 yet	 to	 fully	 recover,	 let	 alone	
forget,	 the	 advent	 of	 the	 private/public	 colonial	 onslaughts.	
During	 the	Cold	War,	 a	number	of	 kleptocratic	 regimes	enjoyed	
full	 support	 from	 their	Western	 patrons	 with	 considerations	 of	
corruption	 and	democracy	 conveniently	 set	 aside.	 	None	of	 the	
development	 agencies	 showed	 much	 concern	 for	 corruption	
during	this	period.			
The	massive	growth	in	the	volume	of	international	trade	and	finance	
in	the	post	Cold	War	period	brings	with	it	the	need	to	reframe	the	
anti-corruption	agenda.	 	 It	needs	 to	 take	account	of	 the	parallel	
shift	 in	 power	 from	 the	 public	 to	 the	 private	 sector	 supported	
by	 rich	 country	 governments	 interested	 in	 the	“privatisation”	 of	
development	 and	 aid.	 	 But	 the	 huge	 international	 capital	 flows	
from	North	to	South	fuelled	corruption	in	unprecedented	ways	and	
amounts.		Enticed	by	the	new	demand	for	investment	expansion,	
goods	and	services	once	provided	by	the	state	were	sold	out	to	
private	firms	under	various	“privatisation”	arrangements.		With	the	
ongoing	shift	came	a	growing	awareness	of	the	public	impact	of	
corporate	activities—for	example	the	environmental	dimension—
calling	 for	 increased	 public	 scrutiny	 and	 disclosure.	 	 Thus,	 just	
when	most	has	been	said	(although	not	necessarily	done)	about	
transparency	 in	 government,	 transparency	 in	 the	 profit-making	
world	 remains	 in	denial—private-sector	disclosure	 is	 haphazard	
at	best.
Privatisation	of	the	public	area	or	commons	constitutes	a	form	of	
systemic	corruption	even	where	governing	elites	went	through	the	
appropriate	World	Bank-advised	steps	 to	 legalise	 the	 transfer	of	
resources	and	abdication	of	regulatory	powers.		Systemic	corruption	
occurs	 where	 governments	 and	 organisational	 procedures	 are	
compromised	in	a	way	that	permits	or	even	feeds	the	individual	
and	 state-sanctioned	 transfer	 of	 public	 property	 and	 resources	
to	private	hands.	 	Shrinking	government	capacity	to	control	and	
prevent	corruption	(regulation)	forms	part	of	the	systemic	picture,	
reflecting	and	interpreting	the	grip	of	international	structures	and	
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entities	on	national	 ones.	 	 Regulation	 and	 control	 of	 corruption	
is	 still,	 in	 principle,	 a	 governmental	matter,	 but	 that	 principle	 is	
weakened	 when	 government	 is	 ideologically	 and	 functionally	
stripped	 of	 supervisory	 power.	 	While	 there	 is	 still	 a	 degree	 of	
regulation	in	the	rich	countries	and	some	developing	ones,	this	is	
not	the	case	for	most	poorer	countries	where,	as	part	of	the	same	
neoliberal	 privatisation	 phenomena,	 the	 already	 limited	 state	
capacities	are	further	circumscribed	by	politicians	and	ideologues	
with	a	radical	laissez-faire	critique	of	the	state	and	by	the	mandates	
of	the	IFIs.		
Evidently	 the	 now-dominant	 neoliberal	 understanding	 of	 the	
role	 of	 government	 dovetails	 perfectly	with	 the	 dominant	 view	
of	 public	 sector	 corruption	 that	 can	 be	 cured	 by	 privatisation.	
Empirical	 evidence	 notwithstanding,	 neoliberal	 partisans	
insisted	that	the	market	was	the	best	regulator.		In	fact,	however,	
we	 witness	 monopolistic	 power	 imposing	 itself	 on	 the	 market.	
TNCs	were	 served	 and	 rewarded	by	 an	 ideology	 that	 packaged	
corporate	expansion	as	a	legitimate	free	market	phenomenon.		If	
a	government	is	serious	about	enforcing	minimal	environmental	
and	labour	standards	on	corporate	operations,	then	corporations	
feel	free	to	move	to	other	countries	with	little	or	no	standards,	but	
eager	to	attract	investment.		
Under	 the	 guise	 of	 globalisation,	 market	 sovereignty	 is	
overtaking	 national	 sovereignty;	 markets	 are	 shaping	 politics	
and	 political	 behaviour.	 	 Power	 flows	 to	 unelected	 institutions,	
be	 they	private	 corporations	or	 entities	 such	as	 the	World	Bank	
and	the	International	Monetary	Fund,	which	are	also	immune	to	
democratic	political	processes.		This	dimension	is	virtually	ignored	
by	 the	 narrow	 anti-corruption	 perspective.	 	 Instead	 there	 is	 a	
feeding	of	an	anti-public	sector	ethos	and	the	natural	distrust	that	
so	many	citizens	have	for	their	government	in	general,	particularly	
in	the	South.	 	Corruption	touches	the	lives	of	so	many	people	in	
the	South	that	 it	becomes	too	important	to	be	left	 in	the	hands	
of	market-centered	and	 the	World	Bank	 in	particular,	where	 the	
interests	 of	 rich	 country	 bankers	 and	 corporations,	 and	 their	
business/government	 associates	 in	 the	South,	 are	 embedded	 in	
the	“deep	structure”	of	policy	and	outlooks.		It	clashes	with	the	goal	
of	enhancing	democratic	control	over	public	resources,	goods	and	
services,	which	is	the	best	guarantee	against	corruption.			
Capitalist	 ideology	 defends	 privatisation,	 deregulation	 and	
liberalisation,	 notwithstanding	mounting	 evidence	 of	 the	 harm	
that	multinationals	and	national	monopolistic	entities	can	cause	
to	the	lives	of	ordinary	citizens,	their	environment	and	their	right	
to	 self-determination.	 	 Water,	 health	 services,	 transportation,	
waste	collection,	telecommunications,	financial	services	and	even	
security	are	being	absorbed	by	an	unaccountable	“for	profit”	sector.	
Restoring	accountability	does	not	 entail	 a	 return	 to	 Soviet-style	
“public”	 bureaucracies.	 	 Rather,	 it	 calls	 for	 democratic	 creativity	
with	new	forms	of	public	supervision	or	control	of	critical	services	
and	areas	of	 the	economy	that	need	to	respond	to	social	needs	
and	not	a	pure	profit	motive.			
The	 point	 is	 to	 take	 account	 of	 new	 dimensions	 of	 corruption	
in	 the	discussion	and	action	plans.	 	That	being	said,	 recognition	
must	 be	 given	 to	 agencies	 such	 as	 Transparency	 International	
and	other	bodies	for	having	opened	the	debate	in	the	first	place.	
Now	we	need	 to	go	beyond	 the	proverbial	 tip	of	 the	 iceberg—
individual	acts	of	graft	or	embezzlement	of	a	public	treasury.		Not	
shifting	at	this	point	can	become	counterproductive	for	the	entire	
anti-corruption	 movement,	 as	 the	 insistence	 on	 public	 sector	
surveillance	becomes	a	convenient	 smoke	 screen	behind	which	
much	greater	frauds	can	take	place.		
Some	would	ask	why	waste	time	dealing	with	the	symptoms	of	a	
problem—corruption—instead	of	the	root	causes,	be	it	poverty	or	
corporate	greed.		The	response	is	that	we	are	forced	to	look	at	both	
for	 analytical	 reasons	but	 also	 for	 strategic	 ones,	 principally	 the	
need	to	reach	those	for	whom	corruption	is	their	introduction	to	
politics	and	mobilisation.		We	are	likely	to	be	hearing	more,	not	less,	
about	corruption	as	visible	disparities	of	wealth,	contradictions	in	
the	 international	 economic	 order,	 displacement	 of	 employment	
and	 control	 of	 scarce	 natural	 resources	 all	 continue	 to	 increase.	
Inequality,	dishonesty,	unfairness,	injustice	and	exploitation	must	all	
form	part	of	a	broader	anti-corruption	discourse	and	mobilisation.	
At	 the	 same	 time,	 it	 becomes	 imperative	 to	 underscore	 the	
contradiction	of	 a	 discourse	by	donors	 or	 IFIs	 pushing	poverty-
producing	policies	that	says	corruption	hurts	the	poor.
The	problem	must	be	addressed	both	politically	and	ideologically.	
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We	 need	 to	 contest	 the	 assumption	 that	 the	 public	 sector	 is	
inherently	 and	 inevitably	 corrupt—and	 that	 the	 private	 sector	
and	 privatisation	 or	 outsourcing	 are	 the	 solution.	 	 Resistance	
entails	recognition	of	the	role	played	by	entities	such	as	the	World	
Trade	Organisation	and	Free	Trade	Agreements	that	demand	that	
corporations	have	rights	equal	or	superior	to	those	of	sovereign	
states	and	societies.
Under	 the	 rules	 of	 neoliberal	 globalisation,	 legality	 and	 justice	
seem	to	be	moving	in	different	directions,	and	the	anti-corruption	
movement	must	choose.		The	evident	injustice	of	an	international	
system	that	enhances	poverty	is	also	a	question	of	corruption—
the	 injustice	 and	 corruption	 that	 characterise	 the	 transfer	 of	
resources	from	poor	to	rich,	from	the	global	South	to	the	global	
North.	 	No	matter	 how	 legalised,	 there	 is	 a	 fundamental	 lack	of	
integrity	and	morality	in	any	system	or	mechanism	that	enforces	
this	extraction.		It	is	a	matter	of	record	that	there	is	a	net	extraction	
from	 the	 South—call	 it	 exploitation	 or	 surplus	 extraction—in	
amounts	significantly	 larger	 than	the	 inflow	generated	by	trade,	
aid,	direct	 investment	and	even	remittances.	 	 If	 the	current	anti-
corruption	discourse	does	not	want	to	lose	its	credibility,	a	first	step	
is	to	acknowledge	the	absence	of	a	level	international	economic	
playing	field.	 	That	field	 is	not	divinely-ordained	by	 the	“market”	
but	has	been	constructed	by	particular	actors	and	is	defended	by	
the	most	powerful	governments	in	the	world.		
A	persistent	bleeding	of	 resources	 from	the	South	 to	 the	North,	
from	poor	to	rich,	constitutes	perhaps	the	most	perverse	form	of	
modern	 corruption—it	 demands	 identification,	 quantification,	
advocacy,	 adjudication	 of	 individual	 responsibilities	 and	
reparations.	 	 Corporate	 power,	 as	 any	 form	 of	 power,	 fabricates	
its	own	discourse	to	neutralise	opposition,	or	better	yet	to	allow	
opposition	within	“safe”	confines.		Given	the	global	configuration	
of	economic	power,	it	is	not	surprising	that	notions	of	exploitation	
are	banned	so	that	the	crudest	 forms	of	corruption/exploitation	
are	 considered	 normal	 and	 certainly	 not	 illegal.	 	 Yet	 corporate	
power	 has	 rigged	 the	 international	 financial	 and	 trade	 regime.	
Far	 from	 reflecting	a	 legal	 compact	of	 the	equality	of	 sovereign	
states,	 the	 economic	 regime	 is	 distinctly	 and	 purposely	 tilted	
against	the	majorities	 in	the	poor	countries,	which	explains	why	
the	disparity	in	wealth	distribution	continues	to	grow.		It	is	unfair,	
dishonest,	unjust	and	corrupt—as	well	as	illegal,	if	one	is	to	judge	
by	international	human	rights	instruments.		
Ending	 corruption	 would	 entail	 the	 construction	 of	 resource	
redistribution	 mechanisms	 such	 as	 the	 Tobin	 tax	 and	 other	
measures	being	proposed.		Ostensibly,	international	bodies	should	
be	 in	 the	 forefront	 of	 development	 through	 redistribution.	 	 But	
the	“donors”	and	IFIs	seem	more	committed	to	redistribution	in	an	
inverse	sense,	from	the	poorer	to	the	rich.		Evidently	the	IFIs	and	
the	World	Trade	Organisation	have	no	interest	in	broadening	the	
definitional	 and	ethical	discussion	around	corruption,	 excluding	
an	elementary	appropriation	of	resources	that	could	help	insure	
elemental	human	and	economic	rights	and	public	services.		
Some	may	argue	that	the	concern	for	justice	and	honesty	only	forms	
part	of	a	national	compact	between	society	and	its	government,	
but	that	is	not	the	case	internationally,	where	governments	pursue	
realpolitik	 in	defence	of	competing	national	 interests.	 	This	begs	
the	question	of	who	determines	what	is	national	interest—indeed	
a	measure	of	democracy	 itself,	 if	 and	when	highly	concentrated	
economic	 power	 is	 held	 in	 check	 by	 a	 human	 rights-grounded	
social	compact.		In	the	longer	term,	a	true	anti-corruption	struggle	
would	work	to	make	such	 international	private	and	 institutional	
practices	 illegal	 and	 punishable.	 	 For	 now,	 it	 is	 important	 to	
challenge	the	corruption	discourse	along	with	the	interventionist	
apparatus	 it	has	created—the	 latest	 instalment	 in	 the	history	of	
mision	civilizatrize.		How	does	that	theory	and	practice	face	up	to	
alternative	 non-capitalist	 understandings	 of	 both	 national	 and	
international	development,	enrichment	and	impoverishment?		
Unsurprisingly,	there	are	vested	interests	that	resist	any	expansion	
of	the	debate	on	corruption.		Actors	such	as	the	World	Bank	and	
Transparency	 International—the	 two	 focal	 points	 of	 the	 anti-
corruption	 “movement”—insist	 on	 focusing	 on	 public	 sector	
officials	 and	 the	 need	 to	 “reform”	 governments	 according	 to	
donor-provided	manuals	and	of	course	with	 the	 involvement	of	
expatriate	consultants	and	specialists.		At	the	level	of	civil	society,	
the	appropriate	NGOs	are	selected	or	created	to	push	for	change	
according	to	a	zealously	kept	procedure.		
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Corporations	wrote	the	first	chapter	of	the	corruption/governance	
manual	insisting	that	corrupt	public	officials	unfairly	“tax”	foreign	
(and	 domestic)	 direct	 investment.	 	 Their	 argument	 goes	 on	 to	
declare,	 almost	 axiomatically,	 that	 private	 investment	 must	 be	
protected	 against	 graft	 because	 investment	 means	 economic	
growth	and	growth	benefits	the	poor.		No	room	is	given	to	those	
expressing	doubts	 about	 the	 effectiveness	of	 the	holy	 trinity	of	
private	 investment-economic	 growth-poverty	 reduction	 that	
insists	 that	 privatisation	 and	 liberalisation	 will	 allow	 poorer	
countries	to	better	“compete”	in	what	is	considered	the	inevitable	
and	desirable	 integration	 into	 the	global	 economy.	 	 In	 this	win-
win	scenario	the	poor	are	supposed	to	benefit,	but	one	might	be	
tempted	to	ask	how	much	the	poor	received	of	the	US$16.2	billion	
in	Christmas	bonuses	paid	out	by	the	New	York	investment	firm	of	
Goldman	Sachs	in	2006?9
Does	foreign	direct	investment	lead	to	economic	growth?		Does	
any	 economic	 growth	 translate	 into	 social	 development?	 	 How	
are	 the	 poor	 as	 a	whole	 to	 benefit	 by	 their	 countries’	 insertion	
into	 the	 global	 neoliberal	 economy?	 	 The	 discussion	 would	 be	
a	substantive	one,	but	 in	the	following	pages	we	can	only	make	
a	 small	 contribution	 by	 reviewing	 how	 neoliberal	 corruption	
takes	 place	 in	 a	 series	 of	 practices,	 transactions,	 processes	 and	
structures.		
Antonio	Tujan,	 Jr.	of	 the	 IBON	Foundation	 in	Phillippines	 .	 states,	
“The	 issues	 of	 corruption	 and	 bad	 governance	 are	 of	 genuine	
concern	 to	 the	 people	 not	 only	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 they	 siphon	
off	 precious	 resources	 for	 development	 and	 social	 services,	 but	
more	 so	 because	 the	 problem	 of	 corruption	 and	 the	 issue	 of	
undemocratic	governance	 is	also	at	 the	heart	of	 the	problem	of	
mal-development,	poverty	and	injustice….		The	issue	of	corruption	
and	governance	cannot	be	comprehended	purely	on	a	national	
level.	 	 Rather	 international	 factors	 and	 forces	 have	 historically	
played	a	role	in	perpetuating	the	problem	up	to	the	present,	just	as	
much	as	it	is	an	international	problem	operating	through	relations	
of	dominance	and	neo-colonialism.”10
9    American Broadcasting Network (ABC) News, December 15, 2006.
0 Antonio Tujan, Jr., editor, The People Speak on Corruption & Governance,  
     (International Initiative on Corruption and Governance/IBON, Manila: 200), v.
III.  Corporate Corruption
In	 Latin	 America	 there	 is	 a	 debate	 about	whether,	 in	 real	 value	
terms,	the	“Golden	Age	of	Pillage”	took	place	with	the	looting	of	
gold	and	silver	 in	16th	and	17th	century,	or	whether	that	amount	
is	 exceeded	 by	 what	 has	 been	 extracted	 in	 the	 last	 40	 years.	
According	 to	 one	 scholar,	 in	 the	 most	 recent	 period	“immense	
legal	and	illegal	transfers	of	property,	wealth,	profits,	interests	and	
royalty	payments	flowed	from	Latin	America	to	the	US	and	the	EU.	
The	most	lucrative	public	enterprises,	valued	at	more	than	US$350	
billion,	were	privatised	without	any	of	the	constitutional	niceties	
and	eventually	ended	up	 in	 the	hands	of	US,	Spanish	and	other	
European	 multinational	 corporations	 and	 banks.	 	 Presidential	
decrees	 bypassed	 congress	 and	 the	 electorate	 and	 dictated	 a	
privileged	 place	 for	 foreign	 capital.	 	 Protests	 by	 Congress,	 the	
electorate	and	national	auditors	were	ignored.”11
Kleptocratic	 regimes,	 whether	 dictatorial	 or	 liberal	 democratic,	
acted	as	accomplices	manifesting	loyalty	to	the	“free	market”	and	
sometimes	justifying	the	property	transfers	in	the	name	of	fighting	
state	corruption.			Wholesale	transfer	of	ownership	of	vital	resources	
and	entities	to	foreigners	that	began	in	Mexico	and	Chile	during	
the	1980s	were	followed	by	the	selling	off	of	most	of	the	region’s	
public	 enterprises—banks,	 power	 plants,	 telecommunications,	
roads,	 water	 and	 transport	 services—to	 foreign	 entities.	 	 Total	
private	 takeovers	 rose	 to	 US$360.5	 billion	 by	 2001—a	 full	 150	
billion	more	than	the	next	most	“attractive”	region,	the	East	Asia	
Pacific.		More	firms	were	sold	and	more	money	was	raised	in	Latin	
America	 than	 in	 almost	 any	other	part	 of	 the	world.	 	The	 result	
was	not	only	a	decrease	in	economic	policy	autonomy	but	also	an	
increase	in	poverty,	unemployment	and	inequality:
•	 In	 Argentina,	 150,000	 workers	 were	 dismissed	 due	 to	
privatisations	between	1987	and	1997;	
•	 About	50	percent	of	all	 employees	 in	firms	privatised	 in	
Mexico	lost	their	jobs;
 James Petras, “Is Latin America Really Turning Left?,” (June, 200), 
     www.globalresearch.org
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•	 In	Brazil,	there	was	a	reduction	of	more	than	90,000	jobs	in	
the	privatised	railways;
•	 In	Nicaragua,	privatisation	resulted	in	the	dismissal	of	15	
percent	of	the	total	labour	force.12
By	 2005	 Latin	 American	 populations	 had	 deposed	 no	 less	 than	
ten	neoliberal	Presidents.		Corruption	was	cited	in	every	case,	and	
was	interpreted	as	inseparable	from	the	blind	pursuit	of	neoliberal	
policies.		
In	 Africa,	 the	 privatisation	 drive	 proceeded	 at	 a	 slower	 pace.	
Fewer	African	governments	adopted	explicit	divestment	policies	
than	in	Latin	America.		Calculations	are	that	state	production	still	
accounts	for	over	15	percent	of	GDP	in	that	region.13		But	the	push	
for	 liberalisation	 and	 privatisation-friendly	 “good	 governance”	
is	underway.	 	With	the	support	of	the	World	Bank,	South	African	
President	 Thabo	 Mbeki	 is	 leading	 a	 G8-supported	 effort	 to	
introduce	rapid	liberalisation	and	governance	“reforms”	as	part	of	
the	New	Economic	Partnership	for	African	Development	(NEPAD).	
African	civil	society	critics	claim	that	NEPAD	“rejects	the	multitude	
of	alternative	African	development	strategies	that	have	emerged	
from	 civil	 society	 and	 academic	movements	 over	 the	 past	 two	
decades….	 	 Included	in	these	policies	are	commitments,	among	
others,	to	fully	participatory	democratic	policy-making,	rejection	
of	 the	 privatisation	 of	 public	 services,	 redirection	 of	 resources	
from	the	private	to	the	public	sector,	debt	repudiation,	increased	
exchange	 controls,	 protection	 of	 vital	 infant	 industries,	 greater	
regional	 cooperation	 and	mobility	 of	 people	 across	 Africa,	 and	
meaningful	environmental	sustainability	that	fully	comprehends	
that	 the	wealth	of	 so-called	developed	nations	was	gained	at	a	
huge	environmental	cost.”14
2 Center for Global Development, Policy Brief, “Privatization in Latin
     America,” www.dgdev.org.
 Alberto Chong, Florencio Lopez de Silanes, “The Truth about Privatization 
     in Latin America,” Inter-American Development Bank,  http://www.iadb.org/ 
     res/publications/pubfiles/pubr-46.pdf
4 Antonia Juhasz, “NEPAD: Foothold for Corporate Globalization in Africa,”  
     Interim Report, Intrinsic Consequences of Economic Globalization on the  
     Environment, International Forum on Globalization, 
     http://www.thebushagenda.net/article.php?id=9
“Corruption	 by	 western	 multinationals	 is	 a	 disease	 all	 over	
Africa,”	says	Churuchill	Maqutu	of	Lesotho’s	High	Court.		Maqutu	
was	 a	 public	 prosecutor	 who	 sued	 some	 of	 the	world’s	 largest	
engineering	companies	for	fraud	in	a	World	Bank-promoted	water	
project,	 the	 largest	of	 its	 kind	 in	Africa.	 	 Funders	of	 the	Lesotho	
Highland	Water	 Project	 included	 the	World	 Bank;	 the	 European	
Investment	 Bank;	 the	 German,	 British	 and	 French	 bilateral	 aid	
agencies;	and	the	UK	Commonwealth	Development	Corporation.	
Participating	 commercial	 banks	 included	 Banque	 Nationale	 de	
Paris,	 Dresdner	 and	Hill	 Samuel;	 and	 a	 number	 of	 export	 credit	
agencies	 (including	 Germany’s	 Hermes,	 France’s	 COFACE,	 South	
Africa’s	SACCE	and	Britain’s	ECGD).		The	ECGD’s	support	amounted	
to	£66	million	and	went	in	loan	guarantees	to	five	UK	companies:	
Balfour	Beatty,	Kier,	Stirling,	Kvaerner	Boving	and	ABB	Generation’s	
UK	subsidiary.	
Apparently,	 not	 one	 of	 the	 donor	 funding	 agencies	 scrutinized	
the	 11	 multinationals	 charged	 with	 paying	 bribes	 to	 influence	
bidding	for	contracts,	even	though	many	of	the	firms	were	not	first	
offenders.		About	two	million	pounds	sterling	in	bribes	were	paid	
into	Swiss	and	French	banks	accounts	opened	by	the	companies	
themselves.	 	 Leaked	 correspondence	 between	 the	World	 Bank	
and	 the	 Lesotho	 government	 suggests	 that	 the	 Bank	 knew	 of	
corruption	allegations	against	Masupha	Sole,	the	former	director	
of	 the	 Lesotho	Highlands	Development	Authority	 charged	with	
taking	bribes	as	far	back	as	1994.		But	the	Bank’s	reaction	was	to	
berate	 Lesotho	 government	 authorities	 for	 having	 suspended	
Sole,	 arguing	 that	 the	 dismissal	 would	 interfere	 with	 project	
construction	timetables	and	could	lead	to	costly	overruns.15
Botswana’s	 lead	 prosecutor	 took	 the	 case	 directly	 to	 the	 donor	
governments	 and	 funding	 agencies	 only	 to	 be	 met	 with	
“considerable	 scepticism	 and	 even	 arrogance,”	 according	 to	 a	
United	Nations	official	who	 followed	 the	case.	 	Testifying	before	
the	 US	 Foreign	 Relations	 Committee	 that	 same	 year,	 Penzhorn	
warned	 that	“there	 is	 a	 lingering	 impression	 in	 Lesotho,	 as	well	
as	in	South	Africa,	that	the	interest	of	first	world	countries	in	the	
 Nicholas Hildyard, “The Lesotho Highland Water Project,” 
     http://www.globalpolicy.org/nations/corrupt/lesotho.htm
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present	prosecutions	lies	not	so	much	in	the	successful	outcome	
of	 these	 prosecutions	 but	 rather	 in	 protecting	 the	 interests	 of	
its	 companies	 that	are	 involved.”	 	 Indeed	donors	 failed	 to	come	
through	on	earlier	promises	of	financial	assistance	to	help	pay	the	
huge	legal	bills,	further	straining	the	budget	of	one	of	the	poorest	
countries	in	the	world	and	one	suffering	an	HIV-AIDS	epidemic.16		
Until	 recently,	 the	 rich	 countries,	 including	 France,	 Germany,	
Switzerland	 and	 Japan,	 allowed	 companies	 to	 deduct	 bribes	
to	 foreign	public	officials	as	 legitimate	expenses.	 	 In	 the	case	of	
Japan	 the	 metaphor	 was	 “entertainment	 and	 social	 expenses.”	
Weeks	 before	 the	 terrorist	 attack	 against	 the	 US,	 the	 Bush	
Administration	vetoed	an	Organization	for	Economic	Co-operation	
and	Development	(OECD)	initiative	to	limit	secret	bank	accounts.	
Subsequently	the	US	government	modified	 its	position	on	bank	
secrecy	 for	 those	 suspected	 of	 terrorism,	 but	 less	 so	 for	 those	
guilty	 of	 bribery	 or	 corporate	money	 laundering.	 	 According	 to	
the	US	Department	of	 Justice,	 between	1994	 and	2001,	“the	US	
government	learned	of	significant	allegations	of	bribery	by	foreign	
firms	in	over	400	competitions	for	international	contracts	valued	
at	US$200	billion....		The	practice	is	global	in	scope,	with	firms	from	
over	50	countries	implicated	in	offering	bribes	for	contracts	in	over	
100	buyer	countries	during	the	seven-year	period.”17		According	to	
an	OECD	study,	“There	has	been	widespread	Western	opinion	that	
foreign-owned	enterprises	are	more	‘clean’	than	domestic	ones	in	
very	corrupt	environments,	which	appears	not	to	be	true.”		
That	report	claimed	that	while	the	US	governments’	1977	Foreign	
Corrupt	Practices	Act,	“together	with	other	influences,	has	resulted	
in	more	comprehensive	codes	of	conduct	and	enhanced	scrutiny	
of	standards	of	corporate	governance,	it	has	not	had	a	significant	
positive	 impact	 on	 actual	 standards	 of	 international	 business	
conduct	of	American	corporations	collectively,	at	least	with	respect	
 Quoted in Sebastian Levine, former Senior Economist with UNDP, “Taking on  
     the Goliaths of corruption”, Eldis Document Store,  http://www.eldis.org/cf/rdr/ 
     rdr.cfm?doc=DOC22
7 Mathew McClearn, “African Advantage: The Lesotho Highland Water  
     Project,” Canadian Business Journal, September 2, 200, Halifax Initiative  
     website, http://www.halifaxinitiative.org/index.php/PressResponses_World/ 
     ARTf42a00b778
to	 the	bribery	of	 foreign	public	officials.”18	 	A	 former	US	Federal	
Reserve	Chairman	warned	that	“corporate	greed	 [had]	exploded	
beyond	anything	that	could	have	been	imagined	in	1990.”		Former	
US	 Treasury	 Secretary	 Paul	 O’Neill	 claimed	 that	 the	 corporate	
world	lived	in	an	“an	ethical	vacuum	space.”19		
Indeed,	the	Enron	fraud	was	not	an	isolated	phenomenon.		A	New	
York	Times	columnist	noted	how	“the	Enron	case	will	forever	stand	
as	the	ultimate	reflection	of	an	era	of	near	madness	in	finance,	a	
time	 in	 the	 late	 1990’s	 when	 self-certitude	 and	 spin	 became	 a	
substitute	 for	 financial	 analysis	 and	 coherent	 business	 models.	
Controls	broke	down	and	management	deteriorated	as	arrogance	
overrode	careful	judgment,	allowing	senior	executives	to	blithely	
push	aside	their	critics....”20	
A	Management	professor	at	Boston	University	commented:	“Enron	
is	one	of	the	great	frauds	in	American	business	history.		But	it	is	also	
a	symbol	of	a	particular	era	of	management	practice.		The	excesses	
of	Enron	point	pretty	clearly	to	what	was	going	on	in	mainstream	
companies	 across	 the	 business	 landscape	 in	 the	 1990’s....	 	 That	
may	 go	 a	 long	 way	 toward	 explaining	 how	 corporate	 America	
became	infused	in	the	late	1990’s	by	what	appeared	to	be	a	near	
endless	amount	of	greed	and	criminality,	leading	to	scandal	at	an	
array	of	corporate	giants,	from	Enron	to	WorldCom,	from	Adelphia	
to	Healthsouth.21
There	 is	 no	 dividing	 line	 between	 corruption	 at	 home	 and	 the	
corruption	practiced	abroad	by	the	same	corporations.	 	A	World	
Bank-co-sponsored	 study	 on	 Transnational	 Corporations	 (TNC)	
and	corruption	in	resource-rich	“transition	economies”	concluded	
that	“it	is	suggestive	that	FDI	(foreign	direct	investment)	originating	
8 DAC Network on Governance, Synthesis of Lessons Learned of Donor 
     Practices in Fighting Corruption,” DAC/DAC?GOVNET (200), 2 June,  
     200. p. 24.
19 Quoted by Robert H. Wade, “Questions of Fairness: In Search of a Just 
     International Economic Orderm,” Foreign Affairs, (September/October 200),  
     Vol. 8, No. , p..
20 Kurt Eichenwald, “Verdict on an Era: Arrogance and Recklessness at Enron,”  
     The New York Times,   May 2, 200 (full text of article in Annex ).
2 Ibid.
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in	 the	United	States—which	has	been	governed	by	 the	Foreign	
Corrupt	Practices	Act	 for	more	 than	20	 years—does	not	 appear	
to	be	characterised	by	higher	standards	of	corporate	ethics	than	
domestic	firms	or	FDI	originating	in	other	countries....”22
One	 difference	 between	 corruption	 at	 home	 and	 corruption	
abroad	was	that	the	international	operations	of	many	of	the	same	
corporate	culprits	 received	explicit	government	and	multilateral	
support.	 	 The	 International	 Financial	 Institutions	 (IFI),	 including	
the	World	 Bank,	 the	 Inter-American	Development	 Bank	 and	 the	
Asian	 Development	 Bank,	 among	 others,	 operate	 programmes	
specifically	 designed	 to	 promote	 private	 investment	 as	 part	 of	
the	neoliberal	development	formula.		A	study	by	the	Washington-
based	Institute	for	Policy	Studies	detailed	how	Enron’s	rise	to	global	
prominence	came	to	depend	upon	a	close	financial	relationship	
with	various	government	institutions	and	the	World	Bank	itself.		It	
turns	out	that	some	21	agencies	representing	the	US	government,	
multilateral	development	banks	and	other	national	governments	
helped	leverage	Enron’s	global	expansion	by	providing	$7.2	billion	
in	public	financing	approved	for	38	projects	in	29	countries.23
Much	 the	 same	 corruption-prone	 institutionalised	 collusion	
is	 standard	 practice	 in	 the	 Asian	 Development	 Bank	 (ADB).	 	 In	
line	 with	 Anglo-American	 neoliberal	 ideology	 that	 holds	 sway	
in	 the	World	 Bank	 and	 the	 IMF,	 the	 ADB	 glorifies	 private	 sector	
development	and	private	capital	flows	as	development	alternatives	
to	official	aid	and,	conveniently,	the	“supply”	side	to	the	“demand”	
for	privatisation	instigated	by	the	IFIs.		Focus	on	the	Global	South,	
a	Bangkok-based	advocacy	and	research	centre,	revealed	how	the	
international	corporate	sector	was	a	principal	beneficiary	of	ADB	
lending,	 with	 37%	 of	 ADB	 contracts	 related	 to	 service	 and	 civil	
works	as	well	as	69%	of	consulting	contracts	going	to	companies	
from	donor	countries,	particularly	Japan,	the	US,	Australia,	Canada	
and	Germany.		Indeed,	many	of	the	consulting	companies	bidding	
for	 ADB	 contracts	 were	 established	 in	 the	 1970s	 and	 1980s	
22 Joel Hellman, et. al., “Are Foreign Investors and Multinationals Engaging in  
     Corrupt Practices in Transition Economies?,” Transition, (May-June-July,  
     2000), p. 7.
2 IPS’ new report, Enron’s Pawns: How Public Institutions Bankrolled Enron’s  
     Globalization Game, http://www.seen.org/pdf/pawns.pdf
precisely	to	benefit	from	the	ideologically	driven	privatisation	and	
deregulation	processes	pushed	by	the	US,	Britain,	Canada	and	New	
Zealand.24		Apparently	advice	on	alternatives	to	privatisation	was	
not	a	service	provided	by	the	same	“development”	banks,	which	
are	more	about	banking	than	development.					
In	 Washington,	 as	 elsewhere,	 the	 longstanding	 and	 lucrative	
revolving	 door	 relationships	 between	 government	 and	
corporations	 has	 reached	 unprecedented	 levels,	 according	 to	
observers.		A	study	by	an	intrepid	New	York	Times	reporter	in	2001	
revealed	 the	dealings	of	 the	Carlyle	Group,	 a	 $12	billion	private	
equity	company	whose	roster	 included	former	top	officials	 from	
the	 Bush	 and	 Reagan	 administrations,	 including	 George	 Bush	
Sr.	 and	his	 former	 Secretary	of	 State,	 James	Baker	 3rd,	 and	Frank	
Carlucci,	 former	 secretary	 of	 defence	 under	 Ronald	 Reagan,	 as	
chairman	 and	 managing	 director.	 	 Also	 on	 the	 adviser	 roster	
were	former	British	Prime	Minister	John	Major,	along	with	former	
president	of	the	German	Central	Bank	Karl	Otto	Poehl,	the	former	
President		of	Philippines		Fidel	Ramos,	former	President	and	Anand	
Panyarachun,	former	Prime	Minister	of	Thailand.
“In	a	new	spin	on	Washington’s	revolving	door	between	business	
and	government,	where	lobbying	by	former	officials	is	restricted	
but	soliciting	investments	is	not,	Carlyle	has	upped	the	ante	and	
taken	 the	 practice	 global.	 	 Private	 equity	 involves	 buying	 up	
companies	 and	 reselling	 them	 to	 very	 rich	 investors	 at	 a	 high	
profit.”	 	The	Carlyle	empire	 spans	 three	 continents	 and	 includes	
investments	 from	and	 in	numerous	countries.	 	According	to	this	
report,	 Carlyle	 owned	 so	many	 companies	 that	 in	 effect	 it	 had	
become	one	of	the	biggest	US	defence	contractors	and	a	force	in	
global	telecommunications.	Obviously	the	firm	benefited	greatly	
from	 the	 contacts	 of	 many	 former	 government	 officials.	 	 “The	
steady	flow	of	politicians	to	lucrative	private-sector	jobs	based	on	
their	government	contacts	 is	a	 familiar	Washington	 tale..	 	But	 in	
this	case,	it	is	being	played	out	for	more	dollars,	on	a	global	stage,	
and	in	the	world	of	private	finance,	where	the	minimal	government	
24 Chris Jones, “The Asian Development Bank, Capital Flows and the 
     Privatization of Infrastructure Projects in the South,” in Focus on the Global  
     South, Profiting from Poverty: the ADB, Private Sector and Development in  
     Asia, (Bangkok: 200).
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rules	prohibiting	 lobbying	by	 former	officials	 for	 a	given	period	
are	not	a	factor.		These	rules	say	nothing	about	potential	conflicts	
when	 former	 government	 officials	 use	 their	 connection	 and	
insights	for	financial	gain.”25		
In	the	light	of	corporate	collusion	in	the	North,	it	is	not	surprising	
that	 the	World	Bank	and	 the	corporate-dominated	 international	
and	 national	 boards	 of	 Transparency	 International	 remain	
tightly	focused	on	South	government	public	sector	“supply	side”	
corruption.	 	 Prosecuting	 illicit	 bribery	 is	 still	 the	 chief	 priority	
and	 there	 is	no	 significant	 inclination	 to	 look	 critically	 at	 FDI	 as	
a	whole	with	 its	 legal	and	 illicit	 linkages	to	political	power.	 	This	
is	 in	 keeping	 with	 the	 G8	 neoliberal	 market	 fundamentalism	
that	dictates	that	FDI	(i.e.,	TNCs	and	finance	capital)	is	the	virtual	
silver	 bullet	 that	will	 deliver	 development.	 	That	message	 came	
out	 clearly	 from	 the	 UN-sponsored	 Finance	 for	 Development	
conference	held	in	Monterrey,	Mexico,	in	March,	2002.		Fifty	heads	
of	state	or	government	and	more	than	200	ministers	heralded	the	
replacement	of	development	assistance	by	private	investment,	i.e.,	
the	privatisation	of	development.		
Officials	 promised	 a	 $5	 billion	 increase	 in	 assistance,	 but	 that	
increase	was,	as	one	commentator	put	 it,	“totally	overshadowed	
by	two	other	haunting	statistics:	the	$800	billion	spent	on	military	
budgets	 worldwide	 in	 2002,	 and	 the	 $200	 billion	 net	 transfer	
of	 financial	 resources	 from	 the	 South	 to	 the	 North.	 	 UNCTAD	
corroborated	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 flow	 of	 net	 resources	 was	 the	
largest	 ever	 from	 the	 world’s	 poorer	 nations	 to	 the	 rich.	 	 UN	
Secretary	General	Kofi	Annan	pointed	out	 that	 funds	 that	could	
be	promoting	investment	and	growth	in	developing	countries	or	
building	schools	and	hospitals	or	supporting	other	steps	towards	
achieving	the	Millennium	Development	Goals	(MDGs)	are	instead	
being	 transferred	 abroad:	 “If	 what	 we	 say	 about	 financing	 for	
development	 is	not	 to	 ring	hollow,	 if	financing	 for	development	
means	anything,	we	must	reverse	this	negative	balance	sheet	and	
fix	the	system	so	that	all	countries,	and	all	people,	especially	the	
poorest,	can	benefit.”26	
2 Leslie Wayne, “For the Old Bush Team, A Whole New Ballgame,” 
     International Herald Tribune, March , 200.
2 Thalif Deen, “Rich Nations Broke Aid Pledge,” Third World Network, 
     http://www.choike.org/nuevo_eng/informes/428.html
More	aid	cannot	fix	the	corrupt	system	that	Annan	signalled.		Rich	
country	orthodoxy	sustained	that	the	system	did	not	need	fixing	
other	than	for	governments	to	get	out	of	the	way	of	investors	and	
corporations.		Attracting	and	protecting	foreign	investment	almost	
becomes	 an	 end	 in	 itself,	 setting	 aside	 social	 and	 humanitarian	
development	components,	and	instead	emphasizing	liberalisation,	
deregulation	and	privatisation	becoming	central	to	the	generation	
of	an	“attractive”	climate	for	investment.		
Government	 itself	 must	 be	 attractive	 to	 investors,	 according	
to	 market	 fundamentalists.	 	 At	 Monterrey	 and	 at	 subsequent	
conferences,	South	governments	meekly	accepted	the	assumption	
that	 they,	 not	 history	 or	 international	 context,	were	 responsible	
for	 the	sorry	state	of	 their	countries.	 	Donors	claimed	they	were	
suffering	 from	“aid	 fatigue,”	 telling	 stories	of	 South	government	
corruption	 and	 demanding	 new	“governance”	 that	 could	 make	
the	countries	worthy	of	 aid	and,	more	 importantly,	of	 corporate	
investment	with	corollary	guarantees	for	profit	remittances.		
“Advancing	 investor	 opportunities”—a	 core	 feature	 of	 “good	
governance”—is	 itself	 fraught	 with	 new	 opportunities	 to	 cheat	
and	 extort.	 	 Concern	 for	malfeasance	was	 limited	 to	 the	 public	
sector,	 leaving	 the	 TNCs	 and	 others	 with	 a	 wide-open	 door	 to	
enjoy	 and	 abuse	 the	 benefits	 of	 liberalisation	 and	 privatisation.	
In	 the	 race	 to	 compete	 for	 Foreign	Direct	 Investment	 (FDI)	 and	
World	Bank	approval,	poor	countries	 tripped	over	each	other	 to	
provide	enhanced	benefits	 for	 investors	even	at	 the	expense	of	
social	 rights	 and	 environmental	 sustainability.	 	 Governments	
themselves	 proved	 incapable	 of	 controlling	 many	 TNCs	 and	
subjecting	 them	 to	 national	 laws	 and	 regulations,	 including	
appropriate	supervision	in	order	to	arrange	proper	tax	collections.	
Transnational	 corporations,	 including	 banking	 firms,	 use	 their	
multi-country	operations	to	hide	and	shift	profits	to	tax	havens	or	
to	countries	where	tax	rates	are	lower.				
Studies	by	UNCTAD	and	others	indicate	that	opening	up	developing	
country	 economies	 to	 foreign	 entities	 can	 be	 a	 double-edged	
sword.		The	same	policies	that	attract	investment	almost	by	their	
very	nature	lend	themselves	to	abuse.		Corporations	and	investors,	
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including	 national	 ones,	 demand	 and	 receive	 tax	 holidays	 and	
breaks,	 subsidies,	 guarantees,	 exemptions	 from	 regulations,	
including	 environmental	 and	 labour	 standards—all	 in	 the	 spirit	
of	countries	becoming	“competitive”	 in	 their	 race	 to	 the	bottom	
in	 social	 terms.	 	 A	 recent	 Botswana	 government	 advertisement	
boasted	that	“Botswana	has	reduced	corporate	taxes,	which	at	15	
percent	 for	manufacturing	entities	are	among	 the	 lowest	 in	 the	
region,	abolished	exchange	controls,	and	introduced	tax	holidays.	
These	have	proven	to	be	inviting	incentives	for	foreign	investors.	
Since	2003,	the	World	Economic	Forum	rates	Botswana	as	one	of	
the	most	economically	competitive	operations	in	Africa.”27
Because	some	60	percent	of	total	international	trade	is	now	intra-
firm	 trade	 (among	 subsidiaries),	 creative	 bookkeeping	 practices	
mean	that	losses	ranging	between	200	and	350	billion	yearly	leave	
developing	countries.28		Corporate	deposits	can	take	place	in	tax	
havens	protected	by	secrecy	laws	or	countries	with	very	low	rates	
of	 taxation	 for	 non-domestic	 enterprises.	 	 Setting	 aside	 notions	
of	 transparency	 and	 fairness,	 corporations	 engage	 in	 deliberate	
mis-pricing	 of	 their	 products	 and	 services	 to	 escape	 national	
tax	 collectors	 or	 even	 to	 claim	 further	 subsidies	 or	 concession	
improvements.	 	There	are	also	“loans”	 from	parent	companies	at	
exaggerated	costs,	or	conscious	false	invoicing	of	the	quality	and	
quantity	of	imports	and	exports.				
Fraudulent	 operations	 are	 the	 standard	 of	 international	 finance	
and	trade.		While	the	cost	for	rich	countries	in	lost	tax	revenues	can	
also	be	significant,	the	benefit	in	political	terms	is	greater.		Not	so	
with	the	South,	where	costs	may	be	greater	than	benefits	not	only	
in	balance	of	payments	 terms	but,	more	 importantly,	 in	 a	grave	
undermining	of	national	capacities	 to	apply	 laws	and	standards	
in	 the	 country	 at	 large,	 as	many	 foreign	 operations	 claim	 to	 be	
above	the	law.		In	a	non-contentious	scheme,	the	question	remains	
whether	short-term	gains	from	investment	are	offset	by	revenue	
losses	 stemming	 from	 overly-generous	 incentives.	 	 The	 theory	
states	that	foreign	investment	generates	employment,	integration	
27 Paid Advertisement: “Botswana, Africa’s Gem,” Foreign Affairs, September/ 
     October, 200. Vol. 8, No. , p.
28 Unpublished research by Sony Kapoor.
into	the	local	economy	and	transfer	of	know-how.	In	practice,	the	
reality,	particularly	for	the	poorer	countries,	can	be	much	different.	
In	 short,	 the	 benefits	 of	 FDI	 are	 not	 self-evident,	 as	 claimed	 by	
neoliberal	development	and	anti-corruption	thinking.		
By	 the	 same	 token,	 the	 lowering	 of	 import	 tariffs	 and	 trade	
and	 investment	 liberalisation—as	 demanded	 by	 “free”	 trade	
agreements,	the	WTO,	the	IFIs	and	“aid”	conditionalities—can	have	
a	negative	effect	on	governmental	revenues	and	hence	on	social	
policy	 expenditures,	 making	 countries	 even	 more	 dependent	
on	 lending	and	assistance.	 	That	 the	rich	countries	can	maintain	
subsidies	 and	 protective	 policies	 while	 the	 poorer	 countries	
cannot	speaks	volumes	about	trade	unfairness	and	international	
power	relations.	 	Yet	the	weaker	countries	are	the	ones	targeted	
by	 anti-corruption	 campaigns,	 led	 often	 by	 the	 same	 bodies	
and	 North	 governments	 engaged	 in	 self-serving	 hypocritical	
practices.		Unfair	competition	is	not	only	sanctioned,	it	is	rewarded,	
notwithstanding	talk	of	“universal”	trade	liberalisation.		
One	quarter	of	all	international	trade	is	controlled	by	the	top	200	
corporations.	 As	 TNCs	 increasingly	 dominate	 world	 trade,	 they	
have	 gone	 beyond	 evading	 regulations	 and	 into	 crafting	 them	
to	their	purposes	and	profit,	at	the	cost	of	billions	to	countries	in	
tax	 revenues.	 	This	 affects	 rich	 and	poor	governments	 alike,	but	
impacts	the	weaker	ones	disproportionately	as	state	prerogatives	
are	 steadily	 negotiated	 away	 through	 bilateral	 but	 also	 global	
legal	 frameworks.	 	A	 series	of	 trade	negotiations	under	 the	old	
General	Agreement	on	Tariffs	and	Trade	and	subsequently	under	
the	World	Trade	Organisation	in	1995	entailed	huge	concessions	
and	 losses	 for	many	 if	 not	most	 of	 the	“developing”	 countries.	
Legally	 enforceable	 agreements	 now	 bind	 the	WTO	 members	
to	 ever-deeper	 liberalisation	 of	 investments	 and	 trade	 in	 both	
merchandise	 and	 services.	 	 Predictably,	 the	WTO	 is	 gripped	 by	
the	 governments	 that	 control	 the	 decision-making	 processes	
in	 the	 IMF	 and	 the	World	 Bank—governments	 of	 countries	 in	
which	 transnational	 corporations	 engaging	 in	 a	 wide	 range	
of	 economic	 sectors	 are	 based	 and	wield	 enormous	 influence.	
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Small	 wonder	 that	 the	 pro-corporate	 anti-corruption	 bodies	
are	 reluctant	 to	speak	about	structural	corruption,	 i.e.	 the	abuse	
of	 corporate	power	 for	private	gain	 at	 the	expense	of	 the	poor,	
North	and	South	alike.	 	Northern	TNCs	and	financial	 institutions,	
abetted	by	accounting	and	legal	firms,	have	all	been	complicit	in	
fomenting	 the	 illicit	export	of	capital.	 	Meaningful	development	
will	be	impossible	until	that	corruption	under	the	public	sector	tip	
of	the	iceberg	is	stopped.		
Under	the	title	Bribe	Britannia	,	The	Economist	slammed	the	British	
Government	for	its	lack	of	resolution	in	the	fight	“against	corporate	
backhanders.”	 	 British	 delegates	 to	 the	 inaugural	 conference	 of	
the	 UN	 Convention	 against	 Corruption	 in	 Jordan	 in	 December	
2006	“were	 piously	 denouncing	 sleaze	 and	 promising	 to	 tackle	
corruption	‘wherever	we	find	 it—whether	here	or	abroad….’	 	At	
home,	meanwhile,	 their	 colleagues	were	busily	quashing	a	 two-
year	 investigation	 into	allegations	of	bribery	 in	connection	with	
the	country’s	biggest-ever	defence	contract,	the	Al-Yamamah	deal	
with	 Saudi	 Arabia.”	 	 The	 UK,	 according	 to	 this	 report,	“has	 long	
turned	a	blind	eye	to	the	bribery	of	foreign	officials	(until	recently	
such	business	costs	were	even	tax-deductible),	but	of	 late	 it	has	
been	trying	to	polish	its	public	image.”29			
While	 the	 British	 government	 ratified	 the	 OECD	 convention	
against	bribing	 foreign	officials	 in	1998,	 the	commitment	 to	 the	
treaty	was	“half-hearted,”	according	to	that	report.	 	Not	until	the	
anti-terrorism	act	of	2001	did	the	government	explicitly	ban	the	
bribing	of	 foreign	officials	by	British	citizens	and	companies,	no	
matter	where	 the	offence	 took	place.	 	Yet	 in	March	of	 2005	 the	
OECD	 formally	 complained	 that	 Britain	was	 dragging	 its	 feet	 in	
implementing	the	convention.	 It	was	no	secret	 that	British	arms	
and	oil	dealers	are	among	the	largest	in	the	world	and	conducted	
their	business	with	official	blessings	and	encouragement.		
A	scandal	erupted	in	December,	2006,		however,	when	the	Serious	
Fraud	Office	called	off	its	investigation	into	a	massive	corruption	
case	involving	Britain’s	biggest	military	contractor	and	members	
of	the	Saudi	royal	family.		BAE	Systems,	the	British	arms	merchant,	
29 “Bribe Britannia,” The Economist, December 19, 2006.  
is	also	one	of	the	top	10	US	military	firms.		Its	director,	Phillip	Caroll,	
is	 a	 former	 chairman	 of	 Shell	 Oil	 and	 was	 tapped	 by	 the	 Bush	
Administration	to	be	the	first	“Senior	Adviser	to	the	Iraqi	Ministry	
of	 Oil”	 in	 2003.	 Allegations	 were	 that	 a	 BAE-administered	 slush	
fund	supplied	the	supposedly	ascetic	royals	with	lush	apartments,	
holidays,	cash,	Jaguars,	Ferraris	and	at	least	one	gold-plated	Rolls	
Royce.	 	All	 in	 return	 for	a	huge	contract	 to	 supply	and	 train	 the	
Saudi	air	force	for	the	paltry	sum	of	$84	billion.	30		
According	 to	 investigative	 reporter	 Chris	 Floyd	 and	 the	 daily	
Observer,	the	Saudi	King	sent	a	message	through	US	Vice	President	
Richard	Cheney—then	in	Riyadh	to	raise	billions	for	Iraq—that	it	
would	 stop	 sharing	 its	 extensive	 intelligence	 on	 terrorism	 and	
kick	out	all	British	military	personnel	if	Prime	Minister	Blair	did	not	
kill	 the	probe.	 	 In	addition,	 the	Saudi	government	 threatened	to	
cancel	a	 follow-on	order	 for	72	Eurofighter	Typhoon	 jet	fighters.	
Blair	claimed	the	investigation	was	halted	because	it	threatened	
“security	and	foreign	policy	interests.”31		“Every	time	a	government	
minister	goes	abroad	and	tries	to	lecture	a	corrupt	dictator	they	
are	going	to	see	this	thrown	back	in	their	face,”	stated	Neil	Cooper,	
of	Bradford	University’s	peace	studies	department.32		Slush	funds,	
oil	sheiks,	prostitutes,	Swiss	banks,	kickbacks,	blackmail,	bagmen,	
arms	deals,	war	plans,	 climb-downs,	 big	 lies	 and	Dick	Cheney—
it’s	 a	 scandal	 that	 has	 it	 all,	 corruption	 and	 cowardice	 at	 the	
highest	 levels,”	 said	 an	 investigation	by	 the	Baltimore	Chronicle	
&	Sentinel.	
On	February	14,	2008	the	High	Court	in	London	finally	heard	the	
the	judicial	review	brought	by	The	Corner	House	and	Campaign	
Against	Arms	Trade	(CAAT)	contesting	the	legality	of	the	Serious	
Fraud	Office’s	decision	to	terminate	its	investigation	into	alleged	
bribery	 by	 BAE	 Systems	 to	 secure	 a	 huge	 arms	deal	with	 Saudi	
0 Ibid.
 “We appear to be giving businessmen carte blanch to do business with Saudi 
Arabia, which may involve illegal payments or illegal inducements.  We have 
been leaned on very heavily by the Saudis,” sail Eric Illsly, a Labour member of 
Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Select Committee quoted by Chris Lloyd, “Corruption 
and Cover Up: War Profits Trump the Rule of Law,” http://baltimorechronicle.com/
2006/122206Floyd-2.shtml
32 Quoted in “Bribe Britannia,” The Economist, December 19, 2006.  
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Arabia.		The	petioners	argued	that	the	decision	to	discontinue	to	
corruption	 investigation	was	unlawful	because	 it	was	“based	on	
considerations	 of	 potential	 damage	 to	 the	 UK’s	 relations	 with	
Saudi	 Arabia,	 in	 particular,	 damage	 to	 UK/Saudi	 security,	
intelligence	and	diplomatic	cooperation.		This	is	unlawful	because	
it	 contravenes	 Article	 5	 of	 the	 OECD’s	 Anti-Bribery	 Convention,	
which	 prevents	 signatories	 from	 terminating	 an	 investigation	
because	of	“the	potential	effect	[of	an	investigation]	upon	relations	
with	another	State”.		Further,	the	same	decision	was	taken	on	the	
basis	 of	 “tainted”	 advise	 received	 from	 government	 ministers	
government	ministers	 (including	 the	Prime	Minister)	 concerned	
over	“the	 risk	 of	 the	UK	 not	 being	 able	 to	 sell	Typhoon	 aircraft,	
and	other	commercial,	economic	and	diplomatic	matters”.	For	 its	
part,	 the	Blair	government,	having	 failed	 in	 its	effort	 to	stop	 the	
investigation,	 later	 denied	 any	breach	of	 the	OECD	Anti-Bribery	
Convention	but		declared	that	it	would	have	taken	the	decision	to	
terminate	the	investigation,	regardless	of	international	law,	on	the	
grounds	of	“national	security”.33	
Much	the	same	self-interest	and	hypocrisy	explains	how	corrupt	
dictators’	funds	continued	to	find	safe	haven	in	British	banks.		Blair	
acknowledged	in	March	2005	that	the	UK	had	to	change	its	banking	
laws	to	speed	up	the	return	of	funds	stolen	from	Africa	by	dictators.	
Under	the	UN	Convention	against	corruption,	assets	would	have	
to	be	returned,	albeit	with	complicated	legal	procedures.		This	was	
also	a	demand	of	the	Africa	Commission	report,	sponsored	by	the	
Prime	Minister	himself,	which	fingered	UK	trade	liberalisation	and	
privatisation	policies	as	part	of	the	problem,	along	with	a	British	
government	reluctance	to	crack	down	on	corporate	corruption.34	
Nonetheless,	some	hope	was	raised	when,	 in	February	2007,	 the	
European	Bank	for	Reconstruction	and	Development	decided	to	
blacklist	the	German	consulting	engineer	Lahmeyer	International	
based	on	evidence	of	fraud	relating	to	a	project	financed	by	one	of	
the	other	development	banks,	the	World	Bank.		The	EBRD,	however,	
 Research by  Susan Hawley, Nicholas Hildyard, Sarah Sexton and Larry  
     Lohmann in  http://www.thecornerhouse.org.uk  or Control BAEin http://www. 
     controlbae.org.
4 Patrick Wintour and Ashley Seager, “New bank law to help return of stolen  
     cash,” The Guardian, March 2, 200.  
issued		a		‘cross-debarment’	directive	that,	in	principle,	could	lead	
to	companies	 found	guilty	of	 fraud	on	projects	financed	by	one	
multilateral	development	bank	being	routinely	blacklisted	by	all	
the	other	entities	as	well.		Standard	practice	held	that	companies	
banned	from	doing	business	with	one	development	bank	could	
carry	on	dealing	with	all	the	others	as	 if	nothing	had	happened,	
the	Financial	Times	noted,	but	 the	EBRD	decision	could	signal	a	
change	 in	 business	 as	 usual:	 multiple	 bank	 blacklistings	 could	
become	the	new	trend.35
	
 German group put on graft blacklist, Financial Times, February 2, 2007.
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IV.  Free Trade Imperialism
In	 the	 period	 since	 the	 establishment	 of	 the	 World	 Trade	
Organisation	 (WTO)	 in	 1995,	 the	 number	 of	 transnational	
corporations	 operating	 worldwide	 rose	 from	 7,000	 to	 40,000.	
Corporations	 demanded	 and	 required	 an	 international	 trade	
regime	 tailored	 to	 the	 volume	 and	 nature	 of	 its	 operations,	
particularly	 in	 intellectual	 property,	 agricultural	 goods	 and	
services.	 	 That	 regime	 is	 being	 crafted	 by	 the	WTO,	 beginning	
with	accords	on	Agriculture	and	Non-Agricultural	Market	Access	
and	moving	to	agreements	on	services	and	intellectual	property	
rights.		As	a	result,	huge	corporations	gain	even	greater	leeway	to	
expand	at	will	and	dictate	further	requirements	that	then	translate	
into	WTO	rules	along	“free	trade”	agreements.		Although	there	is	
nothing	particularly	free	about	the	oligopolistic	rule-fixing,	“free	
trade”	handsomely	 insures	“free	markets”	 for	global	corporations	
in	 agriculture,	 services,	 finance	 and	 industrial	 products	 without	
corresponding	reciprocities.		
There	 is	 something	 corrupt	 about	 an	 international	 exchange	
shaped	 by	 corporations	 through	 the	WTO,	 yet	 that	 same	 body	
being	also	tasked	to	police	the	entire	regime.	 	Perhaps	it	can	be	
no	 other	 way:	 internal	 corporate	 corruption	 is	 complemented,	
protected	 and	 legitimised	 by	 WTO-dominated	 corrupt	 rule-
making	practices.	 	That	the	same	regime	hypocritically	promises	
to	deliver	development	should	also	be	tasked	as	corruption.
The	notion	that	“development”	flows	from	“liberalisation”	of	trade,	
market	access,	the	WTO	and	Free	Trade	Agreements	is	still	a	widely-
promoted	myth.			The	opposite	is	closer	to	the	truth.		For	example,	
liberalisation	of	agricultural	trade	now	carries	with	it	obligations	
for	 governments	 to	 change	 national	 laws	 related	 to	 land	 and	
seeds—in	a	word,	to	facilitate	and	uphold	foreign	corporate	control	
over	 seed	 supply	 and	 agriculture.	 	 Such	monopolistic	 practices,	
aside	from	the	human	toll	and	farmer	suicides	it	entails,	are	also	
corruption.	 	While	 prosecuting	“anti-competitive”	 behaviour,	 the	
WTO	assumes	a	colonialist	task	to	uphold	the	“free	trade”	global	
empire	 and	 punish	 those	 that	 do	 not	 submit.	 	 Governments	
in	 the	 South	 and	 elsewhere	 feel	 compelled	 to	 accept	 the	 free	
trade	credo:	its	rejection	would	spell	immediate	trouble	with	the	
World	 Bank	 and	 the	 IMF	 who,	 along	 with	“donors,”	 demanding	
greater	 “convergence	 and	 coherence”	 at	 the	 level	 of	 national	
policy.	 	 Convergence	 is	 insured	 by	“cross	 conditionality”	 where	
disagreement	with	the	principles	or	any	of	the	official	bodies	can	
spell	retaliation	from	the	others.		But	force	is	seldom	necessary;	the	
neoliberal	credo	is	being	accepted	by	business-minded	governing	
elites	who	profit	handsomely	from	partnerships	or	“facilitation.”
As	powerful	as	they	appear,	however,	international	organisations,	
including	the	IFIs	and	the	WTO,	are	instruments	and	not	sources	
of	power.		The	real	power	lies	with	the	rich	country	governments	
who	are	the	real	decision-makers	at	those	institutions	instructed	
to	 uphold	 and	 promote	 the	 neoliberal	 “structural	 reforms/
liberalisation”	 credo.	 	 Those	 governments,	 in	 turn,	 take	 their	
principal	 cue	 from	 the	 giant	 corporate	 conglomerates	 in	 their	
own	 countries	 or	 region.	 	 Trade	 interests	 dictate	 government	
trade	 policy,	 which	 then	 shapes	“cooperation”	 policy	 as	 well	 as	
diplomacy,	 all	 reflecting	 the	 philosophy	 that	 what	 is	 good	 for	
business	 is	 good	 for	 everyone.	 	The	Seattle	 to	Brussels	Network	
(s2bnetwork),	 an	 NGO	 coalition,	 has	 researched	 how	 European	
corporations	dominate	the	European	Union’s	trade	policies	which,	
it	claims,	are	good	for	neither	the	poor	in	Europe	nor	the	poor	in	
the	developing	countries.		In	a	report	titled	“Corporate	Power	over	
EU	Trade	 Policy,”	 the	 network	 shows	 how	 the	 EU’s	 internal	 and	
external	policies	are	shaped	by	the	strong	corporate	lobbies,	which	
“have	allowed	business	to	take	control	of	the	power	‘in	Brussels.’		A	
business-first	agenda	serves	the	interests	of	a	small	elite	of	large	
European	corporations	“at	the	expense,	and	in	breach,	of	European	
treaties’	 fundamental	 objectives	 of	 sustainable	 development,	
environmental	protection,	social	cohesion	and	democracy.”36		
The	 Europe	 Inc.	 strategy—also	 known	 as	 the	 Lisbon	 agenda—
translates	 into	 a	 negotiation	 strategy	 with	 third	 countries	 that	
gives	 priority	 to	 securing	 markets	 for	 European	 goods	 and	
 Myriam Vander Stichele, Kim Biazaarri, Leonard Plank, Corporate Power 
       over EU Trade Policy: Good for Business, Bad for the World, Seattle to Brussels 
      Network, www.s2bnetwork.org
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financial	services,	while	maintaining	the	right	to	dump	subsidised	
agricultural	 surpluses.	 	 Like	 its	 counterparts	 in	 the	 US,	 Canada	
or	 Japan,	 the	 EU	 corporate	 agenda	undermines	 any	 attempt	by	
developing	countries	to	protect	their	markets	from	the	dumping	
of	agricultural	imports.		And	this	in	turn	jeopardises	the	livelihoods	
of	 millions	 of	 small	 farmers	 who	 cannot	 compete	 in	 either	
domestic	 or	 foreign	 markets,	 whilst	 fostering	 environmentally	
unsustainable	 and	 socially	 irresponsible	 agricultural	 practices.	
What	 is	patently	unfair	should	also	be	regarded	as	corruption—
very	much	 in	 consonance	with	 the	widely	 criticised	 absence	 of	
transparency	 and	 excessive	 corporate	 influence	 over	 politicians	
that	 characterises	 not	 only	 EU	 headquarters	 but	 governments	
in	 general	 in	 the	 EU.	 	 Embassies	 and	 aid	 agencies	 are	 thereby	
instructed	to	support	corporate	demands	for	less	regulation,	more	
market	freedom	and	support	for	national	corporate	bids	for	local	
infrastructure	contracts	and	privatisation	opportunities.37	
For	its	part,	the	US	government	is	just	as	open	about	protecting	and	
promoting	the	interests	of	US-based	corporations.	 	 In	December	
2002	 then-US	 chief	 trade	 negotiator	 Robert	 Zoelick	 laid	 out	 an	
agenda	 for	 a	 new	 world	 trade	 order	 in	 an	 article	 published	 in	
The	Economist	titled	“Unleashing	the	Trade	Winds.”		“The	debate,”	
he	wrote,	“is	now	over	how—not	whether—the	United	States	 is	
advancing	free	trade.”		Zoellick	went	on	to	say	that	“America	has	
stated	its	 intentions	plainly.	 	We	will	promote	free	trade	globally,	
regionally	 and	bilaterally,	while	 rebuilding	 support	 at	home.	 	By	
moving	forward	on	multiple	fronts,	the	United	States	can	exert	its	
leverage	for	openness,	create	a	new	competition	in	liberalisation,	
target	 the	 needs	 of	 developing	 countries	 and	 create	 a	 fresh	
political	dynamic	by	putting	free	trade	on	the	offensive.”38	
“Free	 trade”	has	become	a	euphemism	 for	 corporate	expansion.	
Even	invaded	war-torn	Iraq	does	not	escape	it.		Recommendation	
62	 of	 the	 US	 bipartisan	 Iraq	 Study	 Group	 report	 calls	 for	 the	
commercialisation	and	privatisation	of	that	country’s	oil	industry.	
7 See the comments by Spanish corporation chiefs at a recent Madrid fair trade  
     in Boletín OMAL (Observatorio de Multinacionales en América Latina), 
     No. , December 200 in www.omal.info 
3 “Unleashing the Trade Winds,” The Economist, December 7-12, 2002.
In	complementary	fashion,	the	report	calls	on	the	IMF	(against	that	
body’s	charter)	to	assist	in	the	removal	of		government	subsidies	
to	 maintain	 low	 domestic	 oil	 prices,	 while	 the	 World	 Bank	 is	
summoned	 to	 apply	 its	“good	 governance”	manual.	 	 Finally,	 the	
great	overseer,	 the	US	government,	would	provide	the	technical	
assistance	to	draft	laws	defining	government	rights	and	creating	
the	“necessary	foreign	investment	framework”.39
Reflecting	 its	distrust	of	 the	Baghdad	 regime,	but	probably	also	
any	other	South	government,	the	Study	Group	report	insists	that	
“to	combat	corruption,	the	US	government	should	urge	the	Iraqi	
government	 to	post	all	oil	 contracts,	volumes	and	prices	on	 the	
Web	 so	 that	 Iraqis	 and	outside	observers	 can	 track	exports	 and	
export	revenues....		The	US	should	support	the	World	Bank’s	efforts	
to	ensure	that	best	practices	are	used	in	contracting.		This	support	
involved	providing	 Iraqi	officials	with	contracting	templates	and	
training	them	in	contracting,	auditing	and	reviewing	audits.”40		In	
other	words,	US	companies	cannot	suffer	discrimination—the	flow	
of	profits	must	be	guaranteed	whatever	 the	 form	of	US	military	
disengagement	in	Iraq.		
Bad	enough	that	the	 Iraqi	people	have	to	pay	Saddam’s	corrupt	
loans	and	compensations	for	the	first	war	against	Kuwait.		Although	
suffering	a	war	and	economic	collapse,	Iraqis	have	paid	some	US$1.8	
billion	since	Hussein’s	ouster	 in	April	2004.	 	 Interspersed	among	
the	 legitimate	and	 illegitimate	Kuwaiti	claims	are	demands	filed	
by	US	multinational	corporations,	which	have	succeeded	in	seizing	
about	78	percent	of	Iraq’s	reparation	payments.		Britain	and	the	US	
shamelessly	collected	“reparations”	running	to	hundreds	of	millions	
of	dollars.	They	were	reportedly	awarded	to	Texaco	($505	million),	
Halliburton	($18	million),	Bechtel	($7	million),	Mobil	($2.3	million),	
Shell	($1.6	million),	Nestlé	($2.6	million),	Pepsi	($3.8	million),	Philip	
Morris	($1.3	million),	Kentucky	Fried	Chicken	($321,000)	and	Toys	
R	Us	($189,449).	 	 In	most	cases,	these	corporations	did	not	claim	
that	 Saddam’s	 forces	 damaged	 their	 property	 in	 Kuwait—only	
that	they	had	“lost	profits.”		In	the	case	of	American	Express,	they	
39 Iraq Study Group Report in www.uisp.org./isg/iraq_study_  group_report/re 
     port
40 Ibid.
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experienced	a	“decline	 in	business.”41	 	Being	forced	to	pay	these	
reparations,	 the	now	“free	 Iraq”	had	to	take	a	$437m	emergency	
loan	 from	 the	 IMF,	 further	mortgaging	 its	 economy	 to	 external	
creditors.		
“What	 makes	 these	 reparations	 so	 deplorable,”	 said	 the	 Nestlé	
Boycott	 Campaign,	“is	 that	 the	 people	 of	 Iraq	 are	 in	 desperate	
need	of	resources.		The	country	is	without	adequate	infrastructure	
in	key	areas	such	as	sanitation	and	health.		It	is	the	people	of	Iraq,	
not	companies	like	Nestlé,	that	are	the	greatest	victims	of	Hussein’s	
regime,	and	if	anyone	deserves	to	be	compensated	it	is	the	Iraqi	
citizens.		But	now	their	money	is	being	siphoned	from	their	own	
government	to	line	the	pockets	of	the	world’s	richest	companies,	
while	they	are	left	struggling	to	survive	in	a	ruined	country.”42		The	
inhumanity	of	the	international	power	system	reveals	itself.
Nestlé	 has	 no	 problems	 declaring	 itself	 the	 rightful	 inheritor	
to	Saddam’s	 treasury,	and	 it	 is	not	 the	first	 time	the	corporation	
has	 tried	 to	 expropriate	 the	 funds	 of	 an	 impoverished	
nation.		 In	 2002,	 the	 company	 tried	 to	 collect	 $6	 million	 from	
Ethiopia—whose	 impending	 famine	 would	 end	 up	 affecting	
11	 million	 people—on	 the	 ludicrous	 basis	 that	 the	 country’s	
long-since	 toppled	 military	 government	 nationalised	 a	
company	 in	 1975	 that	 Nestlé	 would	 later	 come	 to	 own.43	
Examined	 closely,	 the	 Iraq	 reconstruction	 template	 is	 not	
qualitatively	 different	 from	 that	 being	 applied	 to	 post-war	 and	
post-disaster	 scenarios.	 	 What	 Shalmal	 Guttal	 of	 Focus	 on	 the	
Global	 South	 calls	 the	 US	 “vertical	 integration	 model”	 even	
applied	 to	 the	 aftermath	 of	 Hurricane	 Katrina.	 	 Following	 the	
disaster,	a	select	group	of	private	companies	with	long-standing	
relationships	 with	 key	 US	 federal	 agencies	 were	 offered	 no-bid	
contracts	for	rehabilitation	and	reconstruction	in	the	New	Orleans	
area.		Former	senior	US	government	officials	were	called	in	by	the	
big	companies	as	highly	paid	consultants	to	help	win	contracts	for	
41 Naomi Klein, “Why is war-torn Iraq giving $190,000 to Toys R Us?,” 
     The Globe and Mail, October 2004.
42 http://www.infactcanada.ca/nbu_Oct04.htm
4 Ibid.
those	same	corporations,	 including	Bechtel	and	Halliburton,	also	
at	work	in	Iraq.		An	NGO	watchdog	group,	Project	on	Government	
Oversight,	stated	that	in	the	case	of	Katrina,	“You	are	likely	to	see	
the	equivalent	of	war	profiteering—disaster	profiteering.”44
In	a	break	with	the	corporate-friendly	anti-corruption	school,	new	
organisations	 such	as	Global	Witness	and	Publish	What	You	Pay	
are	 demanding	 greater	 corporate	 accountability	 in	 its	 dealings	
in	 the	 South.	 	 In	 December	 1999	 Global	 Witness	 published	 a	
path-breaking	 expose	 of	 the	 complicity	 of	 the	 oil	 and	 banking	
industries	in	the	plundering	of	state	assets	during	Angola’s	40-year	
civil	war.		Major	multinational	oil	companies	aided	and	abetted	the	
mismanagement	and	embezzlement	of	oil	revenues	by	Angolan	
elites.	 	 What	 became	 clear	 from	 the	 report	 was	 the	 need	 to	
challenge	corporate	refusal	to	release	financial	information.		
The	 report	 concludes	 with	 a	 public	 call	 on	 the	 oil	 companies	
operating	 in	 Angola	 to	“publish	what	 you	 pay.”	 	 Global	Witness	
has	 been	 joined	by	 the	Christian	 charity	 CAFOD,	 	Open	 Society	
Institute,	Oxfam	GB,	Save	the	Children	UK	and	even	Transparency	
International	 UK	 to	 mount	 a	 worldwide	 campaign	 calling	 for	
all	 natural	 resource	 companies	 to	 disclose	 their	 payments	 to	
governments	for	every	country	of	operation.45		“All	well	and	good,	
but	 incomplete,	as	emphasising	 illegal	bribe	payments	needs	to	
be	accompanied	with	the	still	illegitimate	extraction	of	a	country’s	
wealth;	that	is,	the	difference	between	what	should	be	paid	for	a	
country’s	 resources	and	what	 is	 in	 fact	paid,	 taking	 into	account	
external	capacities	to	fix	the	price	of	key	resources.		In	other	words,	
publish	what	you	really	earn.	
	
In	this	context,	one	would	ask	why	more	scrutiny	is	not	paid	to	tax	
havens,	veritable	sources	and	symbols	of	global	money	laundering.	
Transparency	 International	 (TI)	 came	 under	 fire	 by	 Norwegian	
jurists	and	NGOs	 for	not	 including	 tax	havens	 in	 its	 survey.	 	The	
	
44 Mike Davis,” The Predators of New Orleans,” Le Monde Diplomatique,  
     (October 200), quoted by Shalmali Guttal, “Reconstruction’s Triple Whammy: 
     Wolfowitz, the White House and the World Bank,” Focus on the Global South,  
      December, 200.  www.focusweb.org
4 http://www.publishwhatyoupay.org/english/background.shtml
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Norwegian	 Tax	 Justice	 Network	 (TJN)	 called	 on	 Transparency	
International	to	rate	tax	havens	as	high	as,	if	not	higher	than	bribery	
in	 terms	 of	 impact	 because	 developing	 countries	 lose	 more	 in	
revenue	this	way	than	from	bribery.	 	TJN	director	John	Christens	
claimed	 that	Transparency	 International’s	Corruption	Perception	
Index	 (CPI)	 distorts	 the	 published	 perception	 on	 corruption	
because	 it	only	 looks	at	one	side	of	 the	equation.	 	 For	example,	
said	Christensen,	the	CPI	“consistently	identifies	Africa	as	a	nexus	
of	 corruption”	 while	 40	 per	 cent	 of	 the	 countries	 ranked	“least	
corrupt”	are	offshore	tax	havens.		Eva	Joly,	a	French	magistrate	and	
high-profile	corruption	fighter,	agreed.		She	believes	tax	havens	are	
“one	of	the	biggest	problems	the	world	faces	today….		The	system	
is	such	that	the	really	rich	people	manage	to	evade	a	large	share	of	
their	tax	payment	(which	should	go	to	rich	countries)	by	locating	
their	activities	in	tax	havens.		As	a	result,	the	tax	burden	becomes	
heavier	for	most	people,”	adding	that	there	is	also	the	additional	
concern	these	“secret	structures”	pose	in	regard	to	security	because	
terrorists	can	use	them	to	hide	funds.46		TI	claimed	its	index	cannot	
be	extended	or	revised	to	include	tax	haven	issues.
Citigroup,	 the	 US-based	 financial	 conglomerate,	 is	 the	 largest	
financial	 services	 conglomerate	 in	 the	world,	operating	 in	 some	
100	 countries	 with	 1	 trillion	 in	 assets,	 reporting	 120	 billion	 in	
revenues	and	nearly	25	billion	in	net	income	in	2005.		It	describes	
itself	as	“private	bankers”	who	“act	as	financial	architects,	designing	
and	 coordinating	 insightful	 solutions	 for	 individual	 client	
needs,	 with	 an	 emphasis	 on	 personalised,	 confidential	 service.”	
Investigative	journalist	Lucy	Komisar	looked	into	Citi’s	operations	
and	uncovered	how	services	included	setting	up	shell	companies,	
secret	trusts	and	bank	accounts	to	assist	in	laundering	drug	money,	
hiding	stolen	assets	and	tax	cheating.		Argentina’s	2001	financial	
breakdown	was	in	no	small	part	the	product	of	the	government’s	
inability	to	pay	debts	as	a	result	of	a	massive	evasion	of	taxes	with	
the	flight	of	some	$127	billion	in	capital—a	sum	nearly	equal	to	
the	 country’s	 foreign	 debt—to	 secret	 offshore	 havens	 over	 the	
course	of	a	decade,	according	to	the	Investigative	Commission	on	
4 ”Transparency International should highlight tax havens,”  (original report 
appeared in the Norwegian Journal Development Today), Odious Debts Online, 
March 22, 2007, www.odiousdebt.org  
Capital	Flight	set	up	by	Argentina’s	House	of	Deputies.		A	Citibank	
official	in	Argentina	was	caught	by	a	TV	journalist	offering	to	help	
a	“businessman”	cheat	on	taxes,	wiring	money	in	a	false	name	to	a	
transit	account	at	Citibank	New	York	and	moving	it	from	there	into	
an	International	Personal	Banking	account.		As	a	non-resident,	the	
client	would	then	not	need	to	pay	taxes	on	foreign	soil.		
Offshore	 tax	 haven	 systems	 are	 fundamental	 to	 conducting	
accounting	 frauds,	 as	 the	 centres	 protect	 their	 clients	 from	 the	
country’s	law	enforcement	officers	and	tax	collectors.		Indeed,	there	
are	more	than	70	offshore	centers	that	hold	individual	foreign	funds	
and	in	whic		Citigroup	also	maintains	offices.		According	to	Komisar,	
customers	include	leading	businessmen,	politicians,	government	
and	 military	 officials	 as	 well	 as	 the	 widow	 of	 Colombian	 drug	
trafficker	 Pablo	 Escobar.	 	 Citibank	 officials	 acknowledged	 that	
they	use	the	offshore	system	to	help	clients	avoid	taxes.		Komisar	
explains	that	“the	use	of	‘avoid’	rather	than	‘evade’	is	a	legal	nicety	
that	 occurs	when	 the	wealthy	 and	powerful	 use	 their	 power	 to	
legalise	non-payment	of	taxes	and	hobble	enforcement	agencies	
to	prevent	justified	investigation	and	prosecution.”47	
Disclosure	is	not	an	end	in	itself.		What	also	needs	to	be	challenged	
is	the	fact	that	investments,	especially	in	sub	Saharan	Africa,	earn	
returns	as	obscenely	high	as	30%	per	annum.	 	Governments	are	
also	 responsible	 for	 that	 fact	 and	 officials	 may	 be	 taking	 their	
“cut,”	 but	 the	 cut	 becomes	 legalised	 and	 institutionalised	 as	
countries	compete	to	offer	“incentives”	in	order	to	keep	and	secure	
investment.				
Corporations	 and	 governments	 also	 need	 to	 publish	what	 they	
earn	as	the	product	of	reduced	tax	rates,	tax	holidays	and	in	general	
the	 induction	of	policies	 such	as	financial	 liberalisation	 that	put	
foreign	investors’	 interest	over	domestic	development	goals	and	
encourage	capital	flight	 through	both	 legal	and	 illegal	channels	
47 Lucy Komisar, “Citigroup: a culture and history of tax evasion,” The Public 
Eye on Davos, Tax Justice Network; http://www.taxjustice-usa.org; “Hank and 
Citibank—A Case in Point,” The Nation, www.thenation.com/doc/20008/
komisar; “Confessions of a banker,” New Internationalist, August 200, http://
thekomisarscoop.com
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in	the	banking	system.		While	very	important,	concentrating	on	the	
extractive	industries	is	not	enough;	the	pattern	is	much	the	same	
in	 other	 industries,	 services	 and	 banking.	 	 Researchers	 estimate	
that	 about	 half	 of	 developing	 country	 trade	 is	 controlled	 by	
multinational	firms	that	are	able	to	manipulate	the	prices	on	trade	
and	financial	transactions	using	related	subsidiaries	in	tax	havens	
and	other	countries	to	shift	hundreds	of	billions	of	dollars	out	of	
poor	 countries.	 	 Taken	 together,	 such	 leakages	 cost	 developing	
countries	more	than	$500	billion	in	illegal	and	corrupt	outflows.48
In	Latin	America,	the	golden	age	of	privatisation	induced	most	Latin	
American	countries	to	shift	almost	overnight	to	a	deregulated,	de-
nationalised	low-tax	model	favored	by	the	multinationals.		Of	late,	
the	 tendency	 is	 to	 shift	 to	higher	 tax	models	 and	 convert	 firms	
to	 joint	 ventures.	 	 Related	 processes	 include	 so-called	 “public-
private	partnerships”	(PPP)	and	“contracting-out”	or	“outsourcing”	
services.	 	 The	 bottom	 line	 is	 that	 corporate	 capital	 from	 richer	
countries	must	expand	and	advance,	no	matter	what	the	costs	or	
modalities,	preferably	by	 insuring	 the	cooperation	of	 corporate-
friendly	governance	subject	more	 to	 international	 legal	 regimes	
than	to	national	ones.			
The	 WTO	 and	 many	 FTAs	 make	 reference	 to	 “trade-related	
infrastructure”;	 this	 can	 include	 the	 privatisation	 of	 energy	 and	
water	services,	highways,	ports	and	airports	and	what	many	refer	
to	the	“Walmartisation”	of	retail.		Linking	“aid”	to	trade,	the	IFIs	can	
use	 their	 economic	 power	 to	 demand	 trade	 liberalisation	 and	
privatisation	in	what	is	termed	“conditionality.”		It	all	forms	part	of	
the	neoliberal	‘development’	model	 that	 covers	up	and	 rewards	
essentially	 unfair	 and	 corrupt	 transactions	 intended	 to	 insure	
domination.
As	Rosa	 Luxemburg	 argued,	 colonialism	 is	 a	 constant	necessary	
condition	 for	 capitalist	 growth.	 	 Colonies	 and	 colonisation	 are	
indispensable	 to	 capital	 accumulation.	 	 We	 are	 led	 to	 believe,	
though,	that	“development”	is	also	the	product	of	that	accumulation	
and	expansion,	however	much	 it	 is	based	on	patriarchy	and	the	
concomitant	subjugation	of	people,	nations	and	the	environment,	
48 Research in progress by Sony Kapoor.
along	with	the	destruction	of	cultures.		Real	development	would	
imply	democratic	sovereignty	and	a	nation’s	capacity	to	determine	
its	own	development.		
Vandana	Shiva,	an	activist	and	scholar	from	India,	correctly	insists	
that	it	is	not	a	matter	of	fair	trade	but	of	honest	trade,	as	today’s	
trade,	particularly	 in	 agriculture,	 is	 dishonest	 and	has	become	a	
virtual	war	against	farmers,	 leading	to	what	she	terms	genocide,	
symbolised	 by	 the	 hundreds	 of	 suicides	 by	 farmers	 driven	 to	
bankruptcy	in	 India	due	to	seed	monopolising	practices	such	as	
Monsanto’s.
Shiva	 writes:	 “The	 partnership	 between	 corporations	 and	
governments	is	leading	to	the	emergence	of	a	corporate	state—
with	 the	 state	 using	 its	 political	 power	 to	 help	 corporations	
appropriate	the	wealth	and	property	of	citizens	and	corporations	
using	their	economic	power	to	help	politicians	who	have	helped	
them	crush	democratic	dissent.		This	gives	a	few	people	such	power	
that	they	can	rob	people	of	all	freedoms.		Monopoly	markets	lead	
to	quasi-military	authority.	The	corporate	state	becomes	a	fascist	
state.	 Fascist	 dictatorship	 is	 an	 inevitable	 outcome	 of	 market	
dictatorship….		Every	village	is	being	made	a	concentration	camp.	
Every	home	is	being	turned	into	a	torture	chamber.”49
49 Vandana Shiva, “Corporate Rule=Fascism,” Znet commentaries, August 6,  
     2006, http://www.zmag.org/sustainers/content/2006-0/0shiva.cfm
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V.  Social Bribery: the Privatisation of Public 
Property and Policy 
As	 we	 have	 argued,	 reducing	 anti-corruption	 engagement	 	 to	
issues	 of	 individual	 bribe-making	 or	 bribe-taking	 does	 not	
advance	 us	 very	 far	 in	 our	 understanding	 of	 corruption	 and	
how	best	 to	 tackle	 the	phenomenon.	 	One	misses	 the	 forest	by	
focusing	on	the	tree.		There	may	less	a	role	for	individual	bribery	
when	 influence	 and	 power	 wielded	 by	 a	 corporate	 entity	 can	
clearly	attain	much	more	and	 in	a	 legalised	manner,	particularly	
where	the	“public”	sector	is	now	engaged	in	soliciting	investment.	
Governments,	 particularly	but	not	 exclusively	 in	 the	 South,	 take	
to	 bribing	 foreign	 and	 domestic	 investors	 in	 what	 one	 analyst	
has	termed	“social	bribes”—extending	the	concessions	or	favours	
demanded	by	corporations	in	return	for	undertaking	investments.	
Those	privileges	can	take	various	forms,	such	as	a	guaranteed	rate	
of	return,	“viability	gap	financing”	(grants	under	so-called	public/
private	 partnerships),	 tax	 exemptions	 and	 holidays,	 exemption	
from	 import	 duties,	 provision	 of	 communications	 infrastructure,	
free	 land	 for	 investment	projects,	 including	the	right	 to	sell	 that	
land	at	a	profit,	immunity	from	local	land	and	environmental	laws,	
extended	tax	holidays	and	unimpeded	remittance	of	gains	from	
speculation.50	
While	the	demand	for	government	subsidies	(social	bribery)	is	as	old	
as	capitalist	transactions	themselves,	the	tendency	under	neoliberal	
capitalism	has	been	fuelled	by	the	discrediting	and	dismantling	of	
the	public	sector	in	itself	and	as	a	potential	competitor.	 	Prabhat	
Patnaik	describes	the	process	as	one	that	entails	the	“systematic,	
deliberate	and	entirely	unjustified	vilification	of	the	public	sector,	
which	was	seen	earlier	as	providing	an	alternative	agency	to	the	
capitalists.”	 	 Arguing	 that	massive	 investments	 are	 needed	 and	
that	 the	 state	 cannot	 compete,	 neoliberal	 officials	 come	 to	 the	
unwarranted	 conclusion	 that	 the	 private	 sector	 must	 account	
for	 the	 bulk	 of	 the	 investment	 and	 therefore	 investors	must	 be	
50 Prabat Patnaik, “An Aspect of Neo-Liberalism,” Ideas (December, 2006), No.  
    8. http://www.networkideas.org/news/dec200/news8_Neo_Liberalism.htm
enticed	in	various	ways	through	social	“bribes.”51		The	argument	is	
more	ideological	than	empirical—it	is	also	circular	insofar	as	the	
auctioning	off	of	 the	public	 sector	enterprises	also	deprives	 the	
state	of	t	income	to	effectively	concentrate	the	capital	required	for	
modernisation.
Yet	 corporate-dominated	 entities	 such	 as	 Transparency	
International,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 principal	 international	 conventions	
against	corruption,	prefer	to	maintain	a	narrow	view	of	corruption.	
Indeed,	it	took	some	effort	for	the	World	Bank	to	even	recognise	
and	address	corruption.		Until	the	presidency	of	James	Wolfensohn,	
corruption	was	off	limits	and	too	political	for	the	Bank	to	handle	
given	 its	 need	 to	 maintain	 good	 relations	 with	 its	 “client”	
governments.		TI	developed	as	an	offshoot	of	the	Bank,	only	with	a	
clearer	mandate	for	why	TI	could	call	on	the	World	Bank	to	ensure	
greater	integrity	in	its	projects	and	procedures,	although	carefully	
avoiding	any	mention	of	Structural	Adjustment	Plans	(SAP)	which	
capped	wages	on	bureaucracies	in	many	countries,	leading	to	the	
soliciting	of	petty	bribes.
Along	with	other	agencies,	TI	and	the	Bank	define	corruption	as	
“the	abuse	of	public	office	for	private	gain.”	52		USAID’s	definition	is	
more	sophisticated:	“the	abuse	of	entrusted	authority	for	private	
gain,”	 implying	 that	 corruption	 involves	more	 than	public	office	
abuse	 because	 it	 “may	 be	 undertaken	 not	 only	 for	 immediate	
personal	gain	but	also	for	any	‘private	gain,’	including	that	of	family	
or	 political	 contracts,	 long-term	 rather	 than	 immediate	 payoffs,	
and	the	siphoning	of	public	funds	to	finance	an	incumbent’s	re-
election	campaign...	not	all	illegal	activities	are	corruption,	and	not	
all	forms	of	corruption	are	illegal.”53
USAID	 intentionally	 broadens	 the	 definition	 to	 encompass	
political	and	development	objectives,	given	that	corruption	would	
undermine	both	development	 and	democracy,	 and	 increasingly	
security.	 	 Its	 strategy	 document	 admits	 that	 the	 anti-corruption	
focus	is	chiefly	a	public	sector	one,	but	it	does	recognise	and	extend	
 Ibid.
52 World Bank, Helping Countries Combat Corruption, (World Bank, 1997).
 USAID Anticorruption Strategy, (Washington, D.C., January 200), p. 8.  
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to	 the	field	of	public	and	private	sector	 interaction.	 	For	 its	part,	
the	WB	 identifies	 corruption	 as	“the	 single	 greatest	 obstacle	 to	
economic	 and	 social	 development.”	 	 Corruption	 undermines	
development	 by	“distorting	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 and	weakening	 the	
institutional	 foundations	 on	which	 economic	 growth	 depends,”	
according	to	the	Bank.
Both	the	OECD	and	the	World	Bank	adhere	to	what	social	scientists	
term	the	“principal	agent	client”	framework.		We	are	presented	with	
the	“rational”	behaviour	of	an	agent	[i.e.,	the	public	employee]	who	
takes	possession	for	itself	of	some	public	benefit,	either	financial	
or	of	another	nature,	diverting	it	from	the	principal,	which	is	the	
national	state.		Under	this	scheme,	reducing	corruption	is	a	matter	
of	increasing	the	sanctions	or	risk	of	sanctions,	thereby	sparking	a	
subsequent	rational	decision	not	to	commit	corruption.54
But	corruption	cannot	be	reduced	to	isolated	exchanges:	it	is	also	
the	product	of	a	structure	of	relationships	and	networks	that	can	
subvert	or	capture	bureaucracies	so	as	to	obtain	the	“social	bribe.”	
Here	 we	 suggest	 shifting	 attention	 towards	 the	 international	
private	 entities	 known	 as	 corporations,	which	 are	 becoming	 no	
longer	just	bribe-givers	but	bribe-takers.		The	social	bribe	takes	the	
form	of	benefits	derived	from	rules	under	which	the	corporation	
will	operate.
Corporations	 are	 not	 altruistic	 organisations	 but	 profit-making	
ones—and	matters	of	public	 interest	have	a	way	of	cutting	 into	
profit	margins	or	jeopardising	their	security	against	government	
intervention.		Hence	the	need	to	attain	juridical	guarantees—legal	
protection,	legal	recourse,	fixed	rules	of	the	game,	profit	repatriation,	
etc—that	 will	 protect	 their	 investment	 against	 the	 state	 itself.	
Where	 the	 state	 behaves	 appropriately—“good	 governance”—
there	will	 be	 no	 need	 for	 bribes	 in	 the	 old-fashioned	 term,	 but	
rather	open	transactions	stressing	cooperation	and	profit-sharing	
with	local	elites	who	are	all	too	happy	to	act	as	go-betweens	for	
the	acquisition	of	concessions.		As	bribery	has	also	been	the	focus	
of	 major	 international	 conventions	 and	 agreements—UN,	 OAS,	
54 Robert Klitgaard, Controlling Corruption, (University of California Press, 1991).
OECD—the	 benefit/costs	 of	 engaging	 in	 bribery	 is	 diminishing,	
although	by	no	means	is	it	ended.
While	 corruption	flourishes	under	 the	cover	of	privatisation,	 the	
old	 anti-corruption	 school	 wastes	 its	 time	 trying	 to	 measure	
the	 phenomenon.	 	The	 best	 known	 instrument	 is	 the	TI	 annual	
corruption	index,	which	does	not	measure	corruption	per	se	but	
perceptions	of	 it	(which	may	or	may	not	coincide).	 	 If	corruption	
is	a	matter	of	perception,	one	must	ask	whose	perception?	 	The	
Transparency	 Index	 Corruption	 Report	 tends	 to	 gather	 the	
perceptions	 of	 private	 sector	 leaders	 and	 business	 associations.	
Obviously,	they	will	not	be	talking	about	themselves	but	about	the	
local	government.55	 	Ordinary	citizens,	on	the	other	hand,	would	
probably	be	the	first	to	associate	corruption	with	privatisation	of	
public	services	and	 infrastructure.	 	The	media	 in	many	countries	
would	 also	 corroborate	 the	 tendency	 while	 taking	 electoral	
campaign-induced	accusations	with	a	grain	of	salt.
So	while	businesspeople	judge	and	monitor	the	government,	who	
judges	these	monitors?		And	by	the	way,	who	scrutinises	the	very	
entities	that	preach	transparency	and	accountability?		In	fairness,	
credit	should	be	given	to	the	campaign	efforts,	along	with	the	zeal	
and	resources	that	have	been	expended	to	elevate	the	corruption	
issue	on	the	international	agenda.		But	after	nearly	two	decades	of	
important	work,	the	dominant	anti-corruption	“movement”	seems	
to	be	spinning	 its	wheels,	having	perhaps	accomplished	a	great	
deal	by	way	of	international	conventions	and	influencing	national	
legislation.		Investors	benefit	from	improved	legal	and	institutional	
frameworks,	but	then	doubts	arise	as	to	the	certainty	of	the	much-
touted	equation	between	investment	and	poverty	reduction.
Some	have	 taken	 to	blaming	 the	culture	and	continents	 for	 the	
absence	of	progress,	declaring	entire	regions	and	societies	to	be	
 According to its authors, “The 200 Corruption Perceptions Index is a composite 
index that draws on multiple expert opinion surveys that poll perceptions of public 
sector corruption in  countries around the world, the greatest scope of any CPI to 
date. It scores countries on a scale from zero to ten, with zero indicating high levels 
of perceived corruption and ten indicating low levels of perceived corruption.” 
http://www.transparency.org/news_room/in_focus/cpi_200
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hopelessly	corrupt	and	arguing	that	corruption	is	a	manifestation	
of	some	deep	cultural	disorder	and	character	flaw	that	practices	
and	 tolerates	 abuses.56	 	 The	 point	 is	 not	 to	 make	 corruption	 a	
matter	of	cultural	post-modernism,	let	alone	something	a	citizenry	
should	tolerate.		Others	explain	it	away	through	a	sometimes	racist,	
patronising	dismissal	of	corruption	in	a	given	setting	because	“it	is	
part	of	the	culture.”
While	 the	 debate	 on	 public	 sector	 corruption	 grows	 sterile,	 the	
pace	of	privatisation	 is	accelerating	 in	 the	 real	world.	 	This	 is	no	
coincidence.	 	Corruption	 is	 the	reason	privatisation	 is	 important,	
coming	 as	 a	 heaven-sent	 solution	 that	 would	 also	 allow	 the	
industries	 and	 countries	 to	 be	 “competitive.”	 	 Joseph	 Stiglitz,	
who	while	 at	 the	World	 Bank	 helped	 shape	 the	 anti-corruption	
thrust,	upheld	 the	connection	while	employed	by	 the	Bank,	but	
later	 commented	 somewhat	 apologetically	 that	 “I’m	 not	 sure	
these	 private	 sector	 advocates	 quite	 had	 in	 mind	 the	 abilities	
that	American	corporate	capitalism	has	demonstrated	 so	amply	
recently:	 corruption	on	 an	 almost	unfathomable	 scale.	They	put	
to	 shame	 those	petty	government	bureaucrats	who	 stole	 a	 few	
thousand	 dollars	 or	 even	 a	 few	million.	 	 The	 numbers	 bandied	
about	 in	 the	 Enron,	 WorldCom	 and	 other	 scandals	 are	 in	 the	
billions,	greater	than	the	GNP	of	many	countries,”	he	claimed.57
Simply	pointing	to	the	existence	of	corruption	in	the	North	does	not	
advance	us	very	much	the	construction	of	popular	anti-corruption	
strategies.	 	 Enron-like	 episodes	 have	 an	 impact	 on	 the	 South	
usually	with	some	form	of	linkage	to	public	officials	in	the	various	
countries	in	which	the	corporation	operated.		There	should	be	no	
denying	the	real	problem	of	corruption	in	the	public	sector.	 	But	
it	is	one	thing	to	criticise	corruption	with	a	view	to	strengthening	
the	state	and	the	public	sector,	and	quite	the	opposite	to	fight	it	
in	order	 to	shrink	 the	public	 sector	and	 relegate	 the	state	 to	an	
56 Chabal, Patrick & Chaloz, Pascal, Africa Works - Disorder as political  
     instrument. (Oxford, 1999).
57 Joseph Stiglitz, Corporate Corruption, The conflicts of Interest Driving US  
     Financial Scandals are being Replicated on a Global Scale, Guardian  
     (London), July 4, 2002, available on http://www.commondreams.org/ 
     views02/0704-02.htm
observer	position	(from	a	regulator	to	a	referee,	as	the	World	Bank	
says).
According	to	the	dominant	development/anti-corruption	model,	
national	 governments	 would	 limit	 themselves	 to	 insuring	 legal	
systems	based	on	private	property	 (as	 opposed	 to	 those	based	
on	communal	 tenure).	 	The	point	 is	 to	offer	 the	most	conducive	
conditions	 to	 corporate	 investment	 and	 a	 furious	 multi-
dimensional	privatisation	process	driven	by	the	needs	of	the	TNCs	
and	the	dynamics	of	global	capitalism,	sweeping	up	water,	energy,	
public	 services,	 health,	 education,	 technology	 and	 intellectual	
property.		If	there	is	a	role	for	the	state	under	this	scheme	of	affairs,	
it	 is	one	of	advancing	private	sector	interests	through	free	trade	
and	 investment	agreements,	all	 in	 the	belief	 that	 it	will	advance	
economic	growth	and	allow	their	own	private	sectors	to	expand	
and	profit.
Unfortunately,	 the	dominant	 corruption	 school	has	no	place	 for	
examining	 the	 links	 among	privatisation,	 the	growth	of	poverty	
and	social	inequality	and	ecological	degradation.		Nothing	is	said	
about	irreparable	damages	caused	by	privatisation/liberalisation	
on	 small-scale	 producers	 and	 retailers	 (“Walmartisation”),	 and	
on	 economically	 and	 socially	 vulnerable	 sectors,	 including	
indigenous	communities	and	women.		In	this	context,	Transparency	
International	joins	the	international	entities	that	are	central	to	the	
privatisation	 drive,	 including	 the	 corporations	 themselves,	 the	
World	Bank	and	the	Asian	and	Inter-American	Development	banks.	
Also	 joining	 the	group	 is	 the	United	Nations	due	 to	 its	defence	
and	promotion	of	a	financing-for-development	paradigm	that	in	
effect	assigns	the	development	promotion	task	to	private	capital.	
Comfortably	looking	on	are	the	TNCs,	which	enjoy	the	benefits	of	
the	global	system	of	economic	governance	and	continue	to	elude	
any	significant	global	regulation.
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VI  Governance and Corruption
       Making the (Mis)connections
Governance	 is	first	and	 fundamentally	a	question	of	democracy	
and	democratic	institutions,	or	their	lack.		Good	governance	should	
be	described	as	a	process	of	deepening	democracy	through	forms	
of	institutional	development	that	allow	citizens	to	make	decisions	
and	determine	their	future.		However,	placed	in	the	hands	of	the	
IFIs	and	the	“donors,”	good	governance	means	something	else	for	
somewhere	else.		From	the	hegemonic	perspective,	governance	is	
not	for	deepening	democracy,	but	rather	for	further	tailoring	the	
state	(i.e.	modernisation)	to	meet	the	demands	of	capital.		Which	is	
to	say,	weakening	public	capacity	to	regulate	economic	enterprise	
and	protect	the	weakest,	as	stipulated	in	so	many	Constitutions.
In	 what	 Harvard	 Professor	 Dani	 Rodrik	 calls	 the	 Augmented	
Washington	Consensus,	the	World	Bank	and	the	big	corporations	
are	 pushing	 for	 political	 reforms	 to	 complement	 the	 economic	
ones	demanded	earlier.		
Original Washington
Consensus
“Augmented” Washington Consensus
(the previous 10 items, plus):
1.	Fiscal	discipline
2.	Reorientation	of	public
				expenditures
3.	Tax	reform
4.	Financial	liberalisation
5.	Unified	and	competitive
				exchange	rates
6.	Trade	liberalisation
7.	Openness	to	DFI
8.	Privatisation
9.	Deregulation
10.Secure	Property	Rights
11.	Corporate	governance
12.	Anti-corruption
13.	Flexible	labour	markets
14.	WTO	agreements
15.	Financial	codes	and	standards
16.	“Prudent”	capital-account	opening
17.	Non-intermediate	exchange
							rate	regimes
18.	Independent	central	banks/
							inflation	targeting
19.	Social	safety	nets
20.	Targeted	poverty	reduction
Taking	 “structural	 adjustment”	 into	 its	 third	 decade	 in	 areas	
such	as	Latin	America,	the	IFIs	and	the	“donors”	pushed	for	more	
private	 sector-friendly	“reforms”	 to	make	countries	adjust	 to	 the	
increasing	 requirements	 of	 corporate	 investors—with	 much	 of	
the	 zeal	 wrapped	 up	 in	 the	 discourse	 of	 anti-corruption,	 good	
governance	 and	 institution-building.	 	 Rodrik	 argues,	 “Taken	 to	
its	 logical	 conclusion,	 the	 focus	 on	 institutions	 has	 potentially	
debilitating	 side	 effects	 for	 policy	 reformers.	 Institutions	 are	 by	
their	very	nature	deeply	embedded	in	society.	 	 If	growth	indeed	
requires	major	 institutional	 transformation—in	 the	areas	of	 rule	
of	 law,	 property	 rights	 protection,	 governance	 and	 so	on—how	
can	 we	 not	 be	 pessimistic	 about	 the	 prospects	 for	 growth	 in	
poor	countries”?58		To	which	one	should	add,	how	can	we	not	be	
pessimistic	for	the	poor	themselves	as	poverty	reduction	and	social	
policies	were	at	the	bottom	of	the	list	and	clearly	conditioned	on	
the	macroeconomic	and	macro-political	priorities?
To	 its	 credit,	 the	 mainstream	 anti-corruption	 discussions	 have	
accepted	that	anti-corruption	(state)	practices	are	best	addressed	
within	 the	 framework	 of	 governance—“good	 governance”	 as	
the	 “donors”	 term	 it.	 	 But	 good	 for	 whom?	 	 Like	 “reform”	 and	
“transparency”	 or	“accountability,”	 the	words	 are	 bandied	 about	
as	 something	 not	 only	 inherently	 desirable	 but	 also	 intrinsic	 to	
the	content	of	mainstream	reform:	liberalisation	and	privatisation.	
Corruption	fighters	are	supposed	to	make	this	huge	leap.
Leading	 the	new	western	crusade	 is	none	other	 than	 the	World	
Bank,	today	bent	on	becoming	the	global	anti-corruption	standard	
bearer,	 probably	 because	 if	 it	 does	 not	 stand	 as	 judge	 it	would	
surely	 be	 in	 the	 defendant’s	 chair.	 	 In	May	 2004	 the	 US	 Senate	
Foreign	Relations	Committee	opened	a	hearing	on	corruption	in	
multilateral	development	banks.	Senator	Richard	Lugar,	an	Indiana	
Republican	who	chairs	the	Committee,	cited	experts	who	estimate	
that	$26-130	billion	of	World	Bank	 lending	since	1946	has	been	
misused.	 	 The	 World	 Bank	 rejected	 this	 figure	 and	 vigorously	
defended	its	anti-corruption	efforts.59
8 Dani Rodrik, “Good Bye Washington Consensus, Hello Washington
     Confusion?,” http://ksghome.harvard.edu/~drodrik/Lessons of the 1990s  
     review _JEL_.pdf
59 Bretton Woods Project, US lawmakers scrutinise World Bank record on 
     corruption, 28th May 2004, <http://brettonwoodsproject.org/art. 
     shtml?x=22>
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What	 the	 senators	 did	 not	 look	 into	was	 the	 evidence	 that	 IFI-	
and	 “donor”-supported	 privatisation	 and	 liberalisation	 was	
itself	 generating	 corruption.	 	 Data	 are	 mounting	 steadily	 that	
liberalisation	 can	 actually	 magnify	 existing	 corruption	 and	
illegal	 practices;	 that	 privatisation	 in	many	 cases	 has	 entailed	 a	
concentration	of	resources	in	private	and	corporate	hands	often	
superior	to	that	of	government	itself.		Greater	public	regulation	is	
required,	but	much	of	it	would	run	against	the	current	of	World	Bank-
induced	state	“reform”	programmes.		In	defence	of	its	framework,	
the	Bank	has	 tried	 to	establish	empirical	 linkages	between	anti-
corruption	(governance)	reforms	and	economic	growth,	but	even	
internal	 Bank	 evaluations	 describe	 the	 link	 between	 corruption	
and	country	performance	as	“more	varied	and	diverse.”
Nonetheless,	 the	 introduction	 of	 governance	 into	 the	 debate	
obliges	us	to	look	at	corruption	in	the	context	of	power	within	and	
outside	 government	 and	 at	 national	 economic	 policy	 decision-
making	 as	 it	 relates	 to	 democracy	 and	 corporate	 globalisation.	
There	can	be	no	denying	that	the	use	of	the	state	and	its	resources	
is	a	historical	form	of	consolidating	power	in	any	country,	although	
campaigners	in	the	North	seem	to	think	it	only	applies	to	Africa.
Colonialism’s	essence	was	and	is	to	insure	regimes	that	can	assist	
in	the	management	of	exploitation	in	return	for	a	few	privileges.	
Enter	“donor-sponsored	reforms”	to	governance	that,	on	the	one	
hand,	 threaten	 to	 curtail	 the	 opportunities	 of	 local	 politicians	
to	sustain	their	 regime,	but	on	the	other	open	opportunities	 for	
business	to	make	profits.		Externally-induced	structural	adjustment	
programmes	may	reduce	the	scope	and	size	of	government	but,	as	
will	be	discussed,	this	curbs	the	possibility	of	both	patronage	and	
regulation,	or	forces	government	budget	curtailments	that	entail	
wage	 caps	 on	 public	 employees,	 including	 teachers	 and	 police,	
which	in	turn	generate	unwarranted	solicitations.		
But	the	opposite	 is	also	true.	 	A	study	on	Uganda	 indicated	that	
the	 large	amounts	of	financial	assistance	provided	by	donors	 to	
implement	 structural	 adjustment	 and	 governance	 reforms	 also	
allowed	the	regime	to	increase	its	patronage	practices.		Uganda’s	
creditors	proved	 reluctant	 to	press	 the	government	 to	 confront	
corruption	precisely	because	all	other	conditionalities	 related	to	
liberalisation	 and	 privatisation	 were	 being	 successfully	 carried	
out.		The	study	concluded	that	“by	giving	large	amounts	of	aid	to	
a	 corrupt	 and	 quasi-authoritarian	 government,	 as	well	 as	 being	
reticent	in	their	public	criticism	of	abuse	of	power	and	corruption,	
donors	have	abetted	the	actions	of	Uganda’s	leaders	in	weakening	
those	bodies	that	could	hold	them	responsible	for	abusing	their	
public	positions.	“60
Much	 the	 same	 “good	 governance”	 logic	 drives	 contemporary	
“free	 trade”	 agreements	 and	 the	 workings	 of	 the	 World	 Trade	
Organisation	 norms.	 	 The	 fundamental	 issue	 is	 insuring	 that	
governmental	 institutions	 adopt	 and	 protect	 open	 markets,	
liberalisation	 and	 “non-discriminatory”	 treatment	 for	 the	
transnational	corporate	entities	and	foreign	direct	investment	in	
general.		For	all	the	talk	of	governance	and	anti-corruption	actions,	
market	 considerations	 remain	 dominant,	 even	 overruling	 social	
demands	and	citizen	participation	in	decision-making.		Or	as	the	
2002	World	Bank’s	World	Development	Report	clearly	mandates:	
Building	Institutions	for	Markets.
In	 its	 version	 of	 good	 governance,	 the	 International	 Financial	
Institutions	 employ	 their	 power—i.e.,	 conditionality—to	 push	
corporate-friendly	 “institution-building”	 and	 policy	 “advice”	 on	
banking	 law,	 contract	 law	 and	 company	 law,	 and	 on	 the	 role	
of	 the	 judiciary	 and	 arbitration	 mechanisms	 modelled	 on	 US	
jurisprudence.	 	 The	“reforms”	 get	“institutionalised”	 or	 locked	 in	
through	national	laws	and	the	threat	of	sanctions.		Departure	from	
the	governance	norms	can	deprive	the	offending	government	of	
the	 IMF	seal	of	approval,	which	 for	“donors”	 is	a	precondition	 to	
further	 lending.	 	 In	 similar	 fashion,	 according	 to	one	 study,	“The	
World	 Bank’s	 understanding	 of	 good	 governance	 continues	 to	
reflect	a	concern	over	the	effectiveness	of	the	state	rather	than	the	
equity	of	the	economic	system	and	the	 legitimacy	of	the	power	
0 Tangri, Roger & Andrew M. Mwenda (200): “Politics, donors and the 
ineffectiveness of anti-corruption institutions in Uganda” The Journal of Modern 
African Studies, vol. 44, pp.101-124; Mwenda, Andrew M. & Roger Tangri (2005): 
“Patronage politics, donor reforms and regime consolidation in Uganda,” African 
Affairs, 104/416, pp. 449-467.
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structure.”61	To	which	another	analysis	adds,	“Much	of	the	content	
of	 the	 good	 governance	 agenda…	 is	 concerned	 with	 a	 very	
narrow	set	of	issues	and	interests:	state	accountability	for	business,	
less	so	for	citizens:	strengthening	of	property	rights,	but	not	land	
redistribution	or	attention	to	criminal	justice.		It	is	not	surprising,	
then,	 that	 many	 critics	 ask,	 ‘Where	 are	 the	 poor?’	 in	 the	 Bank’s	
governance	agenda.”62
According	to	Remy	Herrera,	to	the	World	Bank,	“good	governance	
consists	essentially	of	‘deregulating	the	exchange,	trade	and	price	
systems,’	 of	 ‘limiting	 ad	 hoc	 decision-making	 and	 preferential	
treatment	 of	 individuals	 and	 organisations’	 and	 of	 ‘eliminating	
direct	credit	allocation’	by	the	state.		It	is	clear	that	reaching	these	
is	indissoluble	from	pursuing	neoliberal	economic	policies	and	the	
social	model	that	is	the	ultimate	purpose	of	their	implementation.”63	
Stated	differently,	the	rights	of	capital	are	locked	in,	thereby	locking	
out	democratic	control	over	key	aspects	of	the	political	economy.
But	governments	are	also	locked	in	through	close	Bank	oversight	
and	 deep	 involvement	 in	 “national”	 policy-making	 to	 make	
governments	examples	to	each	other	of	splendid	macroeconomic	
capital-friendly	institutions.	 	The	“good	example”	of	a	good	pupil	
allows	the	Bank	to	claim	that	its	massive	intervention	is	welcome,	
productive	 and	 justified.	 	 Graham	 Harrison	 at	 the	 University	 of	
Sheffield	 examined	 the	 role	 of	 the	World	 Bank	 in	 constructing	
“governance	states”	 in	Africa.	Harrison	argued	that	 the	“intimacy	
of	the	Bank’s	intervention	allows	it	to	represent	its	actions	not	as	
external	 intervention	 but	 as	 a	‘partner’	within	 sovereign	 states.”	
“The	 fragility	 of	 governance	 states	 and	 the	 largesse	 of	 external	
agencies	produce	the	‘grease’	that	allows	African	elites	to	embrace	
 Santiso, C., ‘Governance Conditionality and the Reform of Multilateral 
Development Finance,’ G8 Governance no.7, at http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/g7/
governance/santiso2002-gov7.pdf. 
2 Bretton Woods Project, Good Governance and the World Bank, www.
brettonwoodsproject.org., p.2.
 Remy Herrera, “Good Governance v. Good Government” in International 
Initiative on Corruption and Governance, Governance and Corruption, Towards a 
Democratic Approach, (Managua, 200), www.peoplesgovernance.org
the	governance	model	as	part	of	their	own	desires	for	enrichment	
and	social	ascendance,”	according	to	Harrison.64
But	one	must	return	to	the	big	picture	of	why	power	and	democracy	
are	critical	factors,	as	external	actors	weigh	heavily	upon	“national”	
decision-making	at	 the	expense	of	 the	citizenry,	yet	claim	to	do	
so	in	order	to	lower	corruption	levels.		No	doubt	there	is	a	cultural	
and	 even	 racist	 element	 involved	 as,	 in	 their	 non-diplomatic	
moments,	Northern	government	and	corporate	officials	hold	that	
governments	 and	 societies	 in	 the	 South,	 particularly	 Africa,	 are	
“inherently”	and	almost	irreparably	corrupt	and	that	governments	
are	 guilty	 of	 corruption	 until	 proven	 innocent.	 	 There	 follows	 a	
justification	for	enhanced	intervention	in	all	areas	of	government	
policy	and	institutions,	demanding	accountability	to	the	colonialist	
officials.		At	stake	in	all	of	this	is	not	simply	the	issue	of	corruption,	
but	the	critical	right	of	a	people	to	forge	their	own	governments	for	
themselves,	without	 the	pro-corporate	 tutelage	of	many	 foreign	
agencies.	 	 Financial	 dependence	 on	 aid,	 loans	 and	 investments,	
however,	 insure	 governmental	 compliance	 with	 the	 dozens	 of	
conditions	 attached	 to	 IFIs’	 seal	 of	 approval	 and	disbursements.	
There	is	nothing	wrong	with	instituting	environmental	and	social	
impact	 assessments;	 what	 is	 wrong	 is	 the	 imposition	 process	
that	then	de-legitimises	any	product.	 	Small	wonder	that	African	
countries	are	looking	to	China,	or	Latin	American	ones	to	Venezuela	
as	sources	of	financing	with	fewer	strings	attached.	
The	problem	is	not	juridical	but	ethical	and	economic,	in	terms	of	the	
illegitimate	(not	necessarily	illegal)	way	resources	are	transferred	
from	the	many	to	the	few,	from	the	pubic	to	the	private,	from	the	
South	to	the	North,	from	the	national	to	the	external,	and/or	from	
citizens	turned	consumers	to	corporations.
Yet	most	of	the	time	we	hear	about	corruption	it	is	in	the	context	
of	national	or	 local	personalised	power	struggles,	one	candidate	
for	office	against	the	other,	where	accusations	of	being	corrupt	are	
bandied	about.	 	Such	accusations	of	corruption	become	corrupt	
themselves.		Few	political	entities	escape	the	dynamic	of	what	in	
the	United	States	would	be	termed	“pork	barrel”	politics—the	use	
4 Bretton Woods Project,  Bank constructs ‘Governance States’, July 27, 2004,  
<http://brettonwoodsproject.org/art.shtml?x=6293>

FIGHTING CORRUPTION: A NON-CORPORATE PERSPECTIVE

FIGHTING CORRUPTION: A NON-CORPORATE PERSPECTIVE
and/or	misuse	of	political	 authority	and	 influence.	 	Citizens	 feel,	
or	should	feel,	cheated—that	their	resources	(taxes,	environment)	
are	 being	 siphoned	 off	 for	 private	 benefit.	 	 In	 the	 media	 and	
electoral	 scuffles,	 less	 attention	 is	 paid	 to	 institutionalised	 and	
global	components	of	corruption.
Local	 campaigns	 against	 corruption	 become	 isolated	 and	 the	
broader	connections	are	not	made—the	justified	sense	of	anger	
and	shame	does	not	go	on	to	become	a	more	organised	sustainable	
effort	that	looks	at	and	mobilises	around	the	roots	of	the	problem	
rather	than	simply	its	political-electoral	manifestations.		Politicians	
will	 mount	 campaigns	 of	 a	 personal	 nature,	 believing	 that	
looking	at	broader	external	aspects	will	undercut	the	opportunist	
immediate	 objective.	 	 Worse	 still,	 the	 real	 corrupt	 entities	 will	
remain	unscathed—in	 fact,	 they	 too	help	 shape	definitions	 and	
export	ways	of	“safely”	fighting	globalise	corruption	and	 indeed	
the	corrupt	dynamics	of	the	prevailing	international	order.
Of	 late	 one	 detects	 increasing	 acknowledgements	 as	 regards	
the	 conventional	 definition	 and	 analysis	 of	 corruption.	 	 Daniel	
Kaufman,	 head	 of	 the	World	 Bank	 Institute	 (WBI,	 which	 is	 part	
of	 the	 WB	 Group),	 admits	 that	 “this	 analysis	 has	 been	 mainly	
founded	 on	 bureaucratic/public	 sector	 corruption,	 emphasising	
particular	 manifestations	 such	 as	 administrative	 bribery…	 for	
private	gain.”65	 	Reflecting	experiences	of	post-Cold	War	Eastern	
Europe	 and	 elsewhere,	 the	 Bank	 and	 recent	 Anti-Corruption	
Conferences	 are	 slowly	making	a	distinction	between	 legal	 and	
illegal	forms	of	corruption,	and	paying	more	attention	to	patterns	
of	corporate	corruption	(which	also	affect	public	corruption).”	 	A	
political	economy	approach	 is	also	being	 insinuated,	attributing	
an	important	role	to	inequality,	and	in	one	paper	the	WBI	goes	so	
far	as	to	speak	of	legal	corporate	corruption,	but	unfortunately,	or	
perhaps	unsurprisingly,	the	research	degenerates	into	a	series	of	
incomprehensible	formulas	and	equations.66
A	potentially	useful	notion	of	legal	corruption	is	circumscribed	as	
a	phenomenon	“arising	when	the	elite	prefers	to	hide	corruption	
 Daniel Kaufmann and Pedro C. Vicente, “Legal Corruption” (October, 200), 
http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pubs/legalcorporatecorruption.html 
 Ibid.
from	the	population,”	usually	by	way	of	red	tape.		Other	specialists,	
such	 as	 Robert	 Klitgaard,	 talk	 of	 systemic	 corruption,	 but	 only	
where	the	system	refers	to	the	public	sector:	i.e.	when	those	parts	
of	the	government	that	are	supposed	to	prevent	corruption	have	
themselves	become	corrupted—budgeting,	auditing,	 inspection,	
monitoring,	 evaluation	 and	 enforcement.	 	“This	makes	 the	 anti-
corruption	 task	 much	 more	 difficult,”	 he	 admits,	 because	 “we	
cannot	 simply	call	 for	capacity	building	 in	 these	anti-corruption	
parts	of	government,	because	their	capacity	has	been	bought	off	
and	directed	away	from	their	ostensible	mission.”67
There	is	a	Catch	22	situation	that	requires	pushing	the	envelope.	
Slowly	mainstream	anti-corruption	punditry	 is	coming	to	accept	
that	 a)	 corruption	may	 arise	 through	 other	 less	 obvious	 forms,	
which	 may	 involve	 collusion	 between	 parties	 typically	 from	
both	the	public	and	private	sectors,	and	b)	that	collusion	may	be	
legal	in	many	countries.		Of	course,	there	is	nothing	new,	or	even	
particularly	“southern,”	about	legalistically	lobbying	contributions	
by	 the	 private	 sector	 in	 exchange	 for	 passage	 of	 particular	
legislation	biased	in	favour	of	those	agents.		The	recent	Abramof	
influence-peddling	scandal	in	the	US	Congress	testifies	to	that:	the	
US	Secretary	of	the	Interior	is	tainted	and	resigns—and	she	goes	
to	work	with	Shell.
Corruption	in	this	context	is	of	course	still	an	abuse	necessitating	
action	(illegal	or	“legalised”,	but	still	illegitimate)	from	government	
office.	 	The	 focus	 is	 still	 on	 the	public	 sector	 and	 the	 traditional	
definition	 would	 not	 be	 seriously	 contested:	 the	 IFIs	 and	 TI,	
among	others,	would	acknowledge	that	there	is	corruption	in	the	
private	sector,	but	their	attention	and	strategy	is	still	public	sector	
oriented.	 	That	reflects	a	common	ideology	but	also	institutional	
lending	mandates,	“since	the	Bank	lends	primarily	to	governments	
and	supports	government	policies,	programmes	and	projects.”	
The	perpetuation	of	bribe-taking	and	bribe-making	as	the	principal	
form	of	corruption	is	analytically	unsound,	but	more	importantly	
it	is	politically	problematic.		Behind	the	image	of	a	bribe-seeking	
7 Robert Klitgaard, “Leadership beyond Systemic Corruption,” (December 
2004), Claremont Graduate University, http://www.cgu.edu/include/Leadership_
Under_System_Corruption_12-04.pdf
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public	servant	lies	a	conception	of	the	state	as	a	parasite	that	only	
extracts	resources	for	the	sake	of	a	few	bureaucrats	and	politicians.	
That	 conception	 of	 course	 is	 also	 at	 the	 core	 of	 the	 neoliberal	
concept	of	the	state	and	the	need	for	government	to	simply	“get	
out	of	the	way”	and	“remove	layers	of	red	tape”	for	large	and	small	
business	to	prosper	and	everyone	to	gain.		
One	 of	 the	 many	 problems	 of	 the	 neoliberal	 anti-corruption	
ideology	 is	 how	 it	 influences	 discussions	 not	 only	 on	 how	 to	
measure	 corruption	 but	where	 to	 look	 for	 it,	 setting	 a	 basis	 for	
the	 further	weakening	of	 the	 state	 in	 the	 face	 of	 domestic	 and	
international	 corporate	 interests	 and	 the	proper	 regulatory	 role	
that	government	should	play	on	behalf	of	the	citizenry,	particularly	
its	most	marginalised	segments.	 	A	basis	 is	thus	set	for	reducing	
the	discretionary	authority	of	public	employees,	even	where	that	
authority	 is	 required	 and	 can	 be	 effectively	 exercised.	 	 You	 do	
away	with	bribery	by	getting	rid	of	potential	bribe-takers,	who	are	
guilty	before	proven	innocent.68		Again,	if	the	diagnosis	is	partial	
or	 limited,	so	too	will	be	the	prescriptions	at	which	we	arrive.	 	 It	
is	time	therefore	to	seriously,	and	not	only	symbolically,	open	up	
the	discussion	to	alternative	ways	of	 looking	at	corruption,	anti-
corruption	and	the	 locus	required	to	tackle	the	phenomenon	 in	
all	its	manifestations.		
8 Joel Hellman y Daniel Kaufmann, “La captura del Estado en las economías 
     de transición,” www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance
VII. Global Corporations and
        Global Governance
Joseph	Stiglitz	figures	among	the	many	who	now	will	admit	that	
the	international	market	forces	have	simply	become	too	powerful	
to	 allow	 them	 to	 shape	 nations	 and	 societies	 in	 an	 unbridled	
manner:	“What	we	need	to	do	is	to	discover	policy	and	institutional	
changes	that	will	install	checks	on	the	market….		There	are	rules	
of	governance	or	enforcement	that	check	the	activities	of	people	
working	in	the	market…	but	the	absence	of	a	world	governance	
framework	in	the	trade	and	investments	carried	all	over	the	world	
is	a	profound	deficit	 that	need	to	be	addressed,”	says	the	Nobel	
Prize	winner	and	former	World	Bank	CEO.
Evidently	the	market	forces	are	not	shapeless	entities	but	rather	
organisations	directed	by	human	beings	who	have	concentrated	
unprecedented	amounts	of	economic	power.	 	And	 it	 is	 societies	
and	sometimes	governments,	particularly	but	not	exclusively	in	the	
South,	that	become	the	victims	of	economic	liberalisation	policies,	
particularly	 privatisations,	 which	 account	 for	 massive	 amounts	
of	 resources	transferred	to	private,	 largely	unaccountable	hands.	
Corruption	 in	many	of	 these	contexts	 is	 fed	by	an	 ineffective	or	
complicit	bureaucratic	environment.		However	it	is	not	technically	
illegal	since	that	same	power	insures	influence	to	shape	the	laws	
that	protect	and	promote	the	devastating	flow	of	resources	into	
international	corporate	hands.69			
Governance	 is	 brought	 into	 the	 picture	 as	 corruption	 cannot	
easily	be	divorced	 from	policy	and	 institutional	environments—
which	can	either	promote	or	prevent.		Unfortunately	much	of	the	
discussion	over	governance,	including	good	governance,	has	taken	
on	a	technical	and	managerial	character,	an	endless	experimental	
search	for	the	“right”	combinations	of	institutions	and	policy	that	
will	 insure	 “effectiveness.”	 	 Daniel	 Kaufman,	 director	 of	 global	
programmes	at	 the	World	Bank	 Institute	 in	Washington,	calls	 for	
new,	more	forceful	levels	of	Bank	and	other	external	involvement	
in	developing	country	policy-making.		
69 “Foreign Direct Investment - High Risk, Low Reward for Development,” http://
www.blue21.de/PDF/FDI-Report_High_Risk_Low_Reward.pdf
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According	 to	 Kaufman,	 there	 is	 a	 need	 to	 go	beyond	 the	 initial	
development	agency	 insistence	on	anti-corruption	commissions	
and	 campaigns:	 “second	 generation	 institutional	 reforms”	 are	
required	 to	 support	 accountability	 and	 transparency.	 	 “One	
does	 not	 fight	 corruption	 by	 fighting	 corruption,”	 he	 told	 the	
International	Herald	Tribune;	“one	has	to	instead	go	to	the	tougher,	
more	 systemic	 weaknesses	 and	 implement	 the	 appropriate	
political	 and	 institutional	 reforms.”70	 	 But	 who	 decides	 what	 is	
appropriate,	and	is	there	space	for	discussions	and	definitions	of	
alternative	appropriate	policies,	particularly	as	linked	to	questions	
of	poverty	and	autonomous	development?		
It	 is	 not	 incorrect	 to	 make	 an	 analytical	 linkage	 between	
corruption	and	governance	and	from	governance	to	development	
and	 “development	 assistance.”	 	 This,	 however,	 begs	 the	 critical	
question	 of	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 development	model.	 	 Led	 by	 the	
World	Bank,	development	agencies	evade	the	issue	of	protecting	
corporations	 and	 instead	 attribute	 development	 shortcomings	
to	 inadequate	governance	and	high	corruption	 levels,	a	“cancer”	
on	the	global	economy	and	a	measurable	impediment	to	poverty	
reduction,	 according	 to	 the	World	 Bank	 and	others.	 	 Corruption	
is	 one	manifestation	 of	 the	 failures	 in	 the	 dominant	 neoliberal	
model	(which	is	not	to	imply	that	other	development	models	do	
not	or	might	not	have	corruption	problems);	 the	 trouble	 is	 that	
the	 model’s	 shortcomings	 are	 blamed	 on	 corruption	 and	 bad	
governance,	not	on	the	model	itself.			
Over	the	course	of	the	late	nineties,	that	logic	came	to	be	expressed	
in	 the	 increasing	 number	 of	 conditions	 agencies	 placed	 on	 aid	
recipients	 attempting	 to	 “fix”	 governance	 and	 stop	 corruption.	
According	to	one	observer,	“Governance	experts	at	the	Bank	and	
elsewhere	outfitted	 themselves	with	a	dazzling	array	of	 tools	 to	
measure	whether	the	programmes	worked.”71		Typically,	the	Bank	
deliberately	confuses	 the	political	with	the	technical,	as	political	
criteria	do	not	escape	Bank	policy	and	programming.		
70 “Anticorruption drive: Bark or bite?,” International Herald Tribune, April ,  
      200, p. 7
7 Ibid.
In	an	article	titled	“Corrupting	the	Fight	against	Corruption,”	Joseph	
Stiglitz	commented	why:	“Those	who	criticise	the	Bank’s	stance	on	
corruption	do	not	do	so	because	 they	 favour	corruption.	 	Some	
critics	 worry	 about	 corruption	 in	 the	 corruption	 agenda	 itself:	
that	the	fight	will	be	used	as	a	‘cover’	for	cutting	aid	to	countries	
that	displease	the	US	administration.		Such	concerns	have	found	
resonance	 in	 the	 seeming	 incongruity	 of	 the	 Bank’s	 tough	 talk	
on	 corruption	 and	 simultaneous	 plans	 to	 expand	 lending	 to	
Iraq.	 	 No	 one	 is	 likely	 to	 certify	 that	 Iraq	 is	 corruption-free—or	
even	 ranks	 low	 on	 corruption.”72	 	 Still,	 Stiglitz	 believes	 that	 the	
World	Bank	must	play	a	role:	“It’s	fine	for	the	World	Bank	to	deliver	
anticorruption	sermons.	But	policies,	procedures	and	institutions	
are	what	matter.”73
But	 profit	 is	 more	 important	 than	 policies	 and	 procedures.	 	 In	
Iraq	 and	 other	 post-war	 reconstruction	 or	 disaster	 settings,	 the	
White	House	calls	on	the	World	Bank	to	play	its	part	in	the	grand	
US	strategy,	going	beyond	the	usual	imposition	of	economic	and	
financial	conditions	on	investment-hungry	regimes.	 	As	Shalmali	
Guttal	explains,	“When	called	in	to	coordinate	the	reconstruction	of	
a	war-torn	country,	the	Bank	will	continue	to	defend	the	interests	
of	the	US	and	its	allies,	rather	than	the	needs	of	the	people	in	the	
affected	country.		
“The	Bank	will	first	 lay	down	the	rules	and	policies	under	which	
aid	for	reconstruction	is	to	be	solicited	and	used,	then	it	will	bring	
in	 private	 sector	 actors	 to	 implement	 these	 rules/policies	while	
heaping	costs	 (including	debt	 repayment)	on	the	occupied,	and	
when	 things	 go	 wrong—as	 they	 inevitably	 would	 under	 such	
circumstances—the	 Bank	 will	 declare	 the	 affected	 country	 to	
72 Joseph Stiglitz, “Corrupting the Fight against Corruption” (November, 200).
http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/stiglitz7
7 To which one blogger acidly commented: “And of course, the nomination of Paul 
Wolfowitz at the World Bank was the perfect example of such good procedures we 
want to develop in those countries.  He is surely the most competent guy around 
in development and institution building issues.  As a key architect of the war in 
Afghanistan and Iraq, he showed how invading countries is a much more efficient 
technique for imposing democracy, good institutions, security and development 
than are traditional long-term strategies of the World Bank.” http://economistsview.
typepad.com/economistsview/200//links_stiglitz_.html
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be	a	failed	[corrupt]	state	that	 is	 in	need	of	even	more	stringent	
application	of	the	same	rules	and	policies	that	keep	it	a	state	of	
continuing	failure.”74
What	 Naomi	 Klein	 terms	 “disaster	 capitalism”	 is	 riddled	 with	
state-protected	corruption:	“The	first	 step	was	 the	government’s	
abdication	of	its	core	responsibility	to	protect	the	population	from	
disasters.	 Under	 the	 Bush	 administration,	 whole	 sectors	 of	 the	
government,	most	notably	the	Department	of	Homeland	Security,	
have	 been	 turned	 into	 glorified	 temp	 agencies,	 with	 essential	
functions	contracted	out	to	private	companies.	The	theory	is	that	
entrepreneurs,	driven	by	the	profit	motive,	are	always	more	efficient	
(please	suspend	hysterical	 laughter)....	 	Where	has	all	 the	money	
gone?,”	 ask	 desperate	 people	 from	 Baghdad	 to	 New	 Orleans,	
from	 Kabul	 to	 tsunami-struck	 Sri	 Lanka.	 One	 place	 a	 great	 deal	
of	it	has	gone	is	into	major	capital	expenditures	for	these	private	
contractors.	 Largely	 under	 the	 public	 radar,	 billions	 of	 taxpayer	
dollars	 have	 been	 spent	 on	 the	 construction	 of	 a	 privatised	
disaster-response	 infrastructure…	 built	 almost	 exclusively	 with	
money	 from	 public	 contracts,	 including	 the	 training	 of	 its	 staff	
(overwhelmingly	 former	 civil	 servants,	 politicians	 and	 soldiers).	
Yet	it	is	all	privately	owned;	taxpayers	have	absolutely	no	control	
over	 it	 or	 claim	 to	 it.	 	 So	 far,	 that	 reality	 hasn’t	 sunk	 in	 because	
when	these	companies	are	getting	their	bills	paid	by	government	
contracts,	the	Disaster	Capitalism	Complex	provides	its	services	to	
the	public	free	of	charge.”75
Under	these	increasingly	frequent	circumstances,	corruption	will	
reach	 dizzying	 heights.	 	 The	 US	 can	 set	 up	 the	 government—
engineering	a	 coup,	 evicting	an	elected	President	 as	 in	Haiti,	 or	
simply	invading	a	country—and	the	World	Bank,	led	by	war	planner	
Paul	Wolfowitz,	places	laws	into	effect	that	favour	US	commercial	
and	 political	 interests,	 while	 handing	 out	 choice	 contracts	 for	
“rebuilding”	 and	“rehabilitation.”	 	 According	 to	Guttal,	“everyone	
74 Shalmali Guttal, “Reconstruction’s Triple Whammy: Wolfowitz, the White  
     House and the World Bank,” Focus on the Global South, December, 200.   
     www.focusweb.org
75 Naomi Klein, “Pay to be Saved,” The Nation, (August 29, 2006), 
     http://www.thenation.com/doc/20060911/klein
comes	away	with	a	good	chunk	of	the	post-war	reconstruction	pie,	
except	of	course	 local	residents	whose	homes,	 families	and	lives	
are	destroyed	by	the	endless	war	that	the	model	results	in.”76
The	 blueprints	 are	 comprehensive,	 multidimensional	 and	 pre-
planned.	 	Military	components	are	not	excluded.	 	This	was	most	
evident	 in	 the	 case	 of	 Haiti,	 when	 the	 Clinton	 Administration	
decided	 to	 re-install	 the	 deposed	 President	 Aristide	 in	 power.	
Or	at	 least	a	mediated	power.	 	As	Aristide	was	 to	 recall	after	his	
second	ousting	 in	2004,	Washington	 insisted	 that	Aristide	agree	
to	pay	 the	debts	 accumulated	under	 the	Duvalier	 dictatorships,	
slash	 the	 civil	 service,	 open	 up	 Haiti	 to	 “free	 trade”	 and	 halve	
import	tariffs	on	rice	and	corn.		“It	was	a	lousy	deal,”	Aristide	told	
Naomi	Klein,	“but	I	was	out	of	my	country	and	my	country	was	the	
poorest	 in	the	Western	hemisphere,	so	what	kind	of	power	did	 I	
have	at	that	time?”		Aristide,	however,	refused	to	accede	to	the	sale	
of	Haiti’s	government	enterprises,	 including	telecommunications	
and	electricity.		Turning	state	monopolies	into	private	enterprises	
amounted	 to	 enrichment	 of	 an	 already	 corrupt	 oligarchy.	
“Washington	was	very	angry	at	me.	They	said	I	didn’t	respect	my	
word,	when	they	were	the	ones	who	didn’t	respect	our	common	
economic	policy.”			
In	 the	months	 that	 followed,	Washington	 cut	 off	 loans	 and	 aid,	
severely	 undermining	 the	 government,	 while	 USAID	 provided	
millions	to	opposition	groups.		In	February	2004,	US	officials	placed	
Aristide	 on	 an	 aircraft	 and	 transported	 him	 forcibly	 into	 exile.	
Klein	 asked	what	 had	 changed	 since	 the	 overthrow	 of	 Aristide:	
“Corruption?		Violence?		Fraud?		Aristide	is	certainly	no	saint.		But	
even	 if	 the	 worst	 of	 the	 allegations	 are	 true,	 they	 pale	 next	 to	
the	rap	sheets	of	the	convicted	killers,	drug	smugglers	and	arms	
traders	who	ousted	Aristide	and	continue	to	enjoy	free	rein,	with	
full	 support	 from	 the	Bush	Administration	and	 the	UN.	 	Turning	
Haiti	 over	 to	 this	 underworld	gang	out	of	 concern	 for	Aristide’s	
lack	 of	‘good	 governance’	 is	 like	 escaping	 an	 annoying	 date	 by	
accepting	a	lift	home	from	Charles	Manson.”77		Since	then,	and	in	
7 Ibid.
77 Naomi Klein, “Aristide in Exile,” The Nation, (August , 200), 
     http://www.thenation.com/doc/200080/klein
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the	 wake	 of	 continued	 support	 for	 Aristide	 inside	 his	 country,	
US-funded	 groups	 are	 ardently	 at	 work	 hurling	 accusations	 of	
corruption	against	the	exiled	President.78
While	 the	 World	 Bank	 takes	 a	 more	 technocratic	 approach,	
flooding	developing	country	governments	with	consultants	and	
toolkits,	the	bilateral	agencies	tend	to	put	direct	political	pressure	
on	the	same	governments	for	the	same	objective.		All	this	further	
feeds	the	fallacy	that	a	combination	of	pressure	and	policy	advice	
would	 bring	 about	 “good	 governance,”	 sidestepping	 questions	
of	democracy	and	whether	the	real	source	of	“good”	government	
is	not	civil	society	rather	than	external	agencies	and	bureaucrats	
with	toolkits.	
Unfortunately,	 the	 so-called	 War	 on	 Terror	 is	 being	 taken	 as	
justification	 for	 a	 more	 multi-faceted	 intervention	 against	
patterns	of	“grand”	corruption	that	supposedly	entails	risks	to	the	
rich	countries’	national	security.			According	to	USAID,	corruption	
undermines	 government	 effectiveness	 and	 legitimacy,	 thereby	
posing	problems	 for	 state	 stability.	 	 Led	by	 the	US,	many	North	
governments	stress	the	importance	of	preventing	or	pre-empting	
the	emergence	of	fragile,	failed	or	failing	states.		The	USAID	Strategy	
document	is	clear	about	the	need	for	a	more	forceful	intervention:	
“A	 strategy	 of	 high-level	 diplomatic	 pressure	 combined	 with	
investments	to	increase	political	and	economic	competition	will	be	
most	appropriate	in	countries	with	high	levels	of	grand	corruption	
and	limited	evidence	of	political	will	for	reform.”79		
Under	the	heading	“Develop	innovative	interventions	to	address	
grand	corruption,”	 the	Strategy	Document	argues	 that	“bilateral	
donors,	 rather	 than	multilateral	 banks,	may	need	 to	 lead	 in	 this	
area	 given	 the	 highly	 political	 nature	 of	 grand	 corruption,	 and	
thus	the	necessity	for	anticorruption	efforts	to	reach	well	beyond	
the	executive	branch	of	government.”		A	specific	recommendation	
reads:	“Harness	 external	 sources	 of	 pressure	 for	 reform	 through	
78 See the website of the “Haiti Democracy Project”
     http://www.haitipolicy.org/articles/corruption/government/
79 Op. Cit. USAID Anticorruption Strategy, p. .  
strategies	 such	 as	 donor	 consultative	 groups	 and	 interagency	
efforts.	 	 Coordinated	 diplomatic	 efforts	 can	 serve	 as	 the	 ‘stick’	
while	donor	agreements	act	as	a	‘carrot.”80
What	 is	 clear	 is	 that	 anticorruption	 and	 governance	 promotion	
are	 increasingly	 being	 linked	 to	 security	 objectives	 and	 the	
North’s	determination	to	“prevent”	failed	states.		If	state-sponsored	
corruption	is	perceived	to	be	a	path	to	state	failure	and	therefore	a	
threat	to	security,	then	the	pursuers	of	the	“War	on	Terror”	will	have	
one	more	“justification”	to	pursue	their	aggressive	interventions.		
For	their	own	accountability	purposes,	international	aid	agencies	
are	 pushing	 the	 same	governance-corruption	 conjunction	 if	 for	
no	other	reason	that	it	also	conveniently	justifies	greater	agency	
micro-vigilance	 of	 projects,	 policies	 and	 local	 institutions,	 all	
couched	 in	 the	 rubric	of	aid	effectiveness.	 	Setting	aside	 for	 the	
moment	the	reluctance	of	“donors”	to	review	their	own	loop	hole-
filled	procedures,	 	 one	 first	 needs	 to	 ask	 if	 aid	 flows	 are	 indeed	
necessary	to	achieve	economic	and	social	progress	in	the	South.	
And	second	 if	 there	 isn’t	 something	corrupt	about	 the	 fact	 that,	
according	to	the	World	Bank’s	own	figures,	there	is	a	net	flow	of	
resources	from	the	poor	countries	to	the	rich	ones.		Third,	“aid”	has	
its	purposes	and	impact	as	it	heavily	conditions	both	public	policy	
and	 national	 capacities	 to	 present	 alternatives	 to	 development	
paradigms	 emphasising	 privatisation	 and	 the	 displacement	 of	
national	regulatory	institutions	to	the	benefit	of	foreign	investors	
and	local	associates.		
Often	the	reality	is	that	of	“donors”	who	push	poorly	devised	projects	
that	lend	themselves	to	abuse.		In	these	cases,	the	responsibility	for	
graft	must	be	shared.		In	Nigeria,	“18	projects	costing	836	million	
were	never	completed;	another	44	either	never	operated	or	were	
quickly	shut	down,	the	Nigerian	Finance	Ministry	reported.		Of	20	
other	projects	 started	between	1985	 and	1992	 in	Nigeria,	more	
than	half	had	little	impact	or	were	unsustainable,	according	to	the	
World	Bank.”81	
0 Ibid. p. 1, 19.
8 “Africa Tackles Graft, with Billions in Aid in Play,” The New York Times, 
     July , 200.
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In	 July,	 2002	 the	 International	 Rivers	 Network	 reported	 how	
World	 Bank	 staff	 and	management	misled	 the	 Bank’s	 executive	
directors	in	their	decision	to	approve	the	Bujagali	dam	project	in	
Uganda,	manipulating	figures	on	economic	viability.	 	One	report	
suggested	that	the	World	Bank’s	persistent	support	for	the	project	
was	because	 the	 contractors	were	one	of	 the	biggest	 clients	 of	
the	International	Finance	Corporation,	the	Bank’s	investment	arm.	
In	 Kenya,	 another	 Bank	 official	 was	 brought	 to	 trial	 after	 being	
sacked	 for	 receiving	 kickbacks	 from	 two	 Swedish	 companies	
in	 exchange	 for	 steering	 certain	 bank	 contracts	 to	 those	 firms.	
Observers	argued	that	the	World	Bank	and	other	donors	“see	what	
they	 want	 to	 see,”	 sometimes	 compromising	 the	 Bank	 pledge	
to	fight	corruption—the	“micro”	 is	overlooked	when	the	“macro”	
(liberalisation/privatisation)	is	showing	“good	performance.”	82
	
By	 the	 same	 token,	 rich	 country	 governments	 have	 official	 or	
quasi-official	export	credit	agencies	tasked	with	providing	private	
firms	 with	 “export	 credit	 guarantees”	 (subsidies)	 that	 are	 then	
charged	 to	 the	 recipient	 country,	 with	 little	 regard	 to	 evidence	
of	corrupt	behaviour	on	the	firm’s	part.	 	Such	“insurance”	against	
non-performance	 by	 the	 developing	 country	 counterpart	
is	 accompanied	 by	 the	 extraction	 of	 a	 guarantee	 from	 that	
government	to	pay	if	the	transaction	fails.			Investment-desperate,	
or	debt-dependent,	or	profit-minded	local	intermediaries	agree	to	
pay	in	the	event	the	transaction	goes	wrong,	even	though	this	all	
took	place	within	the	private	sector.		
According	 to	 Export	 Credit	 Agency	Watch,	 an	 NGO	monitoring	
network,	 “In	 recent	 years	 Export	 Credit	 Agencies	 (ECAs)	 are	
estimated	to	have	supported	US$50	-	$70	billion	annually	in	what	
are	called	‘medium	and	long-term	transactions,’	a	great	portion	of	
which	are	large	industrial	and	infrastructure	projects	in	developing	
countries.		Many	of	these	projects	have	very	serious	environmental	
and	social	 impacts.	 	For	example,	ECAs	finance	greenhouse	gas-
emitting	 power	 plants,	 large-scale	 dams,	 mining	 projects,	 road	
development	 in	 pristine	 tropical	 forests,	 oil	 pipelines,	 chemical	
and	industrial	facilities,	forestry	and	plantation	schemes,	to	name	
2 “Bank’s pledge to fight corruption put to test,” Bretton Woods Update No. 29,  
      (July, 200) www.brettonwoodsproject.org/topic/governance, 
a	few.	 	Because	most	of	 these	projects	are	high	risk	due	to	their	
environmental,	political,	 social	and	cultural	 impacts,	most	would	
not	 come	 to	 life	 without	 the	 support	 and	 financial	 backing	 of	
ECAs.	Hence,	ECAs	are	strategic	development	 linchpins	that	play	
an	enormous	part	in	the	harmful	impacts	of	corporate	globalisation.”	83		
Even	 Transparency	 International	 has	 felt	 obliged	 to	 blow	 the	
whistle,	 not	 on	 the	 ECAs	 but	 on	 the	 bribery	 that	 takes	 place	 in	
similar	 transactions:	“Bribing	 foreign	 officials	 in	 order	 to	 secure	
overseas	 contracts	 for	 their	 exports	 has	 become	 a	 widespread	
practice	in	industrial	countries,	particularly	in	certain	sectors	such	
as	exports	of	military	equipment	and	public	works.		Normally	these	
contracts	 are	 guaranteed	 by	 government-owned	 or	 -supported	
Export	 Credit	 Insurance	 schemes	 (HERMES	 in	Germany,	 COFACE	
in	 France,	 DUCROIRE	 in	 Belgium,	 ECGD	 in	 the	 UK).”84	 	 No	 small	
amount	of	private	debt	has	become	public	debt	through	this	sorry	
mechanism.		In	fact,	according	to	ECA	Watch,	such	credits	account	
for	 the	 single	 biggest	 component	 of	 developing	 country	 debt,	
consisting	in	1996	some	24%	of	total	debt	and	56%	of	debt	owed	
to	official	agencies.		
Why	 not	 speak	 of	 the	 need	 to	 also	 insure	 corporate	 “good	
governance”	and	corporate	 transparency,	or	of	 the	public’s	 right	
to	secure	information	from	corporate	entities?		There	is	increasing	
acknowledgement	 of	 the	“supply	 dimension,”	 but	 again	 limited	
to	individual	malfeasance.	 	Thus,	at	the	Bank’s	Spring	meeting	in	
May	 2006,	 President	 Wolfowitz	 admitted	 that	 “for	 every	 bribe-
taker,	there’s	a	bribe-giver,	and	often	that	comes	from	a	developed	
country….		We	need	to	do	more	to	address	the	issue	and	to	hold	
private	 corporations	 accountable	 for	 exporting	 corruption	 to	
emerging	economies.”		
According	to	some	observers,	Wolfowitz	was	responding	to	criticism	
for	 focusing	 too	much	 on	 how	 to	 improve	 governance	 among	
World	Bank	aid	recipients.		Several	rich-country	governments	had	
indeed	grown	wary	of	on-again	off-again	Bank	aid	suspensions	to	
a	number	of	countries.		In	a	report	titled	“The	World	Bank	weeds	
8 A number of examples can be consulted on www.eca-watch.org 
4 www.eca-watch.org`
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out	 corruption:	 will	 it	 touch	 the	 roots?,”	 the	 Bretton	 Woods	
Project,	 a	 European	 NGO	monitoring	 and	 advocacy	 group,	 said	
that	 despite	“high-profile	moves”	 by	Wolfowitz,	“the	 root	 causes	
of	corruption—underpaid	civil	servants,	acceptance	of	bribery	by	
big	business	and	dirty	money—remain	largely	unaddressed.”85		
In	the	final	analysis,	the	heart	of	the	good	governance	debate	is	the	
issue	of	responsibility:	responsibility	both	for	creating	the	problems	
and	for	solving	them.			The	two	aspects	cannot	be	separated	lest	the	
people	who	caused	the	problem	now	come	back	with	a	manual	on	
how	to	fix	it.			Looking	in	1997	at	the	record	of	post-independence	
Africa,	 Ugandan	 political	 scientist	Yash	Tandon	 asked,	“Who	 has	
made	such	a	mess	of	Africa?		‘The	corrupt	leaders,’	say	the	people,	
‘leaders	who	are	self-serving	and	power	hungry.’		‘Lazy	people,’	say	
the	leaders,	‘people	who	just	wait	for	the	government	to	give	them	
jobs	and	to	feed	them.’		‘Bad	governments,’	says	the	World	Bank	and	
the	 transnationals,	‘governments	 that	 have	not	 followed	 correct	
fiscal,	monetary,	pricing	and	trade	policies,	and	governments	that	
are	not	accountable	to	their	population.’		‘The	market,’	say	the	left	
intellectuals	 (African	 and	 non-African),	 ‘the	 invisible	 forces	 that	
work	in	favour	of	those	who	own	capital	and	who	exercise	state	
power.’”
“Out	of	these	four	possible	explanations,”,	Tandon	continues,	“it	is	
the	World	Bank-TNC	analysis	and	prescriptions	that	dominate	the	
ideological	realm.		They	have	so	much	human	as	well	as	financial	
resources	at	 their	 command	 that	 to	challenge	 them	 is	an	uphill	
struggle.		In	the	battlefield	of	competing	ideas,	the	playing	fields	
are	not	level.”86		
8 Financial Express, May 24, 200 quoted in Odious Debt Online, June , 200, 
www.odiousdebts.org/odiousdebts/publications/WorldBankWeedsOutCorruption.pdf
8 Yash Tandon, “Reclaiming Africa’s Agenda,” in Yash Tandon, ed., African 
Conceptions of Democracy and Good Governance, (International South Group 
Network: Harare, 1996), p. 2.
VIII. Private Global Power for
         Private Northern Gain
There	 is	a	need	to	refocus	the	struggle	against	corruption—and	
by	 implication	 for	 better	 governance—so	 as	 to	 take	 account	 of	
many	 issues	 that	hinder	 institutional	development.	 	The	theft	of	
public	 resources	 obviously	 hinders	 institutional	 strengthening,	
but	 resources	 are	 also	 stolen	 in	 other	 ways	 and	 must	 similarly	
merit	 the	 study	 of	 anti-corruption	 campaigners.	 	 Perhaps	 there	
is	no	greater	 corruption	 that	 that	which	year	after	 year	extracts	
national	 savings	 and	 resources	 from	poor	 countries.	 	The	 result	
is	dependency,	a	decrepit	public	service	and	inability	to	alleviate	
chronic	poverty—all	of	which	generate	the	petty-corruption	and	
abuses	described	earlier.	 	 In	short,	national	and	internationalised	
corruption	combine	to	hinder	development
Hundreds	 of	 billions	 of	 dollars,	 far	 in	 excess	 of	 aid	 inflows,	 are	
moved	out	of	poor	countries	and	into	the	rich	ones	yearly,	in	the	
form	 of	 debt	 repayments,	 private	 sector	 transfers	 and	 existing	
commercial	 trade	 and	 financial	 flow	 patterns.	 	 North	 to	 South	
aid,	 loans	and	private	capital	 investment	 feed	 rather	 than	offset	
the	imbalance:	“aid”	arrives	with	strings	attached	that	place	clear	
limits	 on	 national	 policies	 to	 escape	 dependence	 and	mobilise	
national	resources.		Instead,	the	strings	perpetuate	a	corrupt	and	
crippling	 depletion	 of	 national	 resources.	 	 Unfair	 trade	 should	
also	be	considered	a	form	of	corruption,	as	are	the	credits	tied	to	
purchases	from	lender	countries,	or	various	forms	of	direct	foreign	
investment	geared	to	the	extraction	of	resources	and	exploitation	
of	 labour	(export	processing	zones	or	maquilas)	with	 little	or	no	
contribution	to	long-term	development.
Small	wonder	 that	many	 in	 the	South	 feel	 that	a	 fairly	 standard	
colonial	demand	for	privileged	access	to	a	country’s	resources	is	
at	the	root	of	much	of	Northern	“anti-corruption”	patronage,	and	
behind	 the	 export	 of	 good	 governance.	 	 Public	 institutions	 are	
asked	simply	to	get	out	of	 the	way	or,	more	recently,	 to	actually	
facilitate	 the	 extraction.	 	 But	 neoliberal	 “aid”	 and	 “investment”	
promotion	 discourse	 would	 have	 us	 believe	 that	 the	 capital	
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flows	from	North	to	South	are	necessary	and	indeed	even	acts	of	
kindness.		
What	 International	 Financial	 Institutions	 and	 bilateral	 “donors”	
call	“Official	 net	 transfers”	 is	 actually	 less	 than	what	 developing	
countries	pay	back	in	principal	and	interest	to	creditors,	according	
to	the	World	Bank’s	own	2006	Global	Development	Finance	report.	
What	is	worse,	the	“resource	flows”	do	not	take	account	of	South	
losses	resulting	from	Northern	protectionism	and	the	dumping	of	
products	on	the	world	market.			Nor,	of	course,	is	there	an	interest	
on	the	part	of	the	IFIs	to	look	into	Northern	corporate	promotion	
of	capital	flight,	tax	evasion	and	fraud	against	the	countries	of	the	
South.		A	genuine	anti-corruption	and	development	concern	would	
target	such	practices	and	call	for	cessation	of	the	financial	drain.	
There	 is	a	need,	 therefore,	 to	 take	 the	anti-corruption	campaign	
into	the	international	debate	on	aid,	debt	and	capital	flows.87		
Fortunately,	 civil	 society	 groups	 North	 and	 South	 are	 working	
together		to	help	control	corporate	abuses.		The	European	Coalition	
for	 Corporate	 Justice,	 a	 network	 of	 organisations	 across	 Europe,	
pursues	 such	goals	based	on	“a	 vision	of	 a	 sustainable	world	 in	
which	corporations’	drive	for	profit	is	balanced	by	the	interest	of	
society	 at	 large,	 and	 respects	 human,	 social	 and	 environmental	
rights.”		The	EECG	believes	that	“regulatory	measures	are	required	
to	insure	that	all	corporations	abide	by	national	and	internationally	
agreed	standards,	whichever	provides	the	highest	standard.”88	
But	 it	 is	more	than	a	question	of	transparency—it	 is	a	matter	of	
stopping	the	illicit	wealth	transfers.		And	this	begins	with	leaving	
behind	conceptions	of	corruption	as	a	public	sector	bribe	or	tax	
of	sorts,	instead	of	the	absence	of	a	tax	paid	on	unfair	transactions	
entailing	 huge	 profits	 in	 a	 world	 rife	 with	 poverty	 and	 disease.	
One	has	to	look,	conceptually	and	arithmetically,	at	the	far	greater	
“drains”	 on	 public	 resources	 than	 those	 commonly	 signalled	 by	
corporate	 friendly	 anti-corruption	 campaigners,	 including	 the	
World	Bank.
7 “Foreign Direct Investment - High Risk, Low Reward for Development,
     ” http://www.blue21.de/PDF/FDI-Report_High_Risk_Low_Reward.pdf
 EECJ, Corporate Social Responsibility at the EU Level,  Advocacy Briefing 
     (November, 200), p.2
IFIs	and	private	financial	corporations	are	part	of	the	problem,	not	
of	the	solution.		These	entities	in	fact	oversee	and	uphold	the	larger	
capitalist	corporate	global	network,	fostering	the	proliferation	of	
illegitimate	money	flows.		Laundering	is	but	the	tip	of	the	iceberg.	
Examples	usually	cited	are	Nigerian	President	Sani	Abacha,	who	
is	estimated	to	have	stolen	some	$4.5	billion.		But	the	Tax	Justice	
Network	 estimates	 that	 over	 the	 past	 three	 decades	 some	 $5	
trillion	has	flowed	from	the	poorer	countries	into	tax	havens	in	the	
North—or	in	the	South	controlled	by	Northern	financiers.			Wealthy	
members	of	the	national	elites,	North	and	South,	are	not	shy	about	
exploiting	bank	secrecy	practices		for	their	own	benefit,	taking	full	
advantage	of	the	privileges	offered	to	corporations	to	further	loot	
the	country.
Money	from	developing	countries	deposited	in	UK	banks	surged	
from	115	billion	pounds		in	1995	to	about	385	billion	by	2004.		A	
study	by	 the	New	Economics	 Foundation	 found	 that	 the	 rise	 in	
deposits	 since	 2000	 from	 just	 one	 country,	 Nigeria,	was	 greater	
than	the	growth	in	UK	aid	over	much	of	the	same	period	(4.5	billion	
to	6.2	billion	pounds).	 	Since	September	11,	2001,	US	authorities	
have	cracked	down	on	money	flows	and	legal	havens	utilised	by	
organised	 terror,	 but	 the	 same	 zeal	 is	 lacking	when	 it	 comes	 to	
corporate	or	 individual	 transactions.	 	“Different	 factors	 are	 likely	
to	 be	 at	 play	 in	 each	 country	 but,	 generally,	 both	 the	 creeping	
removal	 of	 controls	 over	 the	 movement	 of	 money	 around	 the	
world,	and	capital	flight	are	probable	factors.”89		And	the	IFIs	stand	
out	in	the	defence	of	freedom	for	capital	movements	and	freedom	
from	South	capital	controls.	
Then	 there	 is	 the	 critical	 issue	 of	“clean”	money	 exported	 from	
developing	 countries	 back	 to	 the	 North.	 	 Clean	 would	 be	 a	
misnomer,	 since—over	 and	 beyond	 what	 may	 be	 considered	
legitimate	profit	remittances—a	massive		and	chronic	net	resource	
outflow	from	the	South	takes	place,	depriving	hundreds	of	millions	
people	of	a	decent	livelihood	if	not	life	itself.		There	are	a	number	
of	ways	 in	which	 funds	 are	 extracted	 illicitly	but	not	 illegally,	 at	
least	not	yet,	but	a	salient	one	takes	the	form	of	privatisation	of	
public	goods	or	public	services	companies,	as	describe	earlier.		
9 Andrew Simms, The UK Interdependence Report, http://www.neweconomics. 
     org/gen/uploads/f2abwpumbrwp0y2l0s404200747.pdf, p. 
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What	is	important	to	note	in	an	anti-corruption	context	is	that	the	
same	 institutions	upholding	the	anti-corruption	banner	are	also	
behind	the	privatisation	drives.		Data	on	corporate	capital	extraction	
are	 difficult	 to	 obtain,	 particularly	 because	 citizen	 demands	 for	
transparency	and	 information	from	private	corporations	tend	to	
fall	on	deaf	ears.		For	their	part,	inquiring	governments	are	told	they	
should	get	out	of	the	regulation	and	supervision	business,	at	least	
in	the	South.		And	the	IFIs	prefer	not	to	take	up	these	flagrant	cases	
of	corporate	“mal-governance”	or	malfeasance	since	the	neoliberal	
economic	 growth	model	 assigns	 private	 investment	 the	 role	 of	
saviour	and	chief	engine	of	the	global	economy.	 	Unsurprisingly,	
neoliberal	 power	 was	 able	 to	 abolish	 the	 UN	 Commission	 on	
Transnational	Corporations	and	censor	UNCTAD’s	South-sensitive	
analysis	and	monitoring.	
At	the	national	level,	regulatory	legal	regimes	are	also	weakening.	
Even	where	more	nationalist-minded	 authorities	 come	 to	office	
pledging	to	insure	control	and	transparency,	their	hands	are	tied	
by	 legally	binding	 	 investor	“protection”	provisions	 enshrined	 in	
free	trade	regimes	and	related	agreements	policed	by	the	World	
Trade	 Organisation.	 	 	 At	 other	moments,	 revenue	 shortages	 on	
the	 part	 of	 governments	 already	 saddled	 with	 debt	 servicing	
obligations	feed	privatisation.		In	Peru,	this	meant	selling	off	public	
electricity	 firms	 in	 2002	 and	other	 state	 assets	because	 the	 IMF	
demanded	 cuts	 in	 the	 fiscal	 deficit	 and	 the	 raising	 of	 revenues.	
The	government	 raised	US$9	billion	 through	mass	privatisation,	
triggering	mass	discontent,	job	losses	and	higher	utility	rates,90	all	
with	the	complicity	or	complacency	of	the	Fujimori	government	
officials,	who	shared	in	the	transaction	profit.	
Yet	 we	 are	 reportedly	 told	 by	 the	 neoliberal	 authorities	 that	
privatisation	 and	 liberalisation	 are	 synonymous	 with	 good	
governance	 and	 with	 the	 need	 to	 promote	 economic	 growth	
via	 the	private	 sector.	 	Over	 the	 course	of	 the	 last	 two	decades,	
unrelenting	 drives	 toward	 privatisation	 have	 meant	 that	
fundamental	 services	once	provided	or	at	 least	heavily	directed	
by	the	state	are	in	the	hands	of	private	firms,	under	new	rules	of	
90 “The Politics of Privatisation: Arequipa’s Anger, Peru’s Problem,
     ” The Economist, June 22, 2002.
the	game.	 	Services	often	deteriorate	but	official	anti-corruption	
bodies	applaud	rather	than	scrutinise.	
Somehow	one	is	supposed	to	believe	that	corporations	will	always	
behave	responsibly.		But	in	a	report	on	the	very	powerful	and	highly	
concentrated	 pharmaceutical	 industry,	 Consumers	 International	
found	“a	 staggering	 lack	 of	 transparency	 from	 drug	 companies	
about	these	practices”	[thinly	veiled	marketing	ploys	dressed	up	
as	 Social	 Responsibility	 initiatives].	 	 It	 claimed	 that	 “consumers	
are	 being	 misinformed	 about	 the	 benefits	 and	 applicability	 of	
pharmaceutical	 products….	 	 Efforts	 to	 create	 a	 global	 standard	
on	Social	Responsibility	are	being	blocked,	notwithstanding	 the	
fact	that	accessible,	transparent	information	is	an	essential	part	of	
the	principle	of	Social	Responsibility,	as	well	as	a	core	consumer	
right.”91
Rich	country	governments	and	the	IFIs	are	not	innocent	bystanders.	
They	are	explicitly	on	the	side	of	their	companies	and	the	respective	
national	investors.	 	This	should	not	be	surprising—the	overlap	is	
both	 ideological	 and	 financial,	 as	 parties	 and	 candidates	 often	
depend	on	corporate	contributions	to	their	campaigns	and	causes.	
By	the	same	token,	“development	assistance”	is	increasingly	geared	
to	help	create	“efficient	markets”	and	tailor	institutions	to	the	needs	
of	markets	and	big	 investors.	 	 In	practice,	deregulation	and	aid/
debt	dependence	means	leaving	poor	country	governments	in	an	
equally	poor	position	to	control	corrupt	private	sector	behaviour	
in	their	own	countries.		
Over	 the	 course	 of	 the	 past	 decade,	 rich	 country	 governments	
have	gradually	arrived	at	agreements	to	insure	that	competition	
amongst	 corporations	 is	 “fair”	 and	 that	 bribery	 would	 be	
penalised.	 	 However	 the	 dominant	 anti-corruption	 focus	 places	
chief	 responsibility	 on	 the	 countries	 of	 the	 South,	 invoking	
considerations	 around	 development,	 governance	 and	 poverty	
almost	as	afterthoughts.		As	the	2003	DAC	study	admits,	“Much—
although	certainly	not	all—of	the	drive	behind	reducing	corruption	
91 Consumer International, “Old Habits Die Hard: A Consumer Perspective 
on Corporate Social Responsibility, Drug Promotion and the Pharmaceutical 
Industry,” www.consumersinternational.org  
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is	related	to	international	economic	considerations	and	creating	a	
level	playing	field	internationally.”92		
Governments	in	the	North	keep	finding	ways	of	providing	direct	
assistance	to	their	national	corporations	to	secure	contracts	or	a	
dominant	presence	in	a	developing	country.	
	The	British	NGO	War	on	Want	reviewed	its	government’s	role	 in	
relation	to	privatisation	in	the	power	sector,	finding	that	Globeleq–
-a	publicly	owned	company	of	the	UK	government’s	Department	
for	International	Development	(DFID)	set	up	to	promote	the	private	
sector	in	the	developing	world—.has	operations	in	16	countries	in	
Africa,	Asia	and	Latin	America,	Globoleq	promotes	itself	as	the	“the	
fastest	growing	power	company	in	the	emerging	markets,”	utilising	
US$1	billion	of	UK	aid	money	to	US	power	companies	wishing	to	
exit	those	markets.		War	on	Want	concluded	that	energy	distribution	
privatisation	 resulted	 in	a)	 lack	of	 access	 to	electricity	 in	poorer	
communities		hardest	hit	by	ensuing		tariff	increases		b)	a	foreign	
exchange	 risk—weakening	 local	 currencies	 means	 consumers	
must	 pay	 more	 in	 order	 for	 companies	 to	 maintain	 constant	
revenue	 in	 dollar	 terms,	 and	 c)	 falling	 profitability,	 employment	
and	 capital	 investment	 by	 private	 electricity	 companies	 as	well	
as	 rising	debt	and	stagnating	sales.	This	 report	called	on	the	UK	
government	to	review	its	policy	of	using	aid	money	to	promote	
privatisation	of	public	services	in	developing	countries.93	
For	its	part,	the	US	government	provides	hundreds	of	millions	of	
dollars	in	subsidies	to	oil	corporations’	international	operations.		The	
subsidies	are	provided	directly	through	US	development	assistance	
and	export	credit	agencies,	but	also	indirectly	through	the	World	
Bank.		 In	a	letter	to	the	Speaker	of	the	House	of	Representatives,	
a	 group	 of	 NGOs	 and	 citizens’	 organisations	 complained	 how	
“the	 US-funded	World	 Bank	 Group	 has	 provided	more	 than	 $5	
billion	 to	oil	extraction	projects	 since	1992,	while	devoting	only	
five	 percent	 of	 its	 energy	 budget	 to	 clean	 renewable	 resource	
development.		Moreover,	in	the	oil	sector,	82	percent	of	the	World	
92 DAC Network, Synthesis, p. 26
93 War on Want, Globeleq: the alternative report,  http://www.eldis.org/cf/rdr/rdr. 
     cfm?doc=DOC2004
Bank’s	approved	finance	goes	to	projects	that	export	to	the	North.	
These	projects	are	not	about	alleviating	energy	poverty.		They	are	
about	corporate	welfare	for	Big	Oil	and	feeding	oil	addition	in	the	
US	and	Europe.”94	 	This	at	 a	 time	when	 the	 same	oil	 companies	
were	registering	record	profits.		Corruption?
In	 the	 face	of	 such	 realities	 and	 trends,	 genuine	 anti-corruption	
efforts	must	go	beyond	dealing	with	bribes	and	illegal	payments	
that	are	now	the	subject	of	international	conventions.		Influence-
peddling	is	also	a	form	of	corruption	and	it	is	practiced	by	private	
national	and	international	actors.	 	With	developments	 in	Central	
and	Eastern	Europe	in	mind,	the	World	Bank	admits	the	possibility	
of	“state	capture”	when	elites	effectively	take	control	of	legislation,	
institutions	and	policy-making	as	economic	and	political	interests	
intertwine.	 	 Describing	 the	 takeover	 phenomena	 in	 Russia,	 a	
Financial	Times	correspondent	wrote:	“The	oligarchs	were	so	called	
because	they	had	real	power,	 state	power.	 	They	wrote	 the	 laws.	
They	 appointed	ministers,	 often	 entire	 cabinets,	 and	made	 sure	
that	their	interests	are	served.		They	corrupted	the	new	governing	
legislative	 and	 bureaucratic	 class	 of	 Russia,	 in	 the	 centre,	 into	
regions	and	abroad….95”
But	state	capture	can	also	be	initiated	by	external	corporations	and	
facilitated	 by	 the	 international	 financial	 institutions.	 	 Corporate	
interests	 and	 multilateral	 rule-making	 and	 rule-enforcing	
institutions	can	constitute	a	form	of	state	capture	that	the	World	
Bank	and	others	conveniently	do	not	recognise	as	such.		The	result	
is	 much	 the	 same—profiteering	 through	 privatisation	 of	 state	
assets	and	deregulation,	with	the	added	injury	of	denationalisation	
in	many	cases.		
An	 unclassified	 study	 for	 the	 OECD’s	 Development	 Assistance	
Committee	 admitted	 that	 “privatisation,	 particularly	 in	 some	
of	 the	 transition	 countries,	 has	 been	 accompanied	 by	 serious	
corruption.	 	 Crony	 privatisation	 has	 skewed	wealth	 distribution,	
asset	 stripping	 has	 left	 banks	 bankrupted,	 unemployment	 has	
94 Sign-on letter, December 12, 2006, Oil Change International, 
     http://www.priceofoil.org/oilandstate/
95 John Lloyd, Financial Times, August 5, 2000.
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increased,	 and	 social	 services	have	declined.	 	To	what	 extent	 all	
of	this	was	caused	by	privatisation	alone	is	a	matter	of	judgment	
and	 perception.	 	 Some	 would	 argue	 that	 the	 alternatives	 to	
privatisation,	e.g.	doing	nothing,	would	be	worse...;	 the	potential	
impact	 of	 liberalisation	 and	 privatisation	 efforts	 is	 so	 large	 that	
donors	need	a	better	understanding	of	lessons	learned….”96		Quite	
conveniently,	a	World	Bank-supported	research	finding	insinuated	
that	the	problems	of	state	capture	made	possible	by	liberalisation	
could	be	remedied	by	further	liberalisation:	“The	data	suggest	that	
state	 capture	 appears	 to	 thrive	 in	 such	 an	 environment	 of	 only	
partial	economic	and	political	liberalisation.”97
The	World	Bank	and	others	will	only	go	so	 far	as	 to	admit	 to	an	
“inequality	 of	 influence,”	 an	 understatement	 of	 the	 first	 order.	
It	 is	 capital	 and	 power	 that	 drives	 policy,	 and	 even	World	 Bank	
researchers	admit	that	such	unequal	access	to	power	becomes	a	
source	of	“legal”	corruption.98		Inequality,	however,	is	accentuated	
by	 the	 transfer	 of	 public	 resources	 to	 the	 private	 sector,	 i.e.	 by	
privatisation,	 de-regulation	 (and	 pro-corporate	 re-regulation)	
and	 liberalisation,	which	 are	 at	 the	 core	of	World	Bank	 and	 IMF	
insistence.		The	result	is	a	heightened	capacity	of	corporate	capital	
(domestic	 and/or	 foreign)	 to	 manipulate	 political,	 legal	 and	
regulatory	 institutions	 so	 as	 to	 preserve	 and	 extend	 privileged	
positions.		
Interestingly	 enough,	 researchers	 from	 the	World	 Bank	 Institute	
are	 beginning	 to	 admit	 the	 limitations	 of	 the	 conventional	
definition	of	corruption	as	 the	‘abuse	of	public	office	 for	private	
gain’99	 	This	 is	 further	evidence	that	more	attention	needs	to	be	
paid	to	corporations	and	corporate	patterns	of	corruption,	which	
also	affect	public	sector	corruption.		
96 DAC Network on Governance, Synthesis of Lessons Learned of Donor Practic-
es in Fighting Corruption,” DAC/DAC?GOVNET (200), 2 June, 200.  p. 22
97 Joel Hellman, “Beyond the ‘Grabbing Hand’ of Government in Transition: 
Facing up to ‘State Capture’ by the Corporate Sector,” Transition, (World Bank/
William Davidson Institute), 2000.
9 Joel Hellman and Daniel Kaufman, “The Inequality of Influence,” Presentation 
at Stanford Corruption Workshop, Jan 30-31, 2003. 
99 Daniel Kaufman and Pedro C. Vicente, Legal Corruption, www.worldbank.
org/wbi/governance/pubs/legalcorporate corruption.html
It	 stands	 to	 reason	 that	 corporations	 cannot	 be	 above	 anti-
corruption	 scrutiny	when	 they	 constitute	more	 than	half	 of	 the	
world’s	100	biggest	entities,	of	which	less	than	half	are	countries.	
Five	huge	firms—General	Motors,	Daimler	Chrysler,	Ford	Motors,	
Wall	Mart	and	Mitusi—had	sales	 in	1998	that	totalled	over	$708	
billion,	more	than	double	the	GNP	of	the	100	poorest	countries	in	
the	world	 (338	billion	 in	1997).	 	Collusion	between	corporations	
and	public	officials	is	commonplace	and	usually	legal,	principally	
in	 the	 form	of	 lobbying	 influences	and	contributions	by	private	
sector	 agents	 in	 exchange	 for	 passage	 of	 particular	 legislation	
or	allocation	of	procurement	contracts—often	at	the	expense	of	
employees	and	the	wider	public	welfare.
State	capture	is	defined	by	these	researchers	as	the	appropriation	
of	public	office/policy	for	private	purposes,	and	more	specifically	
the	“direct	sale	of	public	policy”	(the	accepted	definition	of	state	
capture).		But	control	over	an	allocation	mechanism,	for	example	
rigged	 biddings	 for	 government	 procurement	 contracts,	 is	
one	 thing	 and	 the	 institutionalised	 legal	 corruption	 and	 state	
influencing	 embedded	 in	 the	 political	 economy	 of	 the	 global	
capitalist	economy	is	another.	Where	key	actors	are	corporations	
and	equally	powerful	regulating	entities	such	as	the	IFIs	and	the	
World	Trade	Organisation	set	unequal	rules	of	global	financial	and	
commercial	intercourse,	governing	elites	simply	opt	to	submit	to,	
or	better	yet	associate	with	the	powerful,	and	even	finance	political	
campaigns	in	order	to	shape	institutions	and	policy	in	a	corporate-
friendly	manner.		Neoliberal	ideology	cannot	admit	that	corruption	
is	 inherent	 in	 the	 fundamentalist	 creed	 that	 “development”	 	 is	
the	 product	 of	 private	 investment	 and	 that	 private	 investment	
requires	the	“appropriate”	market-friendly	institutions	and	policies,	
i.e.,	“good	governance.”
But	 the	 “good	 governance”	 recipes	 for	 the	 South	 are	 vague	
as	 regards	 influence	 peddling—notwithstanding	 or	 perhaps	
because	 of	 the	 inability	 to	 deal	with	 the	 same	phenomenon	 at	
home	 in	the	North.	 	Should	a	“lobbying”	 function	be	considered	
corruption	if	the	objective	is	to	change	the	way	existing	legislation	
is	implemented	and	enforced,	away	from	the	public	interest	for	the	
benefit	of	private	gain?		The	answer	should	be	yes.		In	fact,		there	
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are	cases	where	external	agents,	 including	corporations	and	the	
IFIs,	actually	draft	pro-corporate		legislation	(and	implementation	
norms)	 for	governments	 to	 approve.	 	 Both	 the	product	 and	 the	
process	should	be	considered	corrupt,	as	illegitimate	practices	are	
not	 only	 legalised	 but	 also	 now	protected	 by	 law	 enforcement.	
Here,	therefore,	we	are	no	longer	looking	at	a	form	of	corruption	
different	 from	the	administrative	corruption	 that	 takes	 the	 form	
of	bribes	to	bureaucrats	to	alter	the	implementation	of	rules	and	
regulations,	or	of	kickbacks	on	public	procurement	contracts.		The	
“purchase”	of	laws	and	policies	by	corporations	is	quite	different;	
it	 is	a	 form	of	 legalised	corruption	or	“state	capture.”	–when	the	
outlaws	 write	 the	 laws	 they	 are	 no	 longer,	 technically	 at	 least,	
outlaws.	
Mainstream	researchers	hit	a	roadblock	at	this	point	as	the	data	
and	capitalist	dynamics	continue	to	feature	interlocking	interests	
between	corporations	and	state	officials.		Terms	such	as	legalised	
corruption	 and	 state	 capture	 strain	 the	 conventional	 definition	
of	 corruption,	 and	 in	 consequence	 the	 overly-narrow	 scope	 of	
mainstream	anti-corruption	strategies.	 	Bank	researchers	believe	
that	legalised	corruption	thrives	where	economic	power	is	highly	
concentrated,	when	 forms	of	 collective	 representation	are	weak	
and	“the	 market	 for	 political	 influence	 is	 thus	 monopolised	 by	
dominant	firms.”100		The	World	Bank	is	quick	to	point	out	that	the	
tendencies	belong	to	that	select	group	of	countries	said	to	be	“in	
transition,”	but	 it	 is	clear	that	corporate	and	capitalist	behaviour	
is	not	region-specific,	as	similar	practices	are	carried	out	 in	most	
countries	under	 the	guise	of	 lobbying	or	financing	the	electoral	
campaigns	of	political	authorities.		
In	the	context	of	the	South	and	weaker	countries	in	particular,	more	
attention	needs	to	be	paid	to	legal	corruption	and	corporate-led	
corruption	patterns,	which	 intertwine	with	 the	private,	 business	
and	class	 interests	of	the	“host”	country.	 	This	 is	 legal	corruption,	
which	the	Bank	itself	admits	as	an	empirical	category	but	resists	
applying	to	describe	corporate	patterns	of	expansion	elsewhere	
00 Cheryl Gray, Joel Hellman and Randi Ryterman, Anticorruption in Transition 
2: Corruption in Enterprise-State Interactions in Europe and Central Asia 1999-
2002, (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2004), p. .
in	 the	 world.101	 	 For	 example,	 the	 Indonesian	 government	 is	
pursuing	 a	 civil	 case	 against	 the	 former	 dictator	 Suharto	 and	
his	 sons	 to	 recoup	 up	 to	 $700	 million	 kept	 in	 seven	 so-called	
foundations—cash	 cows	 that	 allegedly	 sucked	 money	 out	 of	
state-owned	enterprises,	banks	and	above	all	private	corporations	
that	benefited	from	his	policies.		But	for	many	critics,	focusing	on	
the	foundation	is	not	really	the	issue.	
More	 important,	 they	 say,	 is	 looking	 at	 how	 he	 used	 his	 power	
to	pursue	policies	 that	 served	his	 interests	 and	 those	of	people	
around	him—and	just	how	much	the	World	Bank	itself	condoned.	
The	difficulty	here	is	that	those	same	policies—and	the	laws	that	
emanated	from	them—were	approved	by	the	Peoples	Constituent	
Assembly	 and	 a	 docile	 House	 of	 Representatives….	 	 Can	 legal	
action	be	taken	against	Suharto’s	children	when	the	policies	that	
led	 to	 their	 enrichment	were	all	government-sanctioned?	 	Only,	
it	would	 seem,	 if	 it	 can	be	proven	 that	 the	 state	 incurred	 losses	
as	a	result.102	 	And	what	of	the	World	Bank’s	own	role,	providing	
an	almost	automatic	$1	billion	a	year	to	the	Suharto	regime	that	
later	 could	 “legally”	 turn	 up	 in	 Suharto-controlled	 accounts?103	
No	one	believes	the	IFIs	were	ignorant	of	what	was	taking	place	
in	 Indonesia,	but	apparently	 the	agencies	did	not	wish	 to	upset	
relations	with	the	government.
A	 similar	 case	 arose	 in	 Peru	 under	 the	 government	 of	 the	
democratically-elected	dictatorship	of	Alberto	Fujimori.	 	He	and	
his	top	collaborator,	intelligence	chief	Vladimiro	Montesinos,	took	
to	creating	new	institutions	where	corrupt	transactions	could	be	
“normalised,”	 benefiting	 a	 number	 of	 political,	 entrepreneurial,	
media	and	judicial	figures.104
0 Daniel Kaufmann and Pedro C. Vicente, “Legal Corruption” (October, 200), 
http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pubs/legalcorporatecorruption.html
02 “Yudhoyono’s Dilemma,” The Straits Times, (Singapore), May 2, 200.
103 Following the fall of General Suharto in 199, the loans dropped to about 400 
million a year until 2004.  “World Bank Again Giving Largo Loans to Indonesia,” 
The New York Times, December 2, 200.
04 Luis Moreno Ocampo, “Corruption and Democracy,” ReVista, Harvard 
Review of Latin America, http://drclas.fas.harvard.edu/databank/Userfiles/3/29/
revista_ss0_web.pdf
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If	 the	 oligarchs	 have	 indeed	 captured	 the	 state,	 then	 the	
government	itself	conveniently	becomes	the	legitimate	“client”	of	
the	International	Financial	Institutions.		But	it	would	be	difficult	for	
the	World	Bank	and	other	agencies	to	admit	to	their	own	role	in	
fostering	corruption	in,	say,	Indonesia	through	30	years	of	lending	
to	the	Suharto	dictatorship.		If	the	regime	was	corrupt,	does	that	
not	mean	that	the	loans	provided	are	also	corrupt	and	illegitimate,	
and	therefore	should	not	be	paid	back,	as	Indonesian	debt	activists	
demand?		
IX.  Looting and Lending:
The Illegitimacy of Debt
	
The	 international	debt	crisis	erupted	only	a	 little	more	than	two	
decades	ago.		It	came	as	a	consequence	of	unilateral	increases	in	
interest	 rates	 following	a	period	of	aggressive	 loan	peddling	by	
Northern	 banks	 and	 governments	 to	Third	World	 governments,	
which	took	on	the	loans	for	both	public	and	private	ends.			By	the	
1980s	the	debt	of	developing	countries	had	reached	some	US$567	
billion.	 	 The	 question	 that	 needs	 to	 be	 posed	 is	 whether	 those	
debts	are	legitimate—i.e.,	whether	they	were	contracted	against	
the	 interest	of	 the	people	of	 the	 country,	without	 their	 consent	
and	with	the	full	awareness	of	the	creditor	and	the	IFIs.
But	this	was	not	a	question	that	the	vast	majority	of	governments	
in	the	South	chose	to	pose.	 	 Instead	they	took	to	accepting	new	
loans	 to	 pay	 the	 old	 ones,	 and	 with	 this	 the	 stage	 was	 set	 for	
extortion	 and	 entrapment	 by	 way	 of	 the	 so-called	 structural	
adjustment	policies	(SAPs).		Aimed	at	building	up	state	capacities	
to	 service	 their	 debts,	 SAPs	 also	 required	 reshaping	 countries’	
financial	and	economic	systems.	 	This	included	adopting	export-
led	 growth	 models,	 making	 stringent	 budgetary	 cuts	 (largely	
in	 services),	 devaluating,	 imposing	 new	 taxes,	 privatising	 state-
owned	enterprises,	 raising	 interest	 rates,	devaluing	 the	currency	
for	export	competitiveness,	and	liberalising	finances	and	trade.
Closer	 scrutiny	of	 the	original	 loans,	however,	 reveals	 that	many	
were	a)	the	product	of	collusion	between	the	loan	provider	and	loan	
receiver,	b)	used	for	unviable	projects,	c)	contracted	by	dictators	
or	illegitimate	regimes	and/or	d)	diverted	for	private	gain.	 	From	
a	 comprehensive	 perspective,	 therefore,	 all	 three	 categories	 are	
examples	of	 corruption.	 	Nonetheless,	 subsequent	governments	
were	 legally	 and	 politically	 compelled	 to	 “honour”	 the	 debts.	
	
For	many	countries,	debt	dependence	forced	the	acceptance	of	trade	
liberalisation	measures.		During	the	early	1980s,	countries	were	told	
to	“integrate”	into	the	global	economy,	export	or	perish	by	stepping	
up	the	production	of	cash	crops	for	international	markets.		Colonial	
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terms	of	subjugation	and	exploitation	seemed	to	come	back	full	
force	with	 South	 economies	 providing	 cheap	 raw	 commodities	
and	cheap	labour	as	demanded	by	Northern	economies.		Export	
market	dependence	now	followed	and	reinforced	debt	domination,	
provoking	 mal-development	 and	 mounting	 levels	 of	 poverty.	
	
In	social,	financial	and	ecological	terms,	the	outcomes	of	imposing	
export-oriented	 and	 trade-liberalisation	 policies	 on	 the	 South	
have	been	devastating.		According	to	the	UN,	more	than	500,000	
children	under	the	age	of	five	died	each	year	 in	Africa	and	Latin	
America	in	the	late	1980s	as	a	direct	result	of	the	debt	crisis	and	
the	 trade	 conditions	 imposed	 by	 SAPs.	 	 Trade	 liberalisation	 is	
estimated	 to	 have	 cost	 sub-Saharan	 Africa	 alone	 some	 US$275	
billion	over	the	past	two	decades.		South	debt	stocks	rose	to	more	
than	a	trillion	dollars	in	1986	and	are	currently	estimated	at	well	
over	US$2	trillion.
In	 2005,	 under	 pressure	 from	 international	 debt	 cancellation	
campaigns,	 the	World	Bank	and	the	 IMF	proposed	a	multilateral	
debt	cancellation.		The	campaigns	have	argued	that	the	proposal,	
backed	by	the	G8,	 falls	way	short	of	any	development	objective,	
not	only	because	it	is	extended	to	only	38	of	160	debt-burdened	
countries,	 but	 also	 because	 it	 excludes	 debts	 claimed	 by	 other	
major	financial	 institutions.	 	 From	 the	anti-corruption	and	debt-
illegitimacy	 campaign	 perspectives,	 the	 G8	 proposal	 evades	
accountability	 for	 the	 debt	 burdens	 accrued	 on	 account	 of	
politically	 repressive	 dictatorships,	 among	 others.	 	 Nor	 does	 it	
address	the	odious	and	illegitimate	debt	mechanisms.		Instead	of	
offering	unconditional	cancellation,	the	proposal	is	contingent	on	
other	debt	repayments	and	the	fulfilment	of	old	SAP	prescriptions	
of	 the	 IMF-World	 Bank	 for	 privatisation,	 financial	 and	 trade	
liberalisation.	 	 Not	 surprisingly,	 the	 proposal	 was	 immediately	
accepted	 by	 the	 IFIs	 in	 their	 annual	 meetings	 later	 that	 year.	
		
Africa’s	 debt	 burden	 today	 amounts	 to	 US$300	 billion,	 with	
over	 US$15	 billion	 being	 spent	 annually	 on	 debt	 repayments	
to	 wealthy	 nations	 and	 institutions.	 	 Debt	 campaigners	 insist	
that	 the	 debt	 should	 be	 repudiated	 because	 of	 its	 illegitimacy	
and	corrupt	origins.	 	To	them,	 it	 is	morally	wrong	to	pay	debt	at	
the	 expense	 of	 government	 capacity	 to	 spend	 on	 basic	 social	
services,	 environmental	 security,	 food	 security,	 or	 of	 diversifying	
its	 economic	 production	 and	 reclaiming	 its	 sovereignty.	 	 Debt	
campaigners	insisted	that	Africa’s	debt	was	illegitimate	because:
•	 “Historical	 inequalities	 arising	 from	 slavery,	 slave	 trade	
wars,	colonial	legacy	and	unequal	trade	relations	framed	
the	structure	for	 imperial	domination	and	control	of	our	
economies	and	the	resultant	debt	crisis;
•	 The	 international	 financial	 institutions	 and	 northern	
industrialised	governments	used	the	deepening	cycle	of	
indebtedness	as	a	tool	of	domination	to	create	favourable	
conditions	 for	predatory	 corporate	 expansion	 to	 further	
loot	and	plunder	Africa’s	human	and	natural	resources.
•	 In	this	cyclical	process	Africa	has	repaid	this	debt	several	
times	over	and	no	 longer	do	we	 just	 shout	–	WE	DON’T	
OWE,	 WE	 WON’T	 PAY,	 but	 declare	 that	 AFRICA	 IS	 THE	
CREDITOR.”
Campaigners	went	on	to	demand	full	unconditional	cancellation	
of	 Africa’s	 debt,	 along	 with	 reparations	 for	 damage	 caused	 by	
debt	 devastation	 and	 a	 comprehensive	 audit	 to	 determine	 the	
full	 extent	 and	 real	 nature	 of	Africa’s	 illegitimate	debt,	 the	 total	
payments	made	to	date	and	the	amount	owed	to	Africa.105
At	 the	 4th	World	 Social	 Forum,	 a	 coalition	 of	 debt	 campaigns	
and	 movements	 organised	 a	 Peoples’	 International	 Tribunal	
on	 Debt	 Illegitimacy.	 	 At	 its	 concluding	 session	 held	 in	 April,	
2002,	 the	 Tribunal	 declared	 all	 external	 debt	 illegitimate	 and,	
thus	 demanded	 its	 immediate	 repudiation	 and	 cancellation.	
	
Judge	 Dumisa	 Ntsebeza,	 former	 chief	 investigator	 of	 the	 South	
African	Truth	and	Reconciliation	Commission	and	one	of	the	four	
members	 of	 the	 Tribunal	 Presidium	 officiating	 in	 the	 session,	
had	 the	 judgment	 read:	“In	 return	 for	 the	 wealth	 illegitimately	
	
0  Africa Jubilee South Declaration at the Illegitimate Debt Audit Workshop, 
June, 2004, http://www.jubileesouth.org/news/EEpEuuEVAuBwgaUCpB.shtml
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transferred	to	the	North	from	the	South,	the	countries	of	the	South	
should	be	provided	reasonable	compensation,	 to	determine	the	
magnitude	and	manner	of	payment	of	which	a	Global	Commission	
on	Debt	should	be	constituted....”
The	 prosecution	 also	 demonstrated	 proof	 through	 numbers	
that	 service	 on	 the	 external	 debt	 results	 in	 a	 net	 transfer	 of	
resources	from	the	South	to	the	North.	 In	1980,	the	South	owed	
US$567	 billion	 dollars,	 yet	 since	 then	 it	 has	 paid	 US$3,450	
billion,	 which	 is	 over	 six	 times	 the	 amount	 of	 the	 actual	 debt.	
Moreover,	the	creditors	continue	to	claim	that	they	are	still	owed	
over	 US$2	 trillion—three	 and	 a	 half	 times	 more	 than	 in	 1980.	
	
In	the	course	of	its	deliberations	in	Porto	Alegre	in	January,	2002,	
the	 Tribunal	 received	 testimony	 from	 21	 victims	 and	 expert	
witnesses	 from	 countries	 in	 Africa,	 Asia,	 Latin	 America	 and	 the	
Caribbean.	 	 Key	 testimonies	built	 the	 case	on	 the	 accusation	of	
debt	 illegitimacy	based	on	 the	 impacts	of	debt	 service	 and	 the	
consequence	of	redirecting	funds	away	from	state	social	service	
obligations.	 	 	Particularly	compelling	were	 the	African	witnesses	
who	documented	the	consequences	 for	 the	region	of	having	to	
pay	 US$13.4	 billion	 annually	 to	 its	 external	 creditors	 between	
1990	and	1993,	which	was	more	than	its	combined	spending	on	
education	and	health….
Illegitimacy	was	spelled	out	based	on	an	examination	of	the	nature	
of	the	contracting	parties,	processes,	terms	and	usage:	testimonies	
covered	cases	of	stolen	wealth,	the	public	assumption	of	private	
debts,	 usurious	 interest	 rates	 and	 odious	 debt.	 	 	 Following	 the	
testimonies,	 the	 Tribunal	 came	 to	 the	 following	 conclusions,	
among	others:	
•	 On	the	accusation	of	debt	illegitimacy	based	on	the	use	
of	the	debt	to	impose	conditionalities	and	the	use	of	debt	
relief	 as	 leverage	 for	 more	 conditionalities,	 witnesses	
presented	their	experiences	and	evidence	of	 the	use	of	
the	 Structural	 Adjustment	 Programs	 as	 conditionalities	
and	eligibility	criteria	for	different	types	of	loans;
•	 On	the	accusation	of	debt	illegitimacy	based	on	the	impact	
of	projects	and	policies	financed	by	debt,	witnesses	spoke	
of	lender-financed	projects	and	policies	that	have	resulted	
in	enormous	ecological	and	social	damage.	This	included	
natural	resource	extraction	that	is	destroying	the	means	
of	 survival	 for	 Southern	 communities,	 contamination	
of	 the	 atmosphere	 through	 excessive	 greenhouse	 gas	
emissions,	the	erection	of	mega-projects	geared	to	profit	
generation,	 the	 appropriation	 of	 traditional	 knowledge	
and	 seeds,	 the	 dumping	 of	 toxic	 wastes	 in	 the	 South,	
and	the	consequences	of	Northern	financial	and	political	
support	for	armed	conflict;
•	 On	 the	 accusation	 of	 debt	 illegitimacy	 based	 on	 the	
nature	 of	 the	 contracting	 parties,	 processes,	 terms	 and	
usage,	testimonies	covered	cases	of	stolen	wealth,	public	
assumption	of	private	debts,	usurious	interest	rates	and	
odious	debt.106
In	a	historical	and	justice	context,	a	great	part	of	the	debt	owed	
by	poor	countries	is	odious	or	illegitimate	in	origin.		Indeed,	much	
of	the	debt	should	be	considered	already	paid.	 	For	all	but	three	
years	 since	 1970,	 the	 poor	 counties	 have	 paid	 more	 money	 in	
the	form	of	interest,	repayments,	penalties	and	fines	on	old	debt	
than	they	have	received	as	new	loans.		Something	is	very	corrupt	
in	a	system	whereby	almost	all	poor	countries	have	repaid	more	
than	they	borrowed	yet	their	debts	continue	to	mount	and	divert	
resources	toward	Northern	corporations	and	banks.		An	immediate	
cancellation	of	illegitimate	debts	is	in	order,	and	where	that	does	
not	 take	 place,	 governments	 in	 the	 South	 should	 feel	 secure	 in	
their	right	to	repudiate	those	corrupt	debts.		
In	the	Americas,	the	case	for	corrupt	contracting	of	debt	in	Haiti	
is	compelling.				More	than	half	the	country’s	debt	was	contracted	
by	 the	 Duvalier	 family	 dictatorship	 (1957-1986).	 	 Independent	
economists	 came	 to	 calculate	 that	 Jean-Claude	 Duvalier	 stole	
$900	million	from	the	Haitian	treasury.		The	lending	was	an	act	of	
corruption,	but	Haitians	are	now	forced	to	pay	the	corrupt	loans.	
0 People’s Tribunal declares external debt illegitimate, calls for the 
decommissioning of IMF-World Bank, (April, 2002), http://www.jubileesouth.org/
news/EpklEpEEVVGwDpzvZd.shtml
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What	 is	more,	 the	World	 Bank	 and	 IMF	 insist	 that	 Haiti	 comply	
with	 economic	 policies	 such	 as	 privatisation	 of	 basic	 services	
or	 increased	 trade	 liberalisation	 before	 obtaining	 full	 debt	
cancellation.107		
A	 study	 by	 the	 New	 Economics	 Foundation	 documents	 how	
Indonesia	overpaid	its	recorded	debt	by	US$151	billion,	which	in	
fact	translates	into	a	cumulative	net	transfer	to	the	North	of	138	
billion	 to	 date.	 	The	 same	 study	 found	 that	 the	 Philippines	 had	
overpaid	its	debts	by	35	billion	and	Argentina	had	overpaid	by	77	
billion.	 	According	to	the	study’s	author,	“people	 in	these—often	
desperately	poor—countries	end	up	paying	three	times	for	loans	
ostensibly	taken	out	in	their	name….		First	they	are	oppressed	by	
the	 regimes	propped	up	and	enriched	by	 these	 loans;	 secondly,	
they	 are	 impoverished	 by	 the	 cost	 of	 servicing	 the	 loans;	 and	
thirdly	they	are	oppressed	yet	again	by	the	penalties	 imposed	if	
the	odious	regimes	default.”108			
An	analysis	of	third	world	debt	and	of	the	unjust	power	relations	
that	produced	it	led	organisations	such	as	Jubilee	South	to	insist	
that	South	countries	were	not	debtors	but	in	fact	creditors.		Citing	
the	 historical,	 moral	 and	 environmental	 damages	 incurred	 by	
Western	colonialists,	including	their	support	to	dictatorships	and	
regimes	 such	as	Apartheid,	 Jubilee	 South	 assumed	 the	position	
of	“Don’t	owe,	won’t	pay.”	 	 In	essence,	organisations	in	the	South	
and	 some	 in	 the	North	 set	 aside	 the	 IFI	 and	“donor”	 references	
to	“debt	 relief	 for	 the	poorest	 countries”	and	 instead	demanded	
unconditional	 cancellation	 and	 repudiation	 of	 all	 debts	 for	 all	
South	countries.			
The	assumption	for	Jubilee	South	and	others	was	that	debt	was	
an	ideological	construct;	that	it	did	not	exist	in	fact	but	was	being	
used	as	an	instrument	of	oppression.		From	the	beginning,	there	
was	insistence	on	the	corrupt	nature	of	the	contracting	that	made	
07 Debayani Kar and Tom Ricker, “IDB Debt Cancellation for Haiti” (Silver City, 
       NM and Washington, DC: Foreign Policy in Focus, December 7, 200).
08 Steve Mandel, “Odious Debt: Debt Relief as if Morals Mattered”  
       (September, 200), http://www.neweconomics.org/gen/uploads  
       v3gdvw45bflbyn55gy1fwr4514092006174700.pdf
the	debts	illegitimate,	which	meant	that	addressing	mass	poverty	
could	 not	 be	 separated	 from	 the	 process	 of	 mass	 enrichment.	
Unsurprisingly,	most	governments	in	the	South	will	not	accompany	
such	an	analysis	for	fear	of	lowering	their	international	credit	rating	
and	being	punished	by	the	“donors”	,	the	World	Bank	and	the	IMF.
Extensive	 work	 by	 NGOs	 and	 analysts	 shows	 how	 repayment	
of	 illegitimate	 debts,	 new	 indebtedness,	 profit	 repatriation	 by	
foreign	 investors,	 structural	 trade	deficits,	price	manipulation	by	
commercial	oligopolies	in	trade	transactions	and	capital	flight	all	
contribute	to	corruption	that	underscores	the	removal	of	scarce	
resources	from	the	poor	countries.		For	example,	non-payment	and/
or	non-collection	of	tax	resources	surely	erode	a	country’s	capacity	
to	finance	development	and	build	key	institutional	facilities.		But	
while	tax	evasion	is	a	crime,	there	are	also	tax	avoidance	and	tax	
privileges	 often	 entailing	 important	 public	 revenue	 losses	 that	
should	also	be	prosecuted	as	a	form	of	corruption.		
Corrupt	transactions	that	take	place	outside	the	state’s	jurisdiction,	
such	as	tax	competition,	price	manipulations	and	the	 increasing	
use	 of	 tax	 havens,	 also	 amount	 to	 illegitimate	 (although	 not	
necessarily	illegal)	resource	extraction.		Privatisation	run	amok	has	
led	 to	cases	where	 the	public	 sector	 is	 called	upon	 to	 subsidise	
foreign	investment	by	offering	a	range	of	“incentives”	that	many	
times	signify	more	losses	than	eventual	gains	for	the	country.
What	needs	to	be	stressed,	according	to	William	Robinson,	is	the	
fact	that	the	phenomenon	of	corruption	in	the	public	sector	is	a	
logical	consequence	of	the	privatisation	and	liberalisation	model.	
The	 opportunities	 for	 enrichment	 are	 many	 and	 the	 internal	
surveillance	 functions	 are	 overwhelmed.	 	 Robinson	 argues	 that	
“corruption	is	a	rational	response	to	the	conditions	generated	by	
the	transnational	project....		That	a	ruling	group	comes	to	constitute	
a	transnational	fraction	linked	to	the	emergent	global	system	does	
not	mean	that	such	groups	are	honest,	clean	and	democratic	 in	
their	governing	conduct;”	109	
109 William Robinson, Transnational Conflicts, Central America, Social Change  
       and Globalization, (Verso: 200), p. 7.
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A	 particularly	 despicable,	 yet	 entirely	 legal	 form	 of	 corruption	
affecting	the	poorest	countries	takes	the	form	of	companies	that	
buy	up	the	debt	of	poor	nations	cheaply	and	then	sue	for	the	full	
value	plus	 interest.	 	Because	 the	holders	never	expect	 to	collect	
on	these	debts,	they	sell	them	at	a	very	low	price	to	the	vultures,	
which	then	resort	to	political	muscle,	bribery	or	 lawsuits	against	
the	country	whose	debt	 it	was	 to	 try	 to	get	back	not	only	 their	
investment	but	the	full	 face	value	of	the	debts	plus	 interest	and	
legal	costs.		Fortunately	this	form	of	financial	piracy	has	captured	
the	attention	of	campaigners	and	some	mainstream	media.		A	BBC	
Newsnight	report	narrated	how	in	1979	Romania	lent	Zambia	15	
million	to	purchase	tractors,	and	when	by	1998	Zambia	could	no	
longer	make	payments,	Romania	offered	to	write	off	the	entire	debt	
for	just	3	million.		Before	the	deal	was	final,	Donegal	International	
swooped	 in	 (like	 a	 vulture),	 and	 snatched	 up	 Romania’s	 cheap	
debt	offer.		It	then	filed	suit	against	Zambia	not	for	the	3	million	it	
had	paid,	but	for	the	original	debt	plus	interest,	or	$42	million.		In	
a	London	courthouse,	the	Zambian	government	alleged	that	the	
vulture	firm	had	paid	a	$2	million	bribe	to	the	“favourite	charity”	of	
the	previous	Zambian	President,	Frederick	Chibula,	by	then	on	trial	
for	wide-ranging	corruption	charges.		The	chief	figure	in	Donegal	
is	Michael	Sheehan,	who	was	reported	to	be	a	sizeable	contributor	
to	the	Bush	presidential	campaign.		Sheehan	and	associates	remain	
active	in	US	courtrooms	asking	for	hundreds	of	millions	of	dollars	
from	severely	poor	countries—notwithstanding	the	fact	that	it	is	
against	US	law	to	bribe	a	foreign	official.		
US	 billionaire	 Paul	 Singer	 is	 the	 founding	 father	 of	 the	 vulture	
profiteering	 business	 through	 his	 firm	 Elliot	 Associates,	 with	
offices	on	Fifth	Avenue	in	New	York	City.		According	to	investigative	
reporter	Greg	Palast,	Singer	bought	up	some	of	Peru’s	debt	for	$11	
million	 in	1996,	then	threatened	to	bankrupt	Peru’s	government	
if	 it	didn’t	give	him	$58	million.	 	He	got	 the	$58	million.	 	 Singer	
also	 bought	 discounted	 debt	 from	 Congo	 Brazzaville	 for	 only	
about	$10	million,	which	his	company	turned	into	$127	million	by	
suing	the	Congo.		But	not	even	that	was	enough:	Singer	claimed	
the	Congo	government	was	corrupt	and	was	hiding	assets	from	
creditors.	 	 The	 US	 courts	 agreed,	 allowing	 him	 to	 seek	 tripled	
damages	under	 the	AUS	racketeering	 law.	 	Congo	was	counting	
on	George	Bush	to	use	his	legal	authority	to	stop	the	court	action,	
but	Singer	is	the	number	one	donor	to	Bush	and	the	Republican	
Party	in	New	York	City,	having	provided	$300,000	during	the	2000	
elections	and	$1.2	million	in	2004.	 	Singer	expects	to	collect	400	
million	from	Congo.110
On	15	 February	2007,	 a	 London	 court	 rejected	 the	 size,	but	not	
the	nature,	of	Donegal’s	claim,	lowering	the	“award”	to	20	million.	
The	 ruling	 provides	 legal	 cover	 to	 one	 of	 the	 most	 predatory	
banking	practices	in	existence,	but	more	importantly	undermines	
governmental	 capacity	 to	 spend	 on	 social	 services.	 	 	 Zambian	
presidential	 adviser	 and	 consultant	 to	 Oxfam,	 Martin	 Kalunga-
Banda,	 believes	 the	 42	 million	 was	 equal	 to	 all	 the	 debt	 relief	
received	 in	 2006:	 “It	 means	 30,000	 children	 who	 would	 have	
benefited	from	going	to	school	free	will	not	be	able	to	do	so.”111	
To	his	 credit,	 Britain’s	 then-Chancellor	 of	 the	 Exchequer	Gordon	
Brown	 told	 the	United	Nations	 in	2002	 that	 this	 form	of	 cynical	
profiteering	was	perverse	and	immoral.		“We	particularly	condemn	
the	 perversity	where	 vulture	 funds	 purchase	 debt	 at	 a	 reduced	
price	and	make	a	profit	from	suing	the	debtor	country	to	recover	
the	 full	 amount	 owned—a	 morally	 outrageous	 outcome.”	 	 Its	
continued	legality,	however,	makes	a	mockery	of	G8	“debt	relief,”	
which	works	for	the	benefit	of	bankers	instead	of	the	South.112	
Sameer	Dossani,	Director	of	50	Years	 is	Enough,	 sums	 it	up	well:	
“The	Donegal	case	in	Zambia	shows	just	how	skewed	the	current	
financial	 system	 is	 towards	 the	 interests	 of	 the	wealthy.	 	 Before	
reaching	a	debt	cancellation	agreement,	an	impoverished	country	
must	borrow	from	the	international	financial	institutions	in	order	
to	 repay	wealthy	creditors	and	those	same	financial	 institutions.	
Dependence	on	aid	money	means	that	the	terms	of	 lending	are	
set	completely	at	the	whims	of	the	creditors,	who	set	conditions	
not	just	on	the	how	the	money	they	lend	is	to	be	spent,	but	on	the	
110 “Vulture Fund” Company Seeks $40 Million Payment from Zambia on $4 
Million Debt, http://www.democracynow.org/article.pl?sid=07/02//28209; 
http://jubileeusa.typepad.com/
 Greg Palast investigation on BBC News in http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/busi-
ness/4.stm
2 Ibid.
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nature	of	the	county’s	economy	itself.		Not	surprisingly,	the	country’s	
economy	 is	 shaped	by	 these	conditions	 to	benefit	 international	
investors	who	make	money	 from	deregulated	financial	markets,	
transnational	 corporations	 that	make	money	 from	 privatisation	
policies	and	buyers	of	commodities	who	make	money	from	trade	
liberalisation.		All	these	policies,	which	further	enrich	these	elites	
in	Europe	and	North	America,	 further	 impoverish	the	country	 in	
question	and	condemn	it	to	a	never-ending	cycle	of	debt.”113
113 Sameer Dossani, “Investors Aim to Profit from Zambia’s Poverty,” Foreign  
       Policy in Focus, http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/40
X.  Anti-Corruption:
Why the World Bank should not lead
The	World	Bank	has	set	itself	the	goal	of	becoming	the	lead	agency	
on	issues	of	anti-corruption	and	governance.		In	many	respects,	as	
we	have	seen,	such	“leadership”	would	make	the	Bank	judge	and	
jury	of	 its	own	actions.	 	There	are	a	number	of	 reasons	why	 the	
Bank	is	 ill-placed	to	lead	global	anti-corruption:	first,	by	virtue	of	
the	Bank’s	own	charter,	governments	are	its	“clients”	and	political	
matters	 are,	 nominally	 at	 least,	 outside	 its	 mandate.	 	 Second,	
any	WB	 strategy	 is	 predicated	 on	 neoliberal	 economic	 growth	
formulas	and	macro-economic	frameworks	that	take	precedence	
over	all	else.		Civil	society	anti-corruption	campaigns,	particularly	
community	 and	 trade	 union-based	 ones,	 have	 no	 reason	 to	
subordinate	 methodology,	 analysis	 and	 actions	 to	 the	 Bank’s	
framework.		
According	 to	 the	 Bank,	 “corruption	 sabotages	 polices	 and	
programmes	that	aim	to	reduce	poverty,	so	attacking	corruption	
is	 critical	 to	 the	 achievement	of	 the	bank’s	 overarching	mission	
of	poverty	 reduction.”114	 	However,	poverty	 reduction	 is	 in	most	
cases	 in	 the	 South	 also	 a	 question	 of	 reducing	 inequality	 and	
thereby	insuring	resource	and	power	redistribution	by	contesting	
the	dominant	development	model	defended	by	so-called	donors,	
multilaterals	and	the	status	quo	in	general.		
In	 addition,	 the	 Bank	 suffers	 from	 an	 overwhelming	 lack	 of	
legitimacy	 and	 credibility	 with	 many	 civil	 society	 groupings	
(engaging	 in	 anti-corruption	 is	 indeed	 an	 intended	 path	 to	 re-
legitimise	itself ).		Campaigners	North	and	South	have	pointed	to	
the	following	factors,	among	others:
a.	 The	lack	of	transparency	and	accountability	in	the	
Bank’s	own	governance	structures	and	in	the	way	
the	Bank	does	business;
4  See Bank Website www.worldbank.org and “Debt briefing for Eurodad 
        corruption, debt and aid meeting,” June 200, www.eurodad.org.
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b.	 The	overriding	focus	on	economic	liberalisation;
c.	 The	 level	 of	 corruption	 being	 found	 in	 Bank	
projects;
d.	 The	 divorce	 between	 the	 Bank’s	 conception	 of	
governance	and	democracy.
e.	 The	mistaken	attention	directed	 to	“the	poor”	as	
victims	by	Bank-shaped	donor	consensus	around	
poverty	 reduction,	 which	 is	 also	 a	 category	
enshrined	outside	the	larger	power	structure	and	
inequalities.		
f.	 The	tendency	of	Bank	analysis	to	deflect	attention	
from	 the	 enduring	 inequalities	 and	 injustices	 at	
the	 international	 level,	 including	 rich	 country	
trade	and	investment	promotion	policies	
In	 short,	 the	 Bank	 is	 already	 too	 powerful	 to	 be	 assigned	 yet	 a	
new	sphere	of	influence	and	too	pro-corporate	finance	to	assure	
an	 even-handed	 public/private	 approach.	 	 Taking	 the	 task	 to	
heart,	however,	the	WB	has,	in	the	eyes	of	some	donors,	gone	too	
far	 by	 imposing	 new	 conditionality	 on	 several	 of	 its	“clients”	 by	
freezing	or	cancelling	loans	or	delaying	debt	cancellation	because	
of	 alleged	corruption.	Writing	about	 the	 tensions	over	 the	 issue	
between	 Wolfowitz	 and	 some	 of	 his	 executive	 directors,	 The	
New	York	Times	 reported,	“The	backlash	at	 the	bank	against	Mr.	
Wolfowitz’s	approach	centers	not	on	his	 intentions	or	goals,	but	
on	the	widespread	fear	that	countries	will	be	categorized	 in	the	
future	as	corrupt	or	not	corrupt,	and	that	lending	will	be	shut	off	
in	a	selective	way.”115
A	 report	 by	 CIDSE,	 a	 European	 coalition	 of	 development	NGOs,	
stated	 in	 clear	 terms	 that	 the	World	Bank	“should	not	 take	on	a	
role	as	central	arbiter	of	governance	or	corruption	standards,	or	
be	seen	to	take	on	such	a	role.”		It	may	be	too	much	to	ask	that	it	
instead	“significantly	step	up	[its]	 response	to	the	supply	side	of	
 Steven Weisman, “Wolfowitz Corruption Drive Rattles World Bank,” The New 
York Times, September 4, 200. 
corruption,	where	Northern	corporations	and	banks	are	complicit	
in	the	illicit	draining	of	resources	from	Southern	countries.”116
In	addition,	the	World	Bank	has	a	narrow	operational-managerial-
engineering	conception	of	governance	and	anti-corruption,	based	
largely	 on	 its	 own	 institutional	 mandate,	 its	 economic	 growth	
formula	and	the	ensuing	policy	prescription	agenda.		It	pretends	
that	governance	standards	are	non-ideological	or	political,	because	
the	 Bank	 is	 not	 supposed	 to	 be	 involved	 in	 political	 matters.	
Looking	to	the	WB	for	guidance	in	this	regard,	as	donor	agencies	
and	 NGOs	 including	 Transparency	 International	 often	 do,	 is	 to	
accept,	tacitly	or	not,	the	neoliberal	corporate-driven	development	
growth	model	that	the	Bank	upholds	and	propagates.		
In	 a	 letter	 addressed	 to	 the	World	 Bank	 President,	 a	 number	 of	
nongovernmental	organisations	stated	that	Wolfowitz’s	corruption	
and	governance	strategy	takes
	
“a	top-down,	interventionist	approach,	which	appears	to	be	based	
on	the	belief	that	the	Bank	is	both	capable	of	and	mandated	with	
fixing	 governance	 systems	 without	 recognition	 of	 democratic	
processes.		It	portrays	governance	as	a	problem	that	can	be	fixed	by	
changing	institutions	and	championing	the	private	sector	whilst	
paying	scant	regard	to	the	crucial	issues	of	the	fulfiment	of	human	
rights	 and	 broad-based	 development....	 	 The	 World	 Bank	 has	
neither	the	mandate,	the	legitimacy	nor	the	capacity	to	become	
a	global	 arbiter	on	 corruption.	Whilst	 corruption	 is	 a	 concern	 in	
many	developing	countries	around	the	world,	recent	events	in	the	
UK	(cash	for	peerages)	and	the	US	(Enron,	Katrina	relief )	illustrate	
that	 it	 is	 far	 from	being	a	‘poor	 country	problem.’	 	The	problem	
needs	to	be	seen	in	the	context	of	other	challenges	that	countries	
face	in	building	democratic	developmental	states	and	combating	
poverty....	 	The	World	Bank	 should	 focus	 its	 energies	on	 its	 own	
operations	 and	 not	move	 into	 the	 role	 of	‘global	 policeman’	 on	
corruption.	 	 It	cannot	be	both	 judge	and	 jury	of	 its	own	actions	
 CIDSE Background Paper, The World Bank’s Strategy on Governance and 
Anticorruption: A civil society perspective, August, 200, http://www.cidse.org/
docs/20060231619535230.pdf
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and	is	not	a	legitimate	actor	to	lead	the	charge	on	issues	of	anti-
corruption	and	much	less	in	the	field	of	governance.”117
Much	the	same	should	apply	to	the	International	Monetary	Fund,	
which	is	busy	at	present	seeking	new	roles	to	justify	its	existence.	
However,	the	dividing	line	between	the	IMF	and	big	corporations	
is	even	thinner	than	the	one	prevailing	at	the	World	Bank.		Stiglitz	
lamented	that	“there	seems	to	be	no	such	rule	on	revolving	doors	
in	place	at	the	IMF;	its	first	deputy	managing	director	moved	from	
his	 senior	 public	 sector	 job	 to	 the	 vice-chairmanship	 of	 one	 of	
America’s	largest	financial	institutions.		The	IMF	is	widely	viewed	as	
reflecting	the	ideology	and	interests	of	the	financial	community,	
of	responding	more	to	its	concerns	than	those	of	the	developing	
countries	 it	 is	 supposed	to	be	helping.	 	 In	 Indonesia,	 there	were	
billions	of	dollars	to	bail	out	foreign	creditors,	but	paying	out	far	
smaller	sums	to	provide	food	and	fuel	subsidies	for	those	thrown	
out	of	their	job	or	who	saw	their	wages	plummeting	was	viewed	as	
a	waste	of	money.		Western	banks	benefit	from	such	bail-outs.118
In	 sum,	 good	 governance	 for	 the	 Bank	 means	 establishing	
market	economy	with	the	“appropriate	macroeconomic	stability,”	
stable	property	rights,	enforceable	contracts,	 transparency,	trade	
liberalisation,	 repatriation	 of	 profits,	 privatised	 or	 public/private	
partnerships	for	service	deliveries	and	mechanisms	to	fight	official	
corruption.	 	 As	 one	 study	 concludes,	“the	Bank’s	 faith	 in	market	
mechanisms	underestimates	the	significant	challenges	posed	by	
institution-building	and	the	need	to	protect	the	vulnerable.”119
The	need	to	create	“effective	institutions”	is	seen	as	a	mechanism	
to	 block	 proposals	 for	 the	“populist”	 altering	 of	 state	 structures	
to	bring	them	closer	to	citizenries.	 	From	the	Bank’s	perspective,	
fighting	corruption	is	an	institutional	and	administrative	task,	not	
7 CIDSE, Eurodad, Afrodad and Latindad letter to Paul Wolfowitz on the World 
Bank Governance and Anti-corruption Strategy, August 7, 2006,   http://www.cidse.
org/docs/20060071455354490.pdf
11 Joseph Stiglitz, Corporate Corruption, “The conflicts of Interest Driving US 
Financial Scandals are being Replicated on a Global Scale,” Guardian (London), 
July 4, 2002, available on http://www.commondreams.org/views02/0704-02.htm
119Vivian Collingwood, ed., “Good Governance and the World Bank,” www.
brettonwoodsproject.org
part	of	democratising	governance.			For	its	part,	the	IMF	is	taking	on	
governance	issues	by	increasing	the	range	of	non-macroeconomic	
issues	it	addresses	in	its	operations	through	the	heavy	influencing	
of	 pubic	 policy.	 	 As	 with	 the	 Bank,	 many	 South	 governments	
feel	 they	 cannot	 effectively	 challenge	 the	 IMF	 because	 of	 their	
financial	dependence	or	because	of	the	“gate-keeper”	role	played	
by	 the	 IMF	 in	giving	 the	green	 light	 for	 financing.120	 	The	 state-
market	 relationship	 is	 at	 the	 core	of	 the	 IFI	 and	“donor”	 agenda	
needing	 to	 be	 enshrined	 through	“good	 governance”	 practices	
but	the	emphasis	is	on	the	market	and	not	the	state,	on	providing	
assurances	for	capital	at	the	expense	of	society.
Conditionality	 is	 needed	 on	 the	 IFIs	 and	 on	 the	 operations	 of	
corporate	and	financial	combines	of	 the	North.	 	 Instead,	 the	WB	
and	IMF	continue	to	push	their	versions	of	good	governance,	and	
use	sticks	to	get	there.		Taking	advantage	of	a	developing	country’s	
dependence	 on	 loans,	 the	 Bank	 employs	 conditionality	 as	 an	
instrument	of	power,	taking	advantage	of	the	venality	of	governing	
elites	and	debt/assistance	dependence	to	shape	governments	and	
civil	society	initiatives	into	the	neoliberal	governance	formula.		In	
this	sense,	any	new	governance	and	anti-corruption	strategy	led	
by	the	Bank	is	bound	to	increase	the	burden	of	conditionality.		This	
externally	driven	process	would	 invariably	discredit	 the	 content	
and	 product,	 not	 least	 from	 the	 standpoint	 of	 proper—bottom	
up—democratic	 process	 in	 which	 concerns	 of	 sovereignty	 and	
self-determination	are	fundamental	core	elements.
World	Bank	researchers	came	up	with	the	notion	of	“state	capture”	
unsuspecting	 perhaps	 that,	 in	 the	 post	 9/11	 security-obssessed	
world,	 corruption	 also	 become	 synonymous	 with	“state	 failure”	
and	threats	to	big	power	“national	security”.				If	a	corrupt	state	is	
unable	to	live	up	to	US	“security”	standards,	it	could	become	not	
simply	an	 inconvenience	 for	corporate	profit-making	but,	 in	 the	
context	of	the	so-called	war	on	terrorism,	a	threat	to	international	
peace.		For	historical	reasons	(a	drawback	to	gunboat	diplomacy),	
this	“securitisation”	of	governance	should	give	rise	to	concern	that	
20  Daniel Bradlow, “IMF Identity Crisis,” Foreign Policy in Focus, De-
cember 2, 200, www.fpif.org
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it	 will	 become	 a	 further	 pretext	 for	“aid	 selectivity”	 at	 best	 and	
external	intervention	at	worse.
But	one	must	of	course	look	further	and	deeper	for	the	causes	of	
state	 fragility/corruption.	 	 As	 this	 paper	 has	 strongly	 suggested,	
it	 may	 be	 the	 liberalisation	 and	 privatisation	 model	 itself	 that	
generates	 the	 very	 weaknesses	 the	 US	 and	 its	 allies	 are	 now	
complaining	 about.	 	 As	 US	 political	 scientist	 Susan	Woodward	
argues,	 “The	 policy	 promoting	 privatisation	 as	 a	 reform	 of	 the	
state	 (with	both	economic	and	political	objectives)	assumes	the	
public	and	private	sectors	are	distinct,	but	this	is	not	true	in	much	
of	the	world,	where	the	public	and	private	realms	are	intermeshed.	
The	consequence	of	this	mistaken	assumption	is	that	privatisation	
programmes	tend	to	legitimise	the	privileged	sector	and	further	
exclude	the	rest	of	the	population	from	the	formal	sector,	pushing	
them	into	informal,	marginal	and	frequently	illegal	activity.”		In	this	
light,	she	adds,	“the	primary	cause	of	the	state	fragility	and	even	
failure	may	be	the	models	of	governance	that	external	actors	such	
as	development	banks	and	ministries	of	foreign	affairs	have	been	
pushing	on	countries	of	the	global	south	since	the	early	1980s	and,	
secondly,	 that	 the	problem	is	not	the	kinds	of	states	that	model	
was	aimed	 to	change	but	 the	kinds	of	 states	 that	 resulted	 from	
those	models.”	121
By	the	1990s,	in	the	face	of	mounting	evidence	that	a	liberalised	
world	economy	was	failing	to	deliver	development	to	the	poorer	
countries,	 the	search	began	 for	other	explanations.	 	That	search,	
however,	did	not	set	aside	the	earlier	premises	of	neo-classical	free-
market	 economics,	 but	 rather	 focused	 on	 supplementary	 ways	
to	set	the	market’s	magic	free.	 	The	World	Bank	and	mainstream	
economists	now	introduced	governance	factors:	getting	institutions	
and	governance	“right”	so	that	the	right	combination	of	policy	and	
institutional	reform	would	deliver	“results.”		This	theoretical	fantasy	
went	on	to	attribute	poverty	to	the	stifling	of	“entrepreneurship”	
by	 poor	 governance	 and	public	 sector	 corruption.	 	On	 June	 11,	
2005,	 the	 G8	 finance	 ministers,	 reflecting	 the	 new	 consensus,	
stated,	“We	 reaffirm	our	view	 that	 in	order	 to	make	progress	on	
2 Susan Woodward, “Fragile States: Exploring the Concept,” paper presented 
to the “States and Security” Learning Group, November 29, 2004, www.fride.org
social	and	economic	development,	it	is	essential	that	developing	
countries	put	in	place	the	polices	for	economic	growth,	sustainable	
development	 and	 poverty	 reduction:	 sound,	 accountable	 and	
transparent	institutions	and	policies;	macroeconomic	stability;	the	
increased	fiscal	transparency	essential	to	tackle	corruption,	boost	
private	 sector	 development	 and	 attract	 investment;	 a	 credible	
legal	 framework;	 and	 the	elimination	of	 impediments	 to	private	
investment,	both	domestic	and	foreign.”122
That	 consensus	 misses	 many	 of	 the	 fundamentals,	 chiefly	 the	
political	nature	of	governance	and,	 in	many	cases,	of	corruption	
itself,	 as	 they	are	embedded	 in	wider	 social,	political	 and	global	
structures.	 	 Nongovernmental	 development	 advocates	 such	
as	CIDSE	 argue	 that	“deep	 social	 inequality	 and	 elite	 capture	of	
power	 and	 state	 resources	 perpetuate	 grand	 corruption	 and	
unaccountable	 governance.	 	 Powerful	 political	 and	 economic	
interests	 resist	 change	 and	 indeed	 are	 often	 abetted	 by	 the	
economic	policy	work	of	donors	(e.g.	creating	an	investment	climate	
conducive	to	foreign	investors	but	from	which	only	the	elite	gain	
locally,	further	entrenching	their	power).		Neo-patrimonial	politics,	
usually	 with	 roots	 in	 colonial	 power	 structures,	 institutionalise	
corruption	and	poor	governance.”123		Part	of	the	conceptualisation	
problem	(or	objective)	is	the	linkage	the	Bank	and	most	“donors”	
increasingly	make	between	the	governance	or	state-failure	agenda	
and	the	commitment	to	economic	liberalisation.		
How	 convenient	 that	 privatisation,	 or	 more	 accurately	
corporatisation,	 emerges	 as	 a	 stellar	 way	 of	 fighting	 corruption	
in	 state-owned	 enterprises	 and	 utilities—all	 on	 the	 dubious	
assumption	 that	 the	 market	 is	 better	 at	 self-regulating	 against	
corruption	 than	 the	 state	 itself.	 	 As	 the	 CIDSE	 study	 argues,	“an	
automatic	assumption	that	a	better	governed	state	is	one	in	which	
government’s	scope	to	regulate	is	reduced,	markets	are	liberalised	
and	 public	 services	 are	 contracted	 out	 to	 private	 providers	 is	
22 G8 Finance Ministers’ Statement on Development and Debt, G8 Finance  
       Ministers’ Conclusions on Development, London, 10-11 June, 2005.
2 CIDSE, “The World Bank’s Strategy on Governance and Anticorruption— 
        a civil society perspective,” A CIDSE Background Paper, (August, 200), 
        p. .  http://www.cidse.org 
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both	deeply	problematic	and	profoundly	political.”124		The	bias	is	
ideological	 as	well	 as	 institutional	 self-interest,	 as	 the	 Bank	 and	
“donors”	 also	 see	 corruption	 as	 a	 threat	 to	 their	 own	 resources	
and	reputation	and	to	the	survival	of	the	aid	industry	itself,	often	
complicit	 in	 lending	 to	 governments	 that	 lacked	 democratic	
legitimacy	 and,	 as	 we	 have	 already	 discussed,	 were	 known	 for	
corrupt	practices.	
As	at	other	times	in	history,	saving	the	natives	against	themselves	
(mal-governance	and	corruption)	assumes	the	status	of	a	civilising	
mission.	 	And	 ideology	 remains	at	 the	centre	of	 that	mission	by	
way	 of	 the	 hegemonic	 perspective	 that	 sets	 aside	 the	 private	
sector’s	role	as	a	corruptor	in	corporate-dominated	governments	
while	proceeding	to	flagellate	the	public	sector,	particularly	under	
left-oriented	governments.	 	Transparency	 International,	 founded	
by	a	former	World	Bank	official,	allows	the	private	sector	to	largely	
define	the	“corruption	index”	for	their	respective	countries.125		Yet	
transparency	 in	 information	 in	 the	 profit-making	 world	 is	 itself	
suspect:	the	focus	on	the	public	sector	leaves	out	large	amounts	
of	key	information	increasingly	held	by	private	entities,	not	least	
thanks	to	the	massive	trend	toward	privatisation.		
As	public	services	are	placed	under	private	control	or	ownership	
in	varying	degrees	and	 forms,	or	under	 so	called	“public-private	
partnerships”	 (arrangements),	 the	 landscape	 of	 public	 access	
to	 information	 shifts,	 as	 indeed	 does	 the	 landscape	 of	 public	
power	and	public	control.	 	 Investor/state	disputes	acquire	a	new	
dynamic	 under	 such	 PPPs,	 leaving	 general	 public	 interests	 as	
considerations	 secondary	 to	 investor	 rights.	 	No	one	can	 ignore	
the	 fact	 that	 North/South	 international	 financial	 transactions	
are	 usually	 conducted	 in	 the	 context	 of	 grossly	 unequal	 power	
relations.		Powerful	parties	drive	processes	and	shape	agreements	
and	therefore	carry	more	of	the	responsibility	for	the	political	and	
economic	consequences	of	the	transactions.		Giving	more	power	
to	 international	 bodies	 and	“donors”	 is	 not	 the	 answer,	which	 is	
24 Ibid., p. 7.
2 “Transparencia Internacional: ¿Movimiento Anticorrupción o Instrumento 
Hegemónico?,” Inforpress Centroamericana, Informe Especial, November 24, 
200. 
why	 it	 is	 unacceptable	 to	 a	 number	 of	movements	 and	 groups	
in	the	South	to	advocate	the	use	of	aid,	loan	or	debt	cancellation	
conditionalities	to	ensure	“good	governance”	or	“fight	corruption.”	
In	addition,	only	ignorance	or	arrogance	would	lead	one	to	believe	
that	the	donor	governments	and	IFIs	are	genuinely	serious	about	
wanting	to	achieve	these	goals.126
Nonetheless,	the	fact	remains	that	business	must	also	be	subject	
to	international	human	rights	standards	and	that	the	state	cannot	
delegate	 its	 legal	 responsibilities.	 	There	 is	 growing	 recognition	
of	the	lack	of	effective	legal	regimes	and	institutions	for	holding	
companies	accountable.		The	UN’s	Office	of	the	High	Commissioner	
for	Human	Rights	has	named	a	Special	Representative	on	Human	
Rights	 and	 Transnational	 Corporations	 and	 other	 Business	
Enterprises	with	 the	mandate	 to	 strengthen	 the	protection	and	
promotion	of	human	rights	in	relation	to	business.	 	A	large	NGO	
coalition	writing	to	the	Special	Representative	underscored	that	
“while	states	are	the	primary	duty-holders	under	international	law,	
including	 human	 rights	 and	 humanitarian	 law,	 it	 should	 not	 be	
forgotten	 that	businesses	also	have	 responsibilities	under	 these	
legal	regimes.		Indeed,	as	part	of	their	obligations	to	protect	human	
rights	under	 their	 jurisdiction,	 states	are	under	a	duty	 to	ensure	
that	business	acts	accordingly…	calling	for	recommendations	as	
to	 how	 states	 can	 effectively	 regulate	 transnational	 businesses	
with	 regards	 to	 human	 rights,	 including	 through	 international	
cooperation.”127			
Although	more	efforts	are	being	made	to	insure	minimal	corporate	
accountability,	 and	 the	 public	 sector	 is	 reassuming	 its	 essential	
functions	 in	countries	such	as	Ecuador,	Bolivia	or	Venezuela,	 this	
continues	to	be	more	the	exception	than	the	rule,	as	democratic	
control	of	public	resources,	goods	and	services	remains,	for	now,	
ideologically	 unfashionable.	 	 As	 a	 reflection	 of	 the	 ideological	
hegemony,	 the	 international	 system	does	not	have	mechanisms	
to	stand	up	to	human	rights	and	environmental	damages	caused	
2 Lidy Nacpil, “Discussion Notes on Principles of “Responsible” Financing, 
Conditionalities v. Terms and Mutual Obligations,” unpublished.
27 Joint NGO response to interim report of the Special Representatives on Human 
Rights…, http://web.amnesty.org/library/ENGIOR000200 
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by	 transnational	 companies.	 	 There	 are	 a	 number	 of	 guidelines	
(namely	 OECD	 Guidelines	 for	 multinational	 enterprises,	 ILO	
Tripartite	 declaration	 of	 principles	 on	multinational	 enterprises,	
UN	Global	Compact),	but	these	are	merely	“voluntary,”	lacking	in	
judicial	structures	for	ensuring	their	enforcement.		Even	the	World	
Bank	was	forced	to	recognise	how,	in	some	“transition”	countries,	a	
process	of	what	it	terms	“state	capture”	has	taken	place,	perpetrated	
by	the	corporate	sector	acting	in	collusion	with	politicians.128	
28  State capture is defined as the “purchase” of law and policies by 
corporations.  Joel Hellman, Geraint Jones and Daniel Kaufmann, “Beyond the 
‘Grabbing Hand’ of Government in Transition: Facing up to ‘State Capture’ by 
the Corporate Sector,” Transition, World Bank/William Davidson Institute/SITE/
BOFIT  (2000).  
XI. Conclusions and Recommendations: 
Toward an Alternative Anti-Corruption Strategy
There	 is	no	agreement	on	what	constitutes	corruption,	 let	alone	
how	to	analyse	and	contest	it.		The	answer	to	what	are	the	causes	
of	corruption	depends	a	great	deal	on	the	paradigm	or	ideological	
preference	employed	by	the	inquisitor.	To	date,	perspectives	from	
the	neoliberal	school	dominate	analyses	and	discussion—that	is,	
corruption	 as	 a	manifestation	 of	 imperfect	 or	 black	markets,	 in	
turn	generated	by	excess	state	intervention.			The	more	the	state	
intervenes	 and	 the	more	 bureaucratic	 procedures	 it	 sets	 down,	
argues	this	view,	the	greater	the	propensity	for	“informal”	parallel	
markets	and	illicit	parallel	channels—the	seedbed	for	corruption	
and	 other	 illegal	 activities—to	 appear.	 	 The	 acclaimed	 French	
political	scientist	Yves	Meny	states:	“Those	who	are	not	convinced	
of	the	intrinsic	perversity	of	the	state	or	of	some	self-evident	merits	
of	the	market	will	emphasise	the	other	aspects:	the	weakening	of	
public	ethics,	the	de-legitimisation	of	the	state	as	the	incarnation	
of	the	public	interest,	the	dissolving	of	collective	values	in	favour	
of	profits	and	the	defence	of	selfish	and	private	interests.”129
One	gets	back	 to	definitions—corruption	as	 typified	 in	national	
and	international	legal	codes.		Jurists	seem	to	have	won	the	debate	
with	a	more	sociological/	political	economy	school	that	probably	
had	a	more	realistic	grasp	on	the	phenomenon.		Perhaps	this	was	
inevitable	given	the	contemporary	demand	for	precision	that	only	
codes	can	provide,	instructing,	say,	the	public	official	on	what	he/
she	can	or	 cannot	do.	 	 It’s	 a	 shame	 that	 the	 same	 insistence	on	
precision	does	not	by	and	large	apply	to	the	private	sector	where,	
as	we	 have	 argued,	 there	 are	 huge	 and	 still-growing	manmade	
loopholes.		
Sadly	the	entire	discussion	presupposes	the	weakness	of	private	
and	public	ethics.		Albert	Camus	probably	had	it	right:	“When	there	
129 Yves Meny, “Corrupción ‘fin de siglo’: Cambio, crisis y transformación de los 
valores,” www.unesco.org/issj/rics149/meny149.htm
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are	no	principles,	rules	are	needed.”		Yet	rules	and	laws	will	seldom	
be	up	to	the	standards	of	ethics—and	rightly	so.		If	corruption	is	
more	a	matter	of	ethics	than	of	legal	custom	then	it	follows	that	
existing	laws	will	never	be	able	to	criminalise	unethical	public	or	
private	behaviour.		A	strictly	juridical	approach,	argues	Yves	Mény,	
has	 the	 problem	 of	 leaving	 aside	 principles	 and	 ethical	 values,	
which	are	the	basis	of	the	laws	themselves.		The	forest	is	lost	for	the	
trees,	opening	up	considerable	leeway,	as	for	example	the	common	
European	practice	of	political	party	financing,	deemed	not	illegal	
by	 politicians	 who	 argued	 that	 since	 parties	 are	 necessary	 for	
democracy,	so	too	are	contributions.		Thus	when	a	party	came	to	
power	it	stood	to	reason	that	its	procurements	would	lean	towards	
the	contributing	businesses.		In	this	way	personal	corruption	could	
be	 condemned	 but	 corruption	 for	 the	 good	 of	 the	 party	 was	
acceptable.130		
As	neoliberalism	penetrates	the	ideological	and	moral	spheres,	the	
result	is	private	and	public	codes	that	today	will	equate	corruption	
with	 the	 legal	 and	 nothing	more.	 	 As	 Karl	 Polanyi	 pointed	 out	
decades	 ago,	 the	 historically	 specific	 “great	 transformation”	
(because	it	was	not	always	like	this	and	does	not	have	to	be	like	
this)	 took	 the	 form	 of	 the	 market	 imposing	 its	 own	 logic	 and	
justification	on	society,	where	ethics	and	the	social	have	become	
subordinated	to	economics	and	the	“free”	market.		How	convenient	
from	the	standpoint	of	private	profit-making	and	powerful	profit-
makers:	 if	they	can	control	rule-making—laws,	definitions—then	
the	limit	for	“non-corrupt”	activities	is	the	sky!			
Contemporary	 corporate	globalisation	has	magnified	 the	divide	
identified	by	Polanyi.	 	Emboldened	and	driven	by	the	possibility	
of	enhancing	profits,	the	private	practice	of	corruption	is	leaving	
behind	 even	 the	meek	public	 attempts	 to	 codify	 and	 outlaw	 it,	
particularly	 at	 the	 international	 level.	 	What	 is	 clear	 today,	 after	
at	 least	a	decade	of	experience,	 is	 that	global	neoliberal	 rules	of	
engagement,	 far	 from	being	 the	panacea	 for	 ending	 corruption	
as	 the	 ideologues	and	 the	G8	would	have	us	believe,	 is	 leading	
precisely	in	the	opposite	direction.		Globalisation	is	not	guilty	by	
130 See the examples cited by Yves Meny, “Corrupción ‘fin de siglo’: Cambio, crisis 
y transformación de los valores,” www.unesco.org/issj/rics149/meny149.htm
omission	 but	 by	 commission.	 	There	 is	 no	 reason	 to	 give	 it	 the	
benefit	 of	 the	 doubt—it	 was	 never	 a	 situation	 of	 transnational	
forces	 moving	 into	 uncharted	 lawless	 waters,	 but	 rather	 of	
deliberately	and	purposively	shaping	the	external	environment	to	
the	needs	and	interests	of	globalised	corporate	capital.
Therefore,	 corruption-laden	 globalisation	 is	 not	 impersonal	 or	
inevitably	development.	 	New	corruption-friendly	rules	continue	
to	be	created	by	new	actors	(albeit	upheld	by	the	same	powerful	
states)	 with	 only	 meagre	 advances	 in	 global	 regulation	 and	
penalisation	 from	 a	 non-market	 anti-corruption	 perspective.	
There	are	now	massive	“opportunities”	 to	practice	corruption,	as	
corruption	demand	and	supply	have	also	become	global.		National	
regulatory	frameworks,	already	inadequate,	are	increasingly	unable	
or	 unwilling	 to	 contain	 the	 activities	 of	 the	 international	 crime	
network	 and/or	 deal	 with	 illegitimate	 international	 economic	
practices.	 	With	 even	 fewer	 law	 enforcement	 resources,	 poorer	
countries	are	in	an	ever	more	disadvantageous	position	vis-à-vis	
powerful	corrupt	global	actors,	made	worse	by	a	North	demand	for	
deregulation	and	a	diminished	role	for	the	state.		While	the	national	
public	sector	and	public	ethics	are	rolled	back,	its	global	counter-
forces	seem	to	be	in	their	infancy	in	what	is	a	huge	imbalance	of	
forces	that	only	powerful	campaigns	can	hope	to	alter.			
Some	will	claim	that	corporate	behaviour	can	be	influenced	towards	
more	 socially-sensitive	 behaviour	 by	 ethical	 considerations;	 Bill	
Gates’	foundations	or	Kofi	Annan’s	Global	compact	come	to	mind.	
But	even	impartial	academic	specialists	are	not	convinced.	 	With	
respect	 to	 transnational	 corporations,	 Susan	 Rose	 Ackerman	
argues	that	“the	persistence	of	corruption	involving	such	important	
economic	actors	suggests	that	their	managers	and	owners	believe	
that	 it	 is	 economically	 beneficial,	 in	 spite	 of	 the	 costs	 to	 host	
countries	and	the	costs	to	the	reputation	of	global	businesses.”131	
Heavy	 public	 relations	 campaigning	 aside,	 the	 reality	 seems	 to	
be	 that	 neither	 short-	 nor	 long-term	 corporate	 profit-making	
131 Rose-Ackerman, Susan, “’Grand’ Corruption and the Ethics of Global Business” 
(October 1999). Yale Law School, Program for Studies in Law, Economics and 
Public Policy, Working Paper No. 22. http://ssrn.com/abstract=191352
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is	 concerned	 with	 avoiding	 corruption	 as	 an	 ethical	 issue,	 any	
more	than	it	seriously	addresses	environmental	or	human	rights	
considerations	 voluntarily.	 	 Despite	 some	 legal	 advances	 and	
campaigning	 around	 corporate	 social	 responsibilities,	 current	
international	efforts	to	reign	in	corruption	are	still	 inadequate—
and	the	inadequacy	is	in	no	small	degree	related	to	the	primacy	
given	to	an	ideological	insistence	on	the	“need”	to	remove	“external”	
constraints	on	business.		
Ironically,	our	understanding	of	 the	grand	globalised	corruption	
and	 the	 question	 of	 what	 is	 to	 be	 done	 leads	 us	 down	 a	 path	
similar	 to	 that	 suggested	 by	 the	 conventional	 anti-corruption	
campaigners.		We	agree	there	is	a	need	to	understand	the	incentives	
for	making	 and	 accepting	“payoffs,”	 be	 they	 institutionalised	 or	
personal,	 legalised	or	 not.	 	To	 change	 this	 one	must	proceed	 in	
two	directions,	one	of	which	 is	 to	 legally	 reduce	the	spaces	and	
“opportunities”	 that	 allow	 for	 illegitimate	 financial	 gain	 at	 the	
national	and	global	level.		The	pious	concern	of	donors	for	improved	
governance	 for	 nation	 states	 in	 the	 South	 should	 be	 matched	
with	an	equal	effort	to	end	global	mal-governance.		An	“enabling	
environment”	is	just	as	crucial	to	generating	genuine	reform	as	it	is	
to	generating	honest	investment.		Democracy	is	that	environment,	
particularly	democracy	as	a	process	that	shapes	and	is	shaped	by	
social	movements.	 	 Peoples’	 organisations,	 by	 their	 very	 nature,	
will	 tend	 to	 expose	 and	deal	with	 the	 causes	of	 corruption—as	
opposed	to	advocacy	groups	proposing	policy	measures	to	deal	
with	symptoms	of	that	phenomenon.		
The	 second	 parallel	 and	 reinforcing	 avenue	 is	 to	 engage	 in	
sustained	education	in	order	to	shift	the	attitudes	of	citizens	and	
politicians	 away	 from	 corrupt	 relationships,	 be	 they	personal	 or	
institutional.		Public	intolerance	and	hence	involvement	more	likely	
to	grow	out	of	people’s	recognition	that	corruption,	ill-conceived	
privatisation	 and	profit-mongering	help	 explain	why	 they	 don’t	
have	decent	public	 services)	Unfortunately,	 countries	North	and	
South	(and	particularly	 formerly	East)	continue	to	pay	dearly	 for	
the	implementation	of	Washington’s	early	pro-privatization	biases	
fundamentalism.		
Removing	incentives	and	policies	that	favour	corrupt	transactions	
is	 only	 a	 first	 step.	 	 Thereafter	 comes	 the	 reconstruction	 of	
public	attitudes	toward	the	exercise	of	state	power	 through	the	
formation	of	honest	and	trustworthy	democratic	representatives	
and	public	sector	officials.		Countries	such	as	Cuba	and	Venezuela,	
where	gross	abuses	by	the	private	sector	have	been	curbed,	are	
still	battling	continuing	manifestations	of	corruption	in	the	public	
sector.	 	Leaders	of	these	countries	had	the	courage	to	state	that	
public	sector	corruption	is	one	of	the	main	domestic	problems	if	
not	the	main	one.		Clearly	the	battle	against	corruption	is	ongoing	
and	in	many	senses	must	incorporate	the	need	to	continually	build	
and	renew	relationships	of	trust	and	democracy	between	citizens	
and	 officials.	 	 Organised	 public	 efforts	 to	 combat	 corruption	 in	
this	 sense	 are	 central	 to	 the	 task	 of	 deepening	 the	 practice	 of	
democracy.		Creating	a	state	whose	citizens	expect	and	receive	fair	
treatment,	not	only	from	officials	but	from	each	other,	constitutes	
a	 core	 part	 of	 any	 project	 for	 democratic	 social	 transformation.	
A	 strong	 anti-corruption	 ethos,	 fully	 contextualised	 in	 national	
and	global	realities,	is	a	key	to	turning	power	into	positive	social	
change.
The	struggle	against	corruption	and	for	clean	government	is	part	
and	parcel	of	an	ongoing	struggle	to	deepen	levels	of	democracy	
and	accountability	at	both	the	political	and	economic	levels.		Today,	
the	vast	increase	in	the	power	of	fewer	and	fewer	corporations	is	
the	 greatest	 threat	 to	 democratic	 governance	 and	 democracy.	
Corporate	 power,	 upheld	 and	 protected	 by	 the	 international	
financial	 and	 trading	order	 and	 represented	by	 the	 IFIs	 and	 the	
WTO,	is	bent	on	capturing	and	corrupting	not	only	governments	
but	also	societies.
More	whistle-blowing	is	required	on	the	ways	the	poorer	countries	
are	forced	to	engage	with	the	rich	ones	on	a	highly	tilted	(corrupt)	
playing	field	 that	 renders	 the	game	dishonest.	There	 is	no	 form	
of	 corruption	 worse	 than	 exploitation,	 and	 that	 includes	 the	
ways	 in	which	 corporations	 and	 rich	 countries	 secure	 access	 to	
cheap	raw	materials	and	labour.		Exploitation	by	the	rich	through	
their	economic	and	military	 superiority	negates	 the	possibilities	
0
FIGHTING CORRUPTION: A NON-CORPORATE PERSPECTIVE
0
FIGHTING CORRUPTION: A NON-CORPORATE PERSPECTIVE
of	 fair	 redistribution	 and	 achieving	 equitable	 environmentally	
sustainable	 development,	 if	 not	 democracy	 itself.	 	 Corruption	 is	
embedded	 in	 the	 very	 structures	 and	 processes	 where	 nations	
and	people	interact	or,	better	said,	exploit	and	are	exploited.		
Our	 vision	 of	 the	 anti-corruption	 struggle	 accepts	 the	 notion	
that	corruption	 is	also	a	matter	of	governance,	but	we	conceive	
of	 governance	 as	 a	 political	 matter,	 not	 a	 managerial	 and	
administrative	 one—which	 is	 to	 say	 that	 we	 place	 social	 and	
economic	 power	 relations,	 both	 within	 and	 outside	 of	 nation	
states,	at	the	core	of	the	discussion,	strategy	and	action	for	fighting	
corruption,	 as	 an	 empowering	 and	 transformational	 framework.	
For	 these	 reasons,	 anti-corruption	 initiatives	 should	 begin	 by	
examining	the	fundamental	dishonesty,	not	to	mention	injustice,	
of	the	multiple	mechanisms	of	exploitation	that	rob	people	of	the	
South	of	their	much	needed	resources.
Only	sustained	democratic	participation,	with	 full	accountability	
and	authority,	can	build	and	organise	consciousness	to	the	point	
where	 it	will	 confront	public	 and	private,	national	 and	 systemic,	
illegal	and	legalised	corruption.
Linking	up	with	both	national	and	international	social	movements	
will	be	critical	in	challenging	the	international	corporate	dimension	
that	weighs	so	heavily	and	with	full	impunity	upon	governments	
and	 citizens,	 particularly	 in	 the	 poorer	 countries.	 	 Only	 new	
alliances	 can	 effect	 changes	 in	 the	 global	 balance	 of	 forces	 to	
attack	 corruption	 in	 its	 economic,	 social	 and	 environmental	
manifestations.	 	 Changes	 in	 the	 balance	 of	 power	 between	
governments	 North	 and	 South,	 but	 also	 between	 organised	
popular	movements	and	 their	own	government	 forms	part	of	a	
strategy	 that	 will	 strengthen	 accountable	 democratic	 political	
entities	vis-à-vis	unaccountable	corporate	power.
Tackling	 systemic	 global	 corruption	 also	 means	 reducing	
corruption	 in	 the	North	 and	dealing	with	 patterns	 of	 corporate	
control	 of	 governance	 and	 decision-making	 there	 in	 order	 to	
make	a	 substantive	global	 contribution	 that	would	help	 further	
empower	 initiatives	 in	the	South.	 	Corporate	power	needs	to	be	
contested	at	home.
On	a	research	level,	there	is	a	need	to	scrutinise	the	nature	of	local	
elites,	how	they	are	formed	and	what	role	corporate	and	external	
agents—colonialism—play	 in	 fostering	 “national”	 patterns	 of	
corruption.	 	 	 In	 the	 final	 analysis,	 it	 is	 not	 a	 matter	 of	 simple	
transparency	 or	 good	 governance,	 or	 even	 of	 replacing	 venal	
government	officials,	but	of	demanding	sustainable	justice	in	the	
broader	 global	 context,	 recognising	 the	 inherent	 inequalities	 in	
the	international	trade	and	financial	system.
A	peoples’	 development	 agenda	would	begin	by	 exposing	 that	
“trade	 liberalisation”	 is	 in	 fact	 corrupt	 and	 anti-development,	
entailing	many	times	the	loss	of	control	over	local	resources,	capital	
and	indeed	sovereignty.		In	South	America	we	are	witnessing	the	
repudiation	 of	 corrupt	 illegitimate	 debts,	 re-nationalisation	 of	
resources	and	strategic	services,	along	with	the	reclaiming	of	rights	
to	land,	water,	seeds,	natural	resources,	livelihoods	and	culture.		The	
rules	of	trade	should	flow	from	such	sovereignty,	not	the	other	way	
around.		Bolivia’s	current	attempt	to	reclaim	its	nation	and	relate	its	
development	to	the	local	indigenous	cultures	is	important	in	this	
regard,	 as	 are	 the	Commercial	 Peoples	Agreements	 signed	with	
Venezuela	upholding	trade	concessions	based	on	solidarity.
Action	 is	urgently	 required	 to	plug	 the	 leaks	by	which	capital	 is	
flowing	 from	 South	 to	 North.	 	 South	 governments	 need	 to	 be	
pushed	(by	their	own	people,	not	by	expatriate	NGOs)	to	repudiate	
debts,	 better	 control	 and	 reverse	 the	 liberalisation	 of	 capital	
accounts	and	re-impose	domestic	performance	requirements	and	
profit	repatriation	restrictions	on	foreign	investment.	Campaigns	
need	 to	 work	 for	 the	 elimination	 of	 bank	 secrecy,	 the	 closing	
down	 of	 tax	 havens,	 and	 actions	 against	 financial	 institutions,	
accountancy	 &	 law	 firms	 and	 multinational	 businesses	 that	
facilitate	the	leakage	of	these	resources.		Action	also	needs	to	be	
taken	to	identify	and	repatriate	the	huge	amounts	transferred	by	
South	elites	to	tax	havens	and	financial	centres	in	the	North,	much	
of	 it	 illegal.	 	Reversing	 the	flight	of	capital	and	 reigning	 in	TNCs	
should	be	key	anti-corruption	concerns.
Further,	 if	 people	 link	 corruption	 to	 their	 own	 hunger	 and	
impoverishment,	an	anti-corruption	campaign	must	do	so	also.	This	
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is	precisely	why	an	effective	strategy	would	go	beyond	a	simple	
manipulation	 of	 anger	 for	 electoral	 reasons	 or	 mobilisation	 for	
mobilisations’	sake.		The	point	is	to	conceive	and	work	not	simply	
around	programmes	 and	politics,	 but	 to	 change	 the	 realities	 of	
life.	 	For	people	to	react	not	only	to	the	petty	corruption	that	so	
often	 surrounds	 them,	 but	 also	 to	 make	 the	 connections	 with	
the	 macroeconomic	 and	 global	 foundations	 of	 corruption	 and	
impoverishment.
For	that	mobilisation	to	take	place,	more	work	needs	to	be	done	
to	connect	and	build	consensus	among	the	different	civil	society	
groups	 working	 on	 development	 finance,	 debt,	 governance,	
transparency	and	corruption	 issues.	 	 	This	 is	 a	necessary	 step	 in	
the	direction	of	elaborating	joint	political	strategies.	 	 	The	 issues	
are	 structural	 but	 also	 ethical—if	 anti-corruption	 work	 teaches	
us	anything	it	is	to	ask	what	values	underpin	personal,	social	and	
institutional	behaviour.
An	anti-corruption	ethos	must	also	oblige	us	to	look	at	ourselves,	
our	 civil	 society	 organisations,	 reviewing	 our	 own	 levels	 of	
transparency	 and	 integrity.	 	 Then	 and	 only	 are	 we	 morally	
and	 organisationally	 equipped	 to	 identify	 and	 act	 upon	 more	
fundamental	 questions,	 i.e.	 to	 ask	 what	 drives	 individuals	 to	
commit,	 partake	 in	 or	 tolerate	 acts	 of	 corruption,	 and	 what	
motivates	 others	 to	 take	 action,	 to	 demand	 good	 government	
and	 partake	 in	 it.	 	 How	 does	 the	 presence	 of	 the	 chronically	
impoverished	 and	 disempowered	 shape	 our	 consciousness,	 our	
analysis	and	our	subsequent	behaviour?		How	did	things	get	this	
way,	how	did	such	a	small	percentage	of	people	in	the	world	come	
to	get	all	the	wealth	and	power	they	now	have?		How	were	corrupt	
structures	constructed?		How	will	they	be	dismantled?		What	will	
they	be	replaced	by?		Where	do	you	fit	in	this	picture?
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